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ABSTRACT 
Attempts to patent human genes by large biotechnology companies are 
viewed with intense suspicion within the wider community. Religious groups, 
indigenous peoples, scientists and even companies themselves are beginning 
to recognise that excessively broad patents on genes may be inappropriate. 
Research on human genes, on the other hand, is recognised as providing many 
benefits to society, particularly in the diagnosis and treatment of genetic 
diseases. Effective diagnosis and treatment will require considerable 
investment in research by biotechnology companies. Companies will not 
provide that investment without protection of the type usually afforded by the 
patent system. Tensions between the need for companies to patent their 
research and the perceived inappropriateness of patenting human genes have 
not yet been fully explored in Australia. My aim in this thesis is to explore 
these tensions and suggest means for reconciliation. 
The threads of the debate on patenting genes are difficult to unravel. 
Before a full assessment of the issues can be made, a description of the two 
highly technical areas of Australian patent law and genetics is required. I first 
provide those descriptive backgrounds, thereby establishing the framework 
around which the other issues can be assessed. 
1. The ethics of human genetic research. Regimes already exist outside the 
patent system for ethical scrutiny of all biomedical research, including human 
genetic research. 
Human genetic research also raises questions involving invasion of privacy 
and genetic discrimination, for which the law may not yet provide adequate 
safeguards. 
2. The role of commercialisation in human genetic research and its 
applications. 
Development of genetic products occurs within a competitive commercial 
environment. There is a need to moderate the excesses that might occur in a 
purely market-driven system. 
3. Patenting of human genetic material. 
Australian patent law principally requires: 
• 	an invention 
• full disclosure 
• commercial applicability 
• novelty and 
• an inventive step. 
Provided that these requirements are met human genetic material is 
patentable, apart from gene sequences of unknown function and naturally 
occurring sequences. 
Patent rights should not be confused with real property rights. Nor 
should human genes be confused with life and humanity. Patents merely 
provide a temporary right to exploit an invention, they do not imply 
ownership. Once this distinction is realised many of the ethical concerns are 
adequately addressed by the current system. I conclude by recommending that 
the tensions associated with patenting human genetic material can be resolved 
within the patent system, principally through limitations that already exist but 
are seldom used. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The science of genetics has changed radically over the last two decades 
since the advent of genetic engineering, which enables the identification, 
isolation and mass production of genes, whether they be from humans or from 
other species of animals or plants. What was until recently thought of as the 
province of science fiction is now mainstream genetic research, which has 
spawned a thriving new biotechnology industry. That industry has made 
major contributions to new and improved technologies in the areas of 
agriculture and pharmaceuticals. In the medical field, however, the 
biotechnological revolution has been slower to provide concrete 
improvements to existing techniques for the treatment of human genetic 
disease. Nevertheless, there is a distinct possibility that in the next two decades 
techniques which have their roots in biotechnology will become more 
routinely available for diagnosis and treatment of human genetic diseases and 
other more common diseases that have genetic components. These 
developments will have a number of consequences socially, economically and 
legally. 
Patents are now a recognised means by which investment in all areas of 
research and development is encouraged, by providing a limited and 
temporary right to exploit inventions and to licence others to do the same. 
However, whether patents are the appropriate mechanism for encouraging 
investment by the biotechnology industry in human genetic research is a 
matter of debate. On the one hand, it could be argued that commercialisation of 
human genetic research by the biotechnology industry is no different from the 
development and manufacture of drugs by the pharmaceutical industry. The 
aims of both are to supply products for the treatment of human ailments. 
Using this rationale, a human gene can be seen as just another chemical, which 
has very little to identify it as being intrinsically human or life-giving once it 
has been isolated from the body. In this respect, there is no reason why existing 
commercial practices including patenting should not play the same role as they 
would for any new drug or device. On the other hand, human genes, which are 
the chemical products that are employed in human genetic technology, are not 
simply man-made drugs but are things that already exist in nature in all 
humans. It has been argued that the sum total of human genes - the human 
genome - is so much a part of human identity that it should be shielded from 
all commercial practices. 1 On this basis, human genetic research should not be 
commercially exploited. Some justification for such a conclusion is provided by 
the general abhorrence of commercial transactions in human body parts in 
many jurisdictions. The tension between these two extreme viewpoints is 
obvious, and reconciliation is becoming more urgent as the influence of 
patenting grows and at the same time the voices of those opposed to patenting 
of human genetic material gain in strength. 
At its most extreme, the anti-patenting lobby would seek to exclude from 
patenting all inventions derived from living material. In 1995, for example, 
representatives of over 80 different faiths and denominations in the USA 
declared their opposition to patenting of genetically engineered animals and 
human genes, cells and organs on the basis that humans and animals are the 
creations of God not humans and as such should not be patented as human 
inventions. 2 Subsequently a group of scientists, clergy and activists met in the 
Blue Mountains in the USA and proposed the Blue Mountains Declaration: 
"The humans, animals microorganisms and plants comprising life on earth are part of 
the natural world in which we are born, The conversion of these life forms, their 
molecules or parts into corporate property through patent monopolies is counter to the 
interests of the peoples of the world. 
No individual, institution, or corporation should be able to claim ownership over 
species or varieties of living organisms. Nor should they be able to hold patents on 
organs, cells, genes or proteins, whether naturally occurring, genetically altered or 
otherwise modified." 3 
More importantly, specific concerns have also been expressed about patenting 
of human genes and cell lines and methods of medical treatment. 
The practical value of such views is dubious for three key reasons. First, 
from an economic perspective, governments will be loathe to exclude 
inventions which use human genetic material from patenting if it means that 
they are likely to lose lucrative biotechnology industries to other countries 
1 	Note UNESCO's Revised Outline of a Declaration on the Human Genome and its Protection 
in Relation to Human Dignity and Human Rights (1995), which provides in Article 1 that 
the human genome should be part of the common heritage of humanity. 
2 	Stone, R., "Religious leaders Oppose Patenting Genes and Animals" (1995) 268 Science 1126. 
3 	This part of the Blue Mountains Declaration was extracted in a letter to Science: Bereano, 
P.L., "Genetic Patents" (1996) 271 Science 14. 
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which continue to offer adequate forms of protection. Even if international 
agreement were reached on this matter, biotechnology patenting havens would 
continue to exist. Secondly, although democratic governments have an 
obligation to follow the will of the majority, there is no convincing evidence 
that the position outlined above is a majority viewpoint. For example, the 
Institute of Theological Studies in Berkeley has been quoted as saying, in 
response to the Blue Mountains Declaration, that for religious leaders to think 
that they have made a contribution to social justice by. such statements is "a 
form of blindness in the middle of seeing". 4 Thirdly, I suggest that objections to 
the use of patents in human genetic research and clinical practice are open to 
challenge because they are based on five faulty premises: 
• that patent rights over a gene or gene sequence equate with ownership of 
the gene in its tangible form; 
• that human genes are equated with life and humanity; 
• that the patent system has a primary regulatory role in human genetic 
research; 
• that patenting of human genetic material implies that all aspects of its 
commercialisation are appropriate; 
• that by allowing patenting of some aspects of human genetic material, it 
follows that there are no limitations on what is patentable. 
I aim to show during the course of this thesis that none of these 
premises can survive close scrutiny. My argument is that there are strong 
ethical justifications and sound public health reasons for encouraging human 
genetic research and its clinical applications, provided that appropriate 
safeguards are in place to ensure both that appropriate ethical consideration is 
given to each case and that fundamental human rights are protected. The 
patent system has much to offer in achieving this end by providing the 
necessary incentive to the business community to invest in that research and 
practice. But it must be recognised that there is an inevitable tension between 
needs and goals of the business sector on the one hand and of academic science 
and the health care system on the other. The dominant measure of success of a 
company is seen in terms of profit margin, whereas the health care system has 
to take into account basic ethical principles requiring that the welfare of the 
individual patient and of the community as a whole are given due recognition. 
4 	In Straus, J., "Intellectual Property Issues in Genomic Research" (1996) 3(3) Genome Digest 
1. 
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Commercial considerations have also been secondary to the scientific 
community, given that academic excellence is both the dominant measure of 
success and the primary criterion for research funding. 
It is no longer the case that academia and health care are entirely 
immune from commercial considerations. Academic funding bodies now look 
more favourably on research that has economic implications and that can be 
linked to industry. Health care systems have also been affected by 
commercialisation in the supply of pharmaceuticals and medical devices. Yet 
neither the health care system nor the scientific academy should ignore the 
fundamental premises on which they are based. This tension between health 
care and pure scientific research on the one hand and commercialisation on 
the other is nowhere more obvious than in human genetic research. The 
public purse is simply not capable of fully supporting this expensive and risky 
research. Commercial interests will only be prepared to contribute, however, if 
their investment can be recouped, and provision of the appropriate security 
will inevitably increase the economic pressures placed on science and on the 
health care system. 
The objections that have been voiced against patenting of human 
genetic material warrant mention and will be discussed more fully in Chapter 1 
of this thesis. My argument, however, is that there are other more real and 
pressing issues that must be resolved in relation to commercialisation of 
human genetic research and patenting of human genetic material. I explore 
these issues in the next five chapters by presenting a comprehensive analysis of 
each of the elements that are needed to construct the proper framework upon 
which to base an informed conclusion, namely: 
• the patent system (Chapter 2); 
• the research and clinical practice of human genetics (Chapter 3); 
• ethics and regulation of that research and clinical practice (Chapter 4); 
• the role of commercialisation in research and practice (Chapter 5); and 
• the extent to which human genetic material can be patented (Chapter 6). 
In the final chapter I will build upon this framework to support my 
arguments as to the appropriateness of the existing system for patenting 
human genetic material. My thesis is that there is no requirement for 
wholesale modification of the system, but that refinement of the limitations 
already existing within the patent system will suffice. The thesis ends with a 
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series of fourteen key conclusions, the aim of which is to provide a more 
balanced system for achieving the goals of encouraging investment in research 
and at the same time protecting the public interest.5 
To the best of my knowledge the law is as stated to 1st January 1997. 
5 	Some of the work presented in this thesis has already appeared in print. See Nicol, D., 
"Should Human Genes Be Patentable Under the Australian Patent System?" (1996) 3 
Journal of Law and Medicine 231; Chalmers, D.R.C. and D. Nicol, "Current Regulation of 
Human Genetic Research and ' Therapy in Australia" (1996) Proceedings from the 
International Turku Symposium on Genetic Ethics, Doing the Decent Thing with Genes, 9-11 
August 1995, 82; Chalmers, D.R.C. and D, Nicol "Take Two Genes a Day" (1997)Today's 
Life Science, in press All of the material extracted from these papers is solely the work of 
the author. Background work for the first paper was initiated in an undergraduate course 
on intellectual property, undertaken by the author in partial fulfilment of the degree of 
Bachelor of Laws. 
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CHAPTER 1: SETTING THE SCENE 
Before I begin my analysis of patenting human genetic material in 
Australia it is necessary to place the topic within the appropriate context. For 
this reason I include in this chapter a review of the objections to patenting of 
human genetic material, which cart be separated into three broad themes: 
• that life in any form should not be patented; 
• that human genes and cells should not be patented; and 
• that methods of medical treatment should not be patented. 
Part 1: 	Patenting of Life Forms 
Legally, inventions derived from living material are generally 
considered to be patentable, and there are numerous examples of such patents. 
One of the earliest cited examples was a patent for a biologically pure culture of 
yeast, granted to Louis Pasteur in 1873.1 Accordingly, the fact that genes and 
gene sequences are derived from living material is not an adequate argument 
to deny them patentability through existing patent law. Although the Blue 
Mountains Declaration seeks to prevent patenting of all living material, the 
main debate in this area from both the ethical and legal perspective has been 
associated with the narrower issue of the extent to which whole living 
organisms can and should be patentable inventions. Although these objections 
to patenting of whole living organisms are not directly relevant to my analysis 
of the patentability of human genetic material, they warrant some 
consideration because of their intensity and their close linkage to the debate on 
patenting of human genes. Some commentators have expressed surprise that 
this issue has been the subject of more public and legal discussion than the 
patenting of human genes. 2 I suggest that this is perhaps more to do with 
ignorance of the extent to which human genes have been patented than a 
genuine greater concern about animal and plant patents. 
1 	Cited by Thomson, J.A., Biopatenting the Splice of Life: A Consideration of the Interface 
between Biotechnological Inventions and Patent Law (1994) Ph.D. Thesis, University of 
Western Australia, at 92. 
2 	See, for example, Moufang, R., "Patenting of Human Genes, Cells and Parts of the Body? - 
The Ethical Dimensions of Patent Law" (1994) 25 IIC 487. 
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1.1 The Law 
It is well established in patent law that whole living organisms can be 
patented. The seminal US Supreme Court case of Diamond v Chakrabarty 3 was 
the first instance in which a court recognised that living organisms themselves, 
just as much as non-living things, were patentable. That decision has been 
generally accepted both in the USA and other jurisdictions. In Australia living 
organisms are considered to be patentable by the Patent Office, 4 although the 
issue has not yet received judicial consideration in the courts. Living organisms 
are not expressly excluded from patenting in any jurisdiction.5 
Microorganisms that have been modified by genetic engineering can 
satisfy the criteria for patenting and many already have been patented. The 
position is less clear for genetically engineered higher organisms. Although 
most genetic engineering involves the insertion of genes into bacteria or cell 
lines, the technology now exists to insert a gene from one species into another, 
to produce a so-called "transgenic". 6 Transgenics play a major role in 
agriculture. They can be made to have resistance to particular viral infections, 
or to grow faster than normal, or to produce better quality products. Transgenics 
are also valuable tools in biomedical research, in the study of human disease, 
and in pharmaceuticals, where they are used to produce therapeutic proteins 
required for the treatment of disease in far larger quantities than can be 
produced by other means. 7 This technique is commonly referred to as 
3 	206 USPQ 193 1980. The law in this area is discussed more fully in Chapter 6, section 1.1.2. 
4 	In Rank Hovis McDougall Ltd's Application (1976) 46 AOJP 3915, for example, a patent 
was granted by the Assistant Commissioner of Patents for a new strain of micro-organism 
that could be used in a process for the production of an edible protein. 
5 	Crespi, S., "The EC Directive on Biotechnology Patents - An Evaluation of the Ethical, 
Social and Political Objections" (1992) 4 Intellectual Property in Business 17. 
6 
	
	Office of Technology Assessment, Transgenic Animals (1988), cited in Dresser, R., "Ethical 
and Legal Issues in Patenting New Animal Life" (1988) Jurimetrics Journal 399 at 405. 
7 Erythropoietin, for example, is an important protein in the production of red blood cells. A 
cell line has been genetically modified to produce large quantities of erythropoietin, 
which can be harvested and used in the treatment of anaemia. Amgen Inc holds the patent 
for the erythropoietin gene sequence: US Patent No 4,703,008, referred to in Maebius, S.B., 
"Novel DNA Sequences and the Utility Requirement: the Human Genome Initiative" 
(1992) Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society 651. 
2 
"pharming" of human proteins. 8 Patents have been granted for transgenic 
animals in Australia and the USA, 9 and the US Commissioner of Patents and 
Trademarks Office expressly considers them to be patentable. 113 In Europe 
patents may be valid for some transgenic higher organisms, but certain 
additional criteria must be satisfied in relation to public order and morality, 
biological processes and animal or plant varieties. 11 
1.2 Objections to Patenting of Living Organisms 
Objections to patenting of higher living organisms (particularly animals) 
fall into two main categories: first objections to animal patenting per se; 
secondly, and more importantly here, objections based on slippery slope 
arguments that once animals can be patented then so too will humans or 
human-animal hybrids. 12 
1.2.1 Living Organisms 
The objection to patenting of higher living organisms can be subdivided 
into what have been referred to as the deontological argument that patenting of 
animals is inherently wrong, and the instrumentalist argument which focuses 
on the indirect harmful effects of patenting on society. 13 The first argument 
carries little weight if it is put in the context of past practice. Animals have been 
See Dresser at 407-409; Manspeizer, D., "The Cheshire Cat, the March Hare, and the 
Harvard Mouse: Animal Patents Open Up a New Genetically-Engineered Wonderland" 
(1991) 43 Rutgers Law Review 417, at 423-428. 
9 	Lane, M.J., "Patenting Life: Responses of Patent Offices in the US and Abroad" (1991) 32 
furimetrics Journal 89. 
10 Commissioner's Notice 17 April 1987, 1077 OG 24, cited in Armitage, R.A., 'The Emerging 
US Patent Law for the Protection of Biotechnology Research Results" [1989] European 
Intellectual Property Review 47; also cited in Dresser. 
11 	Respectively, Articles 53(a) (public order/morality), 53(b) (biological processes and 
animal and plant varieties) of the European Patent Convention 1973. The case law 
considering these provisions will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
12 	Hoffmaster, B., "The Ethics of Patenting Higher Life Forms" (1988) 4 Intellectual Property 
Journal 1. 
13 Dresser, R., "Ethical and Legal Issues in Patenting New Animal Life" (1988) Jurimetrics 
Journal 399. 
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subject to human ownership and commerce for centuries and as such it is 
difficult justify the singling out of patenting as an undesirable form of 
commercialisation. 
With regard to the second instrumentalist argument, the perceived 
harmful effects on society of patenting higher organisms can be seen as four key 
issues. 
• Costs to small farmers are likely to increase because of royalty or licence 
payments for use of patented animal or seed stock. 
• Biodiversity may decrease through the dominant use of a few favoured 
transgenic animals and plants. 
• There are inherent dangers associated with the release of genetically 
modified organisms. 
• Animal suffering may be increased. It has been shown, for example, that a 
transgenic pig that has been patented in Australia has the advantage that 
grows quickly because it possesses the gene for human growth hormone. 
But it also is prone to arthritis and poor vision and dies prematurely. 14 
Another example is the Harvard onco-mouse, which was created specifically 
to develop cancers. 
Counterarguments have been presented in the literature against each of 
these concerns. 
• Increased productivity, made possible through the use of genetically 
modified organisms, may outweigh the costs associated with licence fees. 15 
The increased costs currently faced by small farmers are more probably a 
direct consequence of economic policy than of patenting. 16 The important 
issue is to ensure that farmers have access to, and are encouraged to employ 
new technological developments. 
• Patenting may actually increase biodiversity by encouraging the marketing 
of new strains of plants and animals. 
• The patent system is not the appropriate forum to assess safety issues. A ban 
on patenting will not alleviate concerns associated with the use of 
14 	Ibid., at 422. 
15 Kulseth, R.A., "Biotechnology and Animal Patents: When Someone Builds a Better Mouse" 
(1990) 32 Arizona Law Review 691. 
16 	Hoffmaster, B., The Ethics of Patenting Higher Life Forms" (1988) 4 Intellectual Property 
Journal 1. 
4 
genetically modified organisms. Safety should be ensured and controlled by 
the relevant regulatory agency. 17 
• Stringent regulation is in place in most jurisdictions aimed at ensuring that 
animal suffering is kept to a minimum. The suffering of animals has been 
deemed by the European Patent Office to be acceptable provided that the 
benefit to humans is calculated to outweigh that suffering. 18 
These arguments and counterarguments exemplify many of the 
confusions in the debate, the focus of which is not on patenting per se, but on 
concerns that are more generally associated with genetic engineering and with 
its commercialisation. The same confusions exist in the objections to patenting 
of human genetic material. I will emphasise throughout the body of this thesis, 
that those objections are based on faulty premises and in this form they are not 
sufficiently convincing to justify a change in patent policy. The position of the 
Australian Federal Government in this regard is clearly and emphatically pro-
patenting. In 1992, a major report commissioned by the Federal Government 
was published. 19 All of the arguments opposing patenting were rejected in the 
report and no justification could be found to deny patent rights to the 
biotechnology industry. The Committee expressed the view that the Patents Act 
was not the place for hindering or preventing the development of technologies 
to which society might have an objection. 
1.2.2 The Slippery Slope 
With respect to the slippery slope argument that patenting of animals 
will inevitably lead to patenting of humans, the Australian Patents Act 1990 
explicitly prohibits patenting of humans and biological processes for their 
17 The relevant regulations in the USA are set out in Lauroesch, M.W., "Genetic Engineering: 
Innovation and Risk Minimisation" (1988) 57 The George Washington Law Review 100, at 
117-118. 
18 These are the criteria used by the European Patent Office in its interpretation of Article 
53(a) of the EPC. See, for example, Re Harvard College (President and Fellows) (Decision 
T 19/90) [1990] OJEPO 476. 
19 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, 
Genetic Manipulation: The Threat or the Glory (1992) AGPS. See particularly Chapter 7: 
Legal Issues. Part A Property Rights - The Patenting of Living Organisms. 
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generation. 20 Few other countries state the prohibition so explicitly, but it is 
generally accepted as being implicit in their laws. In the USA, for example, 
patenting has been said by the Commissioner of the US Patents and 
Trademarks Office to be contrary to the Constitution. 21 
The slippery slope argument cannot be dismissed without some 
consideration of human-animal hybrids. Some commentators see the 
production of such creatures through genetic engineering as "a very real 
possibility".22 The realisation of that possibility depends on what is meant by 
the term. Certainly it is now quite possible to insert human genes into embryos 
or cell lines of other species, and to patent the cell line, the animal, and the 
protein expressed by the gene or the process. Few human genes are used in such 
techniques, which makes it difficult to argue that the animal or cell line has any 
intrinsic "humanness". It has been suggested, however, that it may be possible 
to produce and patent near-humans or sub-humans by embryo fusion. This 
technique involves the introduction of embryonic human cells into the 
embryo of a non-human. The creature produced would manifest both human 
and animal traits, and could therefore be described as having human attributes. 
Although this technique has met with some success, for example in the fusion 
of embryonic cells from sheep and goats to produce hybrids known as geeps, 23 
there are no plans for it ever to be used to create human-animal hybrids. It will 
become obvious from my analysis of the regulation of human genetic research 
in Chapter 4 of this thesis that the existing regulatory framework would never 
allow experiments of that type to take place, because they are contrary to 
fundamental ethical principles. 24 To raise them as possibilities obscures more 
20 	In section 18(2). 
21 Commissioner's Notice 17 April 1987, 1077 OG 24, cited in Armitage, R.A., "The Emerging 
US Patent Law for the Protection of Biotechnology Research Results" [1989] European 
Intellectual Property Review 47. 
22 See, for example, Kulseth, R.A., "Biotechnology and Animal 'Patents: When Someone 
Builds a Better Mouse" (1990) 32 Arizona Law Review 691, at 708. 
23 See Dresser, R., "Ethical and Legal Issues in Patenting New Animal Life" (1988) 
Jurimetrics Journal 399, at 406. 
24 The less invasive procedures of insertion of single genes into the human germ line and 
cloning of human embryos are generally considered to be ethically unacceptable and are 
prohibited, see Chapter 4. Dresser, however, presents arguments suggesting that such a 
possibility should not be dismissed totally, at 415. Professor Ricketson has also expressed 
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pressing ethical debates, including those associated with access to human 
genetic information and access to human genetic tissue. 
Part 2: 	Patenting of Methods of Medical Treatment 
Patents have, for many years, been available for products used in medical 
treatment. At the same time, there has been some doubt as to the extent to 
which the methods used in that treatment should themselves be patentable. 
2.1 The Law 
In all jurisdictions it is well recognised that patent claims can be made 
both for inventive products and for inventive processes. In the area of medical 
treatment, although the products used in treatment are considered to be 
patentable, this has not always been the case for methods of treatment. 25 In 
Europe the exclusion for methods of medical treatment remains in force 
through Article 52(4) of the European Patent Convention. The GATT TRIPS 
Agreement also allows members to exclude "diagnostic, therapeutic and 
surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals".26 The exclusion is 
not recognised in the USA and appears to have been discarded in Australia in 
the decision of the Full Federal Court in Anaesthetic Supplies v Rescare. 27 This 
means that certain patents would be valid in the USA and Australia but not in 
Europe. In the area of human genetics, both diagnostic and therapeutic 
treatment methods could come within the ambit of the exclusion.28 
2.2 Ethical Considerations 
The justification for the exclusion is primarily based on ethics, that 
doctors should not be faced with patent infringement actions for performing 
their duties using the best available methods. In Australia the majority view of 
concern over the difficulties in distinguishing between humans and non-humans: Ricketson, 
S., "The Patentability of Living Organisms" (1984). In: D.J. Galligan (ed.) Essays in Legal 
Theory, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, chapter 5. 
25 	See Chapter 6, sections 1.1.3 and 1.3.2. 
26 	Article 27(3). 
27 	Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 28 IPR 383. 
the Full Federal Court in Rescare was that the Court would not entertain 
arguments for exclusion for methods of medical treatment based on ethics, and 
that it would be for Parliament to act, if it is necessary to do so. 29 The matter 
hinges on the clash between the need for economic incentives to take an 
invention to the stage of clinical application versus the undesirability of 
bringing commercial pressures to bear in areas that many believe should be 
immune from such considerations. Commercialisation of health care raises 
questions as to the basic Tights of members of the community to autonomy and 
privacy, and potential problems of conflict of interest for health care providers. 
Further, there may be a number of undesirable effects on the doctor patient 
relationship. The best interests of the patient, the confidentiality of the doctor 
patient relationship and the autonomy of the doctor are all put at risk. 
The commentators are divided on the question of whether these 
undesirable features are outweighed by the desirability of encouraging 
innovation in medical practice. Both Burch30 and McCoy31 believe that they 
are, Loughlan32 does not. According to Burch, patents will only be available for 
methods of medical treatment in specialist areas which require great economic 
investment, and in such cases, the balance is in favour of providing economic 
incentive. If this is the case then the considerations should be no different than 
for patenting of the products used in medical treatment. It is a recognised fact 
that doctors are put under considerable pressure by commercial interests to 
favour their products over other brands. Trust is placed in doctors to be able to 
withstand such sorts of pressure. I can see little justification in distinguishing 
processes and products. In either case the duty of the doctor is to use the best 
tools that are available to discharge their duty to exercise reasonable skill and 
care in the treatment of the patient. 
28 The case law concerning the exclusion in both Australia and Europe is discussed in some 
detail in Chapter 6. 
29 See the judgments of Lockhart and Wilcox JJ in Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd 
(1994) 28 IPR 383. 
30 Burch, G.F., "Ethical Considerations in the Patenting of Medical Processes" (1987) 65 Texas 
Law Review 1139. 
31 	McCoy, T.J., "Biomedical Process Patents Should They Be Restricted by Ethical 
Limitations?" (1992) 13 Journal of Legal Medicine 501. 
32 Loughlan, P., "Of Patents and Patients: New Monopolies in Medical Methods" (1995) 6 
Australian Intellectual Property Journal 5. 
Part 3: 	Patenting of Human Cell Lines and Genes 
Opposition to patenting of human cell lines and genes has, until 
recently, been less vocal than the opposition to patenting of whole living 
organisms. That situation is now changing. The specific arguments against 
patenting of genes and cell lines may well be more convincing here than in the 
more general area of living material. 
3.1 The Law 
Cell lines and genes of known function are susceptible to patenting. A 
large number of patents have been granted which include in their claims 
human cell lines or genes, and challenges to their validity have not yet met 
with success. In Europe, for example, opposition proceedings were brought 
against the Australian Howard Florey Institute for its European patent on the 
H2-relaxin gene. 33 The proceedings were brought by Green members of the 
European Parliament who urged the Opposition Division of the European 
Patent Office to accept their argument that the patent was contrary to the 
immorality provision in Article 53(a) of the European Patent 
Convention. 34The Greens argued that the patent was an affront to human 
dignity, and could be equated with patenting of life and slavery. The Board 
refused to accept any of these arguments on the bases that: use of donated 
ovarian tissue to extract the gene was no more immoral than use of donated 
blood as a source of life saving substances; DNA is not life; ownership of the 
patent is not akin to slavery because it does not give the owner any right over 
the human donor, but merely the right to prevent others from practising the 
same invention outside the human body. Further, in relation to the more 
specific argument that patenting of genes was, of itself, contrary to Article 53(a), 
it was held that there was no public consensus that human genes should not be 
patented and therefore it was not appropriate to exclude them. 
No jurisdiction other than the European Union and its member States 
has express provision for consideration of morality issues. Patent law in all 
33 	Relaxin [1995] OJEPO 388. 
34 Article 53(a) excludes from patenting inventions, the exploitation of which would be 
contrary to "ordre publique" or morality. 
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jurisdictions does place other restrictions on patenting of genes and cell lines. 
All patent applications must fulfil the essential patenting criteria, which are 
discussed in Chapter 2. Naturally occurring cells, genes and gene sequences fail 
because they are discoveries rather than inventions, although isolation from 
their natural environment may be enough to constitute an invention. Patent 
law further excludes gene sequences of unknown function, because they lack 
commercial applicability. 35 Other patent applications which include genes, gene 
sequences or cells may also fail for want of novelty or inventive step or other 
essential criteria. 
3.2 Acceptability of Research v Acceptability of Patenting 
Public concerns associated with patenting genes fall into two parts, 
objections to the types of human genetic research that are being conducted on 
the one hand and to their patenting on the other. A number of surveys have 
indicated general support for human genetic research, and particularly gene 
therapy because it offers the possibility of alleviating suffering caused by genetic 
disease. 36 There has been much less public disquiet about these issues than 
genetic engineering of plants and animals. 
The fact that a particular form of experimentation is ethically acceptable 
does not necessarily mean that it is also patentable. Although the 
transplantation of human organs is now a commonly-used medical treatment, 
commercial dealings in human organs are generally regarded with abhorrence, 
and legislation is in place in many jurisdictions which treats such dealings as 
crimes. 37 The same considerations apply to dealings in human embryos and 
g am e t es. 38 It is unclear, however, whether this prohibition extends to 
commercial dealings with all of the component parts of humans.39 Arguably 
the patenting of any invention derived from the human body conflicts with the 
notion that humans cannot be the subject of property rights or commercial 
dealings. The pro-patenting lobby strongly refutes this suggestion on the basis 
35 These critical issues will be discussed more fully in Chapter 6. 
36 For example, Macer, D., "Public Acceptance of Human Gene Therapy and Perceptions of 
Human Genetic Manipulation" (1992) 3 Human Gene Therapy 511. 
37 For example, Human Organ Transplants Act 1989 (UK) 
38 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (UK) 
39 	See Nuffield Council on Bioethics Human Tissue Ethical and Legal Issues (1995) at 82. 
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that it is not the human body part that is being patented, but the invention that 
is derived from that body part, either in the form of a product or process. 
3.3 Objections to Patenting of Genes and Cell Lines 
The opposition to patenting of human genes is growing and becoming 
more broadly based. Patenting of inventions associated with human cell lines 
and genes engenders strong personal feelings within the population, for 
precisely the reasons stated in the Greens' arguments in the Relaxin case." 
People do equate patents on genes with ownership of life. The extreme 
response elicited by patent applications for cell lines derived from indigenous 
peoples in a number of countries is testimony to this concern. 
An early attempt by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in the USA 
to patent a cell line derived from a member of the Guyami tribe in Panama was 
discovered in a routine check on patent applications by the Rural 
Advancement Foundation International (RAFI), which is a private Canadian 
organisation whose aim is the monitor the extent of patenting in agriculture. 
RAFI publicised the matter widely and brought it to the attention of the 
Guyami people. The World Health Organisation and other international bodies 
were lobbied, and ultimately the NIH patent application was withdrawn. More 
recently, however, a patent has been granted for a cell line derived from a 
member of the Hagahai tribe in Papua New Guinea, and other similar patents 
are pending. The Hagahai patent is for, inter alia, "a human T-cell line (PNG-1) 
persistently infected with a Papua New Guinea (PNG) HTLV-1 variant and the 
infecting virus (PNG-1 variant)".41 It offers the potential for vaccine 
development and therefore has important implications both therapeutically 
and commercially. 42 
Terms such as biopiracy have been used to describe the actions of the 
NIH, because, it is claimed, the permission of neither the PNG government nor 
40 Relaxin [1995] OJEPO 388. 
41 US Patent Number 05397696. 
42 Note, however, that to date the patent appears not to have been a commercial success. 
This may well have led to a reported decision by the NIH to abandon the patent: "US to 
Surrender Hagahai Patent?" (1996) GenEthics News September-October, 1. 
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the Hagahai people was sought.43 Others have argued that the Flagahai were in 
fact consulted by Dr. Carol Jenkins, one of the patentees. She is an 
anthropologist who has studied with the Hagahai for over ten years and is 
employed by the PNG Medical Research Institute. She claims that the Hagahai 
consented to patenting of the cell line, and further that they were offered and 
accepted a 50% share of the royalties flowing from the patent." Irrespective of 
the correct factual circumstances, the RAFI disclosures have brought patenting 
human cell lines to the public's attention. 
The issue of patenting cell lines from indigenous peoples is associated 
with two other more far-reaching problems. The first is associated with the 
commercialisation of donated tissue. 45 There are no requirements at present in 
patenting legislation that people who donate material which is subsequently 
used as a substratum for a patentable invention should either be consulted with 
reference to the patent application, or should have a right to a share in the 
profits from the patent. According to Moore's case," if the commercial 
potential of the tissue is known at the time of removal, and not disclosed, this 
may lead to infringement of informed consent requirements or breach of 
fiduciary duty. But this will not, of itself, either void the patent or create a right 
to a share in the profits. Some have argued that irregularities in the acquisition 
of tissue should be considered by patent authorities when granting a patent,47 
but for the time being there is no express requirement to do so. The same 
considerations apply whether the tissue is derived from first or third world 
peoples. 
The second problem is that a number of developing countries are rich 
sources of unique plant and animal varieties which are being exploited by large 
biotechnology companies from the developed world. The patenting of those 
peoples' own cell lines is perceived by them as being one further layer of 
43 See, for example, RAFI, "New Questions About Management and Exchange of Human 
Tissues at NIH Indigenous Person's Cells Patented" [1996] RAFI Communique March/April 
1,2. 
44 	Taubes, G., "Scientists Attacked for 'Patenting' Pacific Tribe" (1995) 270 Science 1112. 
45 Note that this issue is discussed more fully in Chapter 4. 
46 	Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 51 Cal. 3d 120. 
47 For example Bently, L. and B. Sherman, "The Ethics of Patenting: Towards a Transgenic 
Patent System" (1995) 3 Medical Law Review 275, at 290. 
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exploitation. There are important reasons why the exploitation of those 
resources, whether in the form of seed stocks or human cell lines, should 
continue. For example, indigenous plant varieties may have resistance to 
microbial attack, or may have medicinal properties, and human cell lines may 
have immunity to particular diseases. In this particular area, the whole 
research base could be undermined by objections to patenting irrespective of 
whether they are based on the right or wrong premises. Thus it may become 
necessary to remove commercial influences and limit the effect of patents in 
order to provide the right incentive to encourage indigenous groups to allow 
the research to proceed. The views expressed by Maori and Pacific Islander 
groups at a recent Health Research Council of New Zealand conference, 
Whose Genes Are They Anyway? are instructive. 
"Maori at the conference support genetic research and application that enhances the 
quality of life for Maori as defined by Maori. Any genetic research and application 
with Maori must occur within the paradigms of a Maori world view. 
Maori who attended both the Hui at Takapuwahia and the conference were 
unanimous that tissue and other body material taken from Maori belongs to Maori. 
Maori must always be in a position to make informed decisions as to how their genetic 
material is or can be used."'" 
3.4 Endorsement of Patenting Genes 
On the other side of the debate, the international Human Genome 
Organisation has endorsed patenting of human genetic information, apart from 
DNA sequences of unknown function. 49 A wide range of other organisations, 
including the British National Academies Policy Advisory Group, 50 the 
European Group of Advisers on Ethical Implications of Biotechnology 51 and 
48 Report of the HRC Conference on Human Genetic Information, Wellington, New Zealand. 
July 1995. 
49 Caskey, C.T., R.S. Eisenberg, E.S. Lander and J. Straus, "HUGO Statement on Patenting of 
DNA Sequences" (1995) Genome Digest 6. 
50 National Academies Policy Advisory Group, Intellectual Property and the Academic 
Community (1995) Royal Society, London. 
51 	Ethical Aspects of Patenting Inventions Involving Elements of Human Origin (1996) 8th 
position paper. 
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the International Bar Association 52 have all given similar guarded 
endorsements. 
Part 4: 	Summary of the Debate 
In summary, those in favour of patenting living material, in particular 
human genetic and cellular material, argue that there is nothing intrinsically 
unpatentable about inventions in this area (apart from DNA sequences of 
unknown function) and that there is no justification to treat them differently 
from inventions in any other technology. Those against patenting argue that 
even if inventions derived from human genetic research are patentable there 
are strong ethical reasons why they should not be, and appropriate provision 
should be made in patenting legislation to exclude them. 
Indigenous groups are not lone voices in opposition to patenting of 
genes and cell lines. For example, a coalition of .women's rights groups plans to 
oppose the patenting of the breast cancer gene BRCA1. 53 Similar strong views 
have been expressed by a group of European scientists who object to a patent on 
human umbilical cord blood cells, primarily on ethical grounds. 54 This has had 
the indirect effect of turning public sentiment away from the research itself. 
Calls have been made for express exclusions from patenting to be added to 
existing patents legislation, and a moratorium on granting of patents by Patents 
Offices around the world in the interim. It seems certain that continued 
patenting of human genes and cells will have to be vigorously defended now 
that the opposition to patenting has the support of indigenous, women's and 
religious groups. 
One of the difficulties with any proposition involving the exclusion of 
genes and cells from the patent system is finding an appropriate means of 
exclusion, an appropriate limit on exclusion and an appropriate means for 
ensuring that research and practice continues. My argument in this thesis is 
that there is little to be gained by expressly excluding human genetic material 
52 Draft Convention on the Human Genome. 
53 "Gene Battle" (1996) New Scientist 25 May 12; "US Coalition Counters Breast Gene 
Patents" (1996) 381 Nature 265. 
54 Butler, D., "US Company Comes under Fire over Patent on Umbilical Cord Cells" (1996) 382 
Nature 99. 
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from patenting, and much to be lost if the progress of human genetic research 
and clinical practice slows. It is more appropriate to find suitable means for 
limiting the disadvantageous effects of patenting human genetic material from 
within the patent system. I suggest a number of possible means for achieving 
this end in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 2: AUSTRALIAN PATENT LAW 
Introduction 
The principles of patent law are recognised universally, and were 
reaffirmed in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. Article 27 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights 1994 states that: 
1. ...patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in 
all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step 
[synonymous with the term "non-obvious"] and are capable of industrial application 
[synonymous with the term "useful"]. 
Patents have many of the same features as do classical real and personal 
property rights. Once granted, patents confer the right on the patentee to: 
• use, make or sell the invention; 
• exclude others from making, using or selling the invention for a limited 
period. 
• sell, licence or assign to others the right to make use or sell the invention for 
a limited period. 
In other respects, however, patents are quite different from conventional 
property rights. As a patentee neither possesses nor owns the physical object of 
the patent (nor any future product of the patent), any direct comparison with 
real property ownership fades. Unfortunately, many of the arguments voiced 
against patenting of human genes presuppose that the patentee materially 
"owns" the object of the patent. This view is entirely misconceived. Patent 
rights are merely akin to real property rights; they are not the same. This legally 
misconceived view, however, also exemplifies genuine public concerns about 
developments in genetic research and commercialisation of health care which 
may justify legislative action. 
In this regard, it could be argued that gene patents are fundamentally 
different from patents in other areas because they deal with the hereditary 
material of all living things. Accordingly, it is not in the public interest to allow 
patents for genes and it is necessary to provide either specific exclusions within 
the patent system or an alternative form of protection. The opposing argument 
is that gene patents require the same consideration as for all other patents, and 
that there is no justification for giving genes special treatment. On this basis, 
existing interpretations of the particular requirements set out above in the 
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GATT TRIPS Agreement, as well as the requirement for full disclosure of the 
invention provide sufficient limitations as to the extent of patenting in this 
area. This thesis assesses the validity of the two divergent arguments. 
In this chapter I will explore the fundamental nature of the patent 
system, first by presenting a brief description of the history of the patent system 
followed by an examination of the economic rationale for its continued 
existence in Australia. A more detailed statement of the leitmotif of patent law 
in Australia follows, with regard to the construction of the patent, the 
disclosure requirements, each of the requirements set out in Article 27 of the 
GATT TRIPS Agreement, and the new threshold requirement that there be an 
invention on the face of the patent application, as propounded by the High 
Court in Philips v Mirabella. I 
Part 1: 	The Patent System 
1.1 History 
The Australian patent system is based on medieval English patent law. 
Australia shares this origin with many other countries, notably the USA, 
England and other countries of Europe. The first grants of patents probably 
arose in the fifteenth century in England. 2 Subsequently, in 1624, the Statute of 
Monopolies gave statutory recognition to patents and specifically excluded 
1 	NV Philips Gloeilampenfabrielcen v Mirabella International Pty Ltd (1995) 32 IPR 449. 
The most influential accounts of Australian patent law are provided by Professor James 
Lahore in a loose leaf service: Lahore J., J. Garnsey, J.W. Dwyer, A. Duffy and W. Covell, 
Intellectual Property in Australia: Patents, Designs and Trademarks Law (1994) 
Butterworths, Sydney, Volumes 1 and 2; Jill McKeough in her textbook and casebook: 
McKeough, J. and A. Stewart, Intellectual Property in Australia (1991) Butterworths, 
Sydney (second edition to be released in 1997) and McKeough, J., Intellectual Property 
Commentary and Materials (1992) Law Book Company, Sydney, second edition; and 
Professor Sam Ricketson in his textbook and casebook: Ricketson, S., The Law of 
Intellectual Property (1984) Law Book Company, Sydney, and Ricketson, S., Intellectual 
Property Cases, Materials and Commentary (1994) Butterworths, Sydney. 
2 	Boehm, K., The British Patent System, Vol 1: Administration (1967). In: Ricketson, S., 
Intellectual Property Cases, Materials and Commentary (1994) Butterworths. 
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them from a general prohibition against monopolies. 3 The over-arching 
requirement that there be a "manner of manufacture" in that Jacobean Statute 
is still retained in the modern Australian Patents Act 1990 as the touchstone for 
patentability.4 
Calls for reform of the English patent system were made in the 
nineteenth century primarily in response to the excessive costs and complex 
procedures involved in obtaining a patent, as well as the general movement in 
favour of free trade and a lack of evidence of any link between the patent 
system and economic growth. A number of review committees were set up and 
Patent Bills proposed. 3 The reform process ended with the Patents Act 1883 
(UK). Similar concerns have again been expressed in both England and 
Australia and the review process has been repeated, culminating in new 
legislation in the shape of the Patents Act 1977 (UK) and Patents Act 1990 (Cth). 
There is now considerable variation in the legislative requirements for 
patenting between England, the USA and Australia. In England, for example, 
reference to the Statute of Monopolies was removed from the Patents Act 1977 
in order to achieve harmonisation with the European Patent Convention. Any 
such differences have to be taken into account in comparing the law from these 
3 	Section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies states that "Provided also and be it declared and 
enacted that any declaration before mentioned shall not extend to any letters patent and 
grants of privilege for the term of fourteen years or under, hereafter to be made, on the sole 
working or making of any manner of new manufactures within this realm, to the true and 
first inventor and inventors of such manufactures which others at the time of making such 
letters patent and grants shall not use, so far as they be not contrary to the law, 
mischievous to the state, by raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt at trade, or 
generally inconvenient; the said fourteen years to be accounted from the date of the first 
letters patent or grant of such privilege hereafter to be made, but that the same shall be 
of such force as they should be if this Act had never been made, and of none other." 
4 Section 18(1)(a) refers to the manner of manufacture requirement, and the definition of 
invention in the dictionary in Schedule 1 defines an invention as "any manner of new 
manufacture ...". 
5 	See Boehm, op cit. 
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jurisdictions. Indeed, a number of warnings have been issued by the judiciary 
as to the use of inappropriate case law.6 
The Australian Commonwealth government has power to enact patents 
legislation through s51(xviii) of the Constitution. In 1903 the first Patents Act 
entered into force and was not superseded until 1952. Both Acts were generally 
based on existing English legislation at the time. The 1952 Act was replaced by 
the 1990 Patents Act, which gave effect to recommendations of a Report by the 
Industrial Property Advisory Committee. 7 The legislation was extensively 
redrafted and rearranged using "plain English" although the core concepts 
remained unchanged. 
1.2 International Obligations 
A number of international treaties and conventions have been agreed 
upon in order to create greater harmonisation in patent law between countries. 
1.2.1 The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1883, 
revised in Stockholm, 1967. 
The main aims of this convention are to ensure first the equal treatment 
of foreign and national applications for patents, and secondly that the first 
applicant in one country has priority over other applicants for the same 
invention in different countries. 
1.2.2 The Patent Cooperation Treaty 1970 
In 1970 Australia signed the Patent Cooperation Treaty, which treats a 
single international application for a patent as having the same effect as if 
6 	In Genentech Inc's Patent [1989] RPC 147 in the English Court of Appeal both Purchas 
(at 198) and Mustill U (at 259) commented that the 1977 Patents Act had displaced 
residual common law and it would be a mistake to use the old cases to interpret the 
statute. Similarly, in CCOM Pty Ltd v fiejing Pty Ltd (1994) 28 IPR 481 at 558 the 
Australian Federal Court urged care in using English cases from after the 1977 Act to 
interpret the Australian statute. 
7 	Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia (1984) AGPS (hereafter referred to as 
the IPAC Report). 
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applications had been filed separately in each of the countries in which patent 
protection is requested. The application is then processed separately in each 
country. 
1.2.3 The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) Convention 1970 
WIPO is an agency of the United Nations. Its function is to administer 
conventions and agreements related to intellectual property. 
1.2.4 The GATT TRIPS Agreement 1993. 
Calls were first made in the United States to bring intellectual property 
matters within the ambit of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
through a desire to reduce the economic losses suffered through trade in 
counterfeited goods. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeited Goods arose out of the 
Uruguay round of negotiations, completed in 1993. The objectives of the 
Agreement are stated in Article 7, and focus on the contribution of the 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights to the promotion of 
technological innovation and transfer and dissemination of technology. The 
principal aims of members are to: 
• reduce distortions and impediments to international trade; 
• promote the effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights; 
and 
• ensure the measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights 
do not themselves become barriers to international trade. 
Australian obligations under the GATT TRIPS Agreement were implemented 
through the Patents (World Trade Organisation Amendments) Act 1994 (Cth). 
The effect of these international conventions and agreements on 
patenting is that it is now common practice to lodge patent applications in a 
number of countries. Indeed, a survey conducted by Mandeville et al in 1981 
indicated that the majority of applications for patents in Australia come from 
foreign applicants. 8 This is also the case in the European Union. A recent 
8 	Mandeville, T.D., D.M. Lamberton and E.J. Bishop, Economic Effects of the Australian 
Patent System (1982) AGPS, Commissioned Report to the Industrial Property Advisory 
Committee (hereafter referred to as the Mandeville Survey), at 71. 
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survey has indicated that 70 percent of all patents issued by the European Patent 
Office belong to either Japanese or North American companies. 9 This 
predominance of foreign patents may well put into question the validity of the 
patent system, since the main rationale for its existence is the economic 
advantage that patents provide to the country in encouraging indigenous 
innovation (see below, Part 2). One possibility that has been raised to ameliorate 
the disadvantages arising out of the grant of patents to foreigners is that 
Australia should weaken its patent protection, so that it can free-ride on 
inventions from other countries." This option, however, is clearly not in 
Australia's best interests from the perspective of international relations. 
Indeed, it has been recommended that what Australia should be doing is 
ensuring that there is international cooperation to prevent others from free 
riding. 11 I would agree that it is not in Australia's interests to be seen to be 
flouting attempts by other countries to harmonise national laws. In the long 
term Australia is much more likely to benefit than to lose from an 
internationally harmonised patent system, one of the aims of which is to 
remove havens in which patented inventions can be exploited with impunity. 
Part 2: 	Economics and the Patent System  
It is generally recognised that the justification of the present patent 
system is that the grant of patents encourages innovation, which is beneficial to 
the Australian economy. For example, a Report by the Senate Standing 
Committee on Science and the Environment 12 stated that: 
'the primary function of patent legislation should be to serve as an instrument of 
national economic policy aimed at the stimulation of indigenous industrial 
innovation not as a means for giving effect to the 'natural right' of the inventor." 13 
9 	Thomas, S.M., A.R.W. Davies, N.J. Birtwistle, S.M. Crowther and J.F. Burke, 
"Ownership of the Human Genome" (1996) 380 Nature 387. 
10 	For example: Bureau of Industry Economics, The Economics of Patents (1994) AGPS, 
Occasional Paper 18. 
11 	Ibid. 
12 	Industrial Research and Development in Australia (1978) AGPS. The Jessop Report. 
13 	Ibid., 129. 
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This has not always been accepted as the only rationale for the existence 
of the patent system. Four distinct theses have been proposed as providing 
possible justifications for the nineteenth century patent system: 14 
• the natural law thesis: that people have a natural right to property in their 
own ideas; 15 
• the reward-by-monopoly thesis: that there should be some reward to the 
inventor for his efforts in producing a useful invention, and the greater the 
usefulness, the greater should be the reward; 
• the monopoly-profit-incentive thesis: that, assuming that innovation and 
economic growth are desirable, there should be some incentive to encourage 
inventive activity, which further assumes that inventive activity is causally 
linked to economic growth; and 
• the exchange-for-secrets thesis: that the patent is a bargain between the 
inventor, who gains a temporary monopoly, and the public, who gain by 
disclosure of the invention. 
The comments made by the Senate Standing Committee, extracted 
above, indicate that the dominant role of the modern patent system is in 
providing economic benefit to the country. On this basis, the main benefit of 
the patent system should not be in providing reward for the hard work of the 
inventor, nor should that system recognise any natural right of the inventor. 
Further, although the grant of a patent does involve a trade-off of a temporary 
monopoly to the inventor in return for disclosure, the primary focus of the 
system should not be seen as providing for private agreements between the 
inventor and the public. Patents are public documents granting state sanctioned 
monopolies and the patent system should therefore provide benefit to the 
public. 
14 	Machlup, F. and E. Penrose, "The Patent Controversy in the 19th Century" (1950) 10 
Journal of Economic History 11. 
15 	A detailed analysis of the arguments for and against patents as natural rights is 
presented by Thomson, J.A., Biopatenting the Splice of Life: A Consideration of the 
Interface between Biotechnological Inventions and Patent Law (1994) Ph.D. Thesis, 
University of Western Australia. It could be argued that the only right conferred by 
statute is the right to exclude others from making, using or selling the invention. The 
inventor can already do these things herself. But of course licensing or selling the rights is 
only worthwhile if others can be excluded. 
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This rationale makes two important assumptions: that technological 
innovation leads to greater economic and social welfare, and that patenting 
encourages innovation. This is not the place to analyse the first assumption, 
since it would require a detailed analysis of economic theory. A case can be 
made for the second assumption on the bases that: 
• the award of a monopoly in the exploitation of the invention should 
encourage the inventor both to create new inventions and to take the 
patented invention through to commercial application; 
• public access through disclosure of the invention should encourage other 
innovation in areas related to the patented invention; and 
• once the patent has expired the invention is freely available and can be 
further developed. 
Empirical evidence of a causal link between the patent system and 
innovation, however, is decidedly lacking. 16 Indeed the anti-competitive effect 
of awarding a patent monopoly may be a disincentive to innovation. Machlup 
suggests as much: 
"If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our 
present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But 
since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the 
basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it." 17 
Machlup's view has to be placed in the Australian context. Clearly, the 
social benefits and costs of the patent system will vary from country to country. 
Australia is industrially developed but small, therefore the considerations are 
different from those that apply in large industrialised countries, like the USA. 
Smaller countries or those which are poorly developed in industrial terms are 
much less likely to have a substantial indigenous innovation base than larger 
more industrially developed countries. In that regard, I suggest that the patent 
system may provide more of an advantage to foreign innovators seeking to 
exploit their inventions in the host country than to the economy of the host 
country. This may be the price that Australia has to pay for a harmonised patent 
system. 
16 	See, for example, the Mandeville Survey. 
17 	Machlup, F., An Economic Review of the Patent System (1958) US Government Printing 
Service, Washington. 
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2.1 The Australian Context 
In 1984 a report was published by the Industrial Property Advisory 
Committee (IPAC), the aim of which was to suggest ways in which the patent 
system might better enhance Australia's long term economic development 
through innovation. 18 The patent system is most clearly justified when social 
benefits outweigh social costs. Social benefits have been said to include: 
• incentive for innovation 
• disclosure of the invention. 
Social costs include: 
• direct costs of running the patent system 
• indirect costs to society of the grant of a monopoly. 19 
In practice, there is no convincing evidence that the patent system does 
in fact encourage innovation. By hindering competition the patent system 
could actually inhibit innovation. Furthermore, there is no clear benefit to the 
public in disclosure. In terms of costs, the Mandeville survey estimated that the 
direct costs of administering the system were approximately $17 million in 
1979-80. Social costs were said to be too difficult to quantify with any accuracy, 
although probably the greatest cost was identified as restrictive terms and 
conditions in licensing agreements. 20 
The reports by Mandeville and IPAC indicate that the benefit cost ratio in 
Australia is negative, or at the very best in balance. Even so, there may still not 
be sufficient justification for abolishing• the patent system. In terms of 
international commercial relations, the costs of abolishing it may be large. The 
primary recommendation of IPAC report was that Australia should continue to 
operate a patent system. But there is no justification for increasing the ambit of 
that system. With this in mind, patenting of human genetic material should 
not be allowed to extend beyond the limits that are already set within the patent 
system. 
18 	The IPAC Report. 
19 	Ibid. 
20 	Mandeville survey, at 112. 
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2.2 Appropriateness of Monopoly Rights 
The 1993 Hilmer Report 21 set the benchmark for Australia's national 
competition policy. By granting a monopoly, the patent system of its very 
nature may be seen as anti-competitive, and that anti-competitive feature 
makes the patent system a key consideration in free market debates. It has been 
pointed out elsewhere that both competition policy and patenting have a 
common central economic goal of maximising wealth by producing what 
consumers want at the lowest cost, and therefore they need not necessarily be 
seen as antagonistic to one another.22 The Hilmer Report did not oppose 
patents outright, seeing them as limited exceptions to the national competition 
policy. The difficulty with the two systems is finding the right balance in their 
interaction. 23 If one accepts that the award of a temporary monopoly for 
inventions is justifiable on the basis of being in the public interest, the 
legislature must seek to ensure that the patent monopoly is not extended 
beyond those appropriate limits. Thus the debate that is of interest here is not 
about patenting as such but about the appropriate and justifiable limits on the 
patent system. My focus is on possible abuses of the monopoly which could 
include: 
• refusal or inability to adequately exploit the invention; 
• refusal to licence others to perform that exploitation; 
• imposition of restrictive or onerous terms in licensing agreements; and 
• extension of the monopoly beyond its time or scope. 
Two mechanisms exist which may minimise some of these undesirable effects 
of granting the patent monopoly: compulsory licensing and provisions in Part 
IV of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). 
2.1.1 Compulsory licensing 
Provisions in Chapter 12 of the Patents Act enable a person to apply to 
the court for an order requiring the patentee to grant the applicant a licence to 
work the invention, provided that the applicant can convince the court that the 
"reasonable requirements of the public" have not been satisfied and the 
21 	National Competition Policy (1993) AGPS. 
22 	Bowman, W.S., Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal and Economic Appraisal (1973) 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
23 	The Hilmer Report, at 150. 
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patentee gives no satisfactory explanation. 24 Section 135 sets out how the 
reasonable requirements of the public are shown not to have been satisfied. To 
date few applications have been made for compulsory licences. In Fastening 
Supplies Pty Ltd v Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp25 Menzies J examined the 
equivalent provision in the 1952 Act and held that even though the reasonable 
requirements of the public had not been met when the petition was lodged, 
they were being met at the time of judgment. Moreover, his Honour was not 
satisfied that the petitioner was a suitable company to be granted a licence to 
work the invention. In consequence a compulsory licence was denied. 
Given the lack of case law considering this provision, it is difficult to say 
with any certainty the types of cases that will persuade the court to grant a 
compulsory licence. One of my principal conclusions in Chapter 7 is that there 
may be some circumstances, for example when patent claims are made for new 
products to be used in the treatment of serious disease, when delay in bringing 
the invention to the phase of commercial application is inexcusable in terms of 
public interest. In such circumstances it is entirely appropriate for the courts to 
look favourably on applications for compulsory licences. 26 
2.1.2 Part IV Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974 
Enactment of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA) provided an 
important package of legislation in two spheres of commercial law. Part V 
concerns • consumer protection and Part IV is aimed at preventing abuse of 
•market power.27 The provisions of Part IV are most relevant to the present 
discussion. These include: 
• Prohibition on anti-competitive agreements: "s45 sections". 28 The primary 
focus of inquiry is whether the agreement has the purpose or likely effect of 
substantially lessening competition. 
24 	Section 133. 
25 	(1970) 44 ALJR 7. 
26 	Note, however, that applications can only be made three years after grant. For there to be 
unacceptable delay, therefore, it must be longer than three years. 
27 	A useful overview of this area of law is provided by Hurley, A. and G. Wiffen, Outline of 
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (1994) Butterworths, Sydney. 
28 	Ibid., Chapter 4. 
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• Misuse of market power: s46. The corporation must both have a substantial 
degree of market power and take advantage of that market power by 
eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor, preventing market 
entry, or deterring a person from engaging in competitive conduct. 
• Exclusive dealings: s47. Again, the main focus is whether the agreement has 
the purpose or likely effect of substantially lessening competition. 
• Resale price maintenance: s48 and Part VIII. 
• Price discrimination: s49. Section 49 has now been repealed,29 on the 
recommendation of a number of committees, because of its potential to 
discourage pro-competitive conduct. 
• Mergers and acquisitions: s50. 
Mere acquisition of a monopoly right through issue of a patent may not 
of itself be a breach of any of these provisions of the TPA, although s51(1) of the 
TPA provides that anti-competitive conduct permitted under intellectual 
property legislation is not exempt from the TPA. Section 51(3) then goes on to 
provide an exemption from ss 45, 47,48 and 50 but not from s 46, 
"to the extent that the condition relates to ... (iii) the invention to which the patent 
relates or articles made by use of the invention". 
The operation of the s51(3) provision was reviewed for the Trade Practice 
Commission by the Minter Ellison Group in 1991. 30 The group listed conduct 
that it saw as having an anti-competitive effect, including: enforcement actions 
and settlement; acquisition of intellectual property rights; refusal to licence; 
licence terms and conditions. As I suggested earlier, the last option is the one 
most likely to be used in an anti-competitive fashion. 31 In this respect Part IV of 
the TPA only gives limited assistance in guarding against anti-competitive 
conduct, since provided that the clauses used in a particular licensing 
agreement "relate to the invention to which the patent relates" 32, they will be 
29 	Repealed by the Competition Policy Reform Act 1995 (Cth). 
30 	Application of the Trade Practices Act to Intellectual Property (1991) AGPS. 
31 	The TPC report lists thirteen possibilities: exclusive grant; territorial restraints; price 
restrictions; quota restrictions; quality requirements; minimum royalty/quality; post-
termination restrictions; sub-licence restrictions; grant back provisions; no challenge 
provisions; non-competition clause; full or third line forcing; leveraging. 
32 	As per s51(3). 
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protected by s51(3). The only case that has considered s51(3) is Transfield Pty Ltd 
v Arlo International Ltd33 : in which Mason J (as he then was) stated that: 
"In bridging the different policies of the Patents Act and the Trade Practices Act 
s51(3) recognizes that a patentee is justly entitled to impose conditions on the 
granting of a licence or assignment of a patent in order to protect the patentee's legal 
monopoly... Section 51(3) determines the scope of restrictions the patentee may 
properly impose to the use of the patent. Conditions which seek to gain advantage 
collateral to the patent are not covered by s51(3)." 34 
The need for the exemption in s51(3) was questioned by Professor Baxt in 
his report to IPAC. 35 IPAC subsequently recommended the removal of that 
provision from the TPA. This was justified on the basis that there is no reason 
for special treatment of patent related conduct. Pt IV sections operate with 
regard to substantial lessening of competition and hence if the likely public 
benefit of the patent monopoly outweighs its anti-competitive effect, there is no 
breach. The Trade Practices Commission made a similar recommendation in its 
submission to the Hilmer inquiry. 36 On the other hand, the Australian 
Industrial Property Organisation, the Australian Information Industry 
Association and the Institute of Patent Attorneys of Australia all supported its 
retention. 37 Although the Hilmer committee saw force in arguments for the 
removal of s51(3) it claimed that it was unable to make expert 
recommendations and merely recommended further examination. 38 For the 
time being, therefore, the provision remains. Provided that the focus is on the 
invention itself, it allows considerable scope for anti-competitive conduct 
which may further marginalise the public benefit arising out of the patent 
system, since it allows the imposition of onerous licensing conditions, and 
even outright refusal to licence at all. I will provide a case study in Chapter 5 
which demonstrates possible detrimental consequences that may flow from 
refusal to licence. I conclude in Chapter 7 that now is the appropriate time for 
33 	(1980) 30 ALR 201. 
34 	Ibid., at 217. 
35 	Monash University Law School Report to the Industrial Property Advisory Committee 
(1983). Volume 2 Interface Between Anti-trust and Intellectual Property Legislation by 
Professor R. Baxt. 
36 	Hilmer Report, at 149. 
37 	Ibid. 
38 	Hilmer Report, at 151. 
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expert examination of the relationship between patent law and the provisions 
of Part IV of the TPA. 
Part 3: 	The Australian System 
The Patents Act 1990 (Cth) and associated regulations establish the 
parameters within which the Australian patent system functions. The main 
changes from the 1952 Act sought to "internationalise" . patenting requirements, 
by testing novelty and inventive step against disclosures anywhere in the 
world.39 In the second reading speech of the Patents Bill 1990, Senator Ray 
referred to the impact of these changes: . 
"The most significant changes made by the Bill focus on fostering indigenous 
innovation and the use of the international patent system in developing export 
markets to improve Australia's international competitive position." 40 
The fundamental principles of modern Australian patent law are 
described below in order to provide a framework within which the issues 
associated with patenting of inventions arising out of human genetic research 
and its applications can be placed. 
3.1 Applying for a Patent 
The Patents Act 1990 (Cth) enables any person to apply for either a 
standard or a petty patent for a patentable invention. The term of a standard 
patent is 20 years,41 and cannot be extended. 42 A petty patent extends for only 12 
months, extendable for another 6 years.43 The requirements for petty patent 
applications are less onerous than for a standard patent. The present discussion 
focuses primarily on the requirements for a standard patent. 
Section 4 Patents Act 1990 lays out flow charts of the typical steps 
involved in obtaining a patent. A person may either make a provisional 
3 9 	These changes are discussed in more detail below. 
40 	Parliamentary Debates 29 May 1990 Senate, 1271. 
41 	Section 67 Patents Act 1990 (Cth). 
42 	Division 2 - Standard patents in Part 3 - Extension of Term was repealed by the Patents 
(World Trade Organization Amendments) Act 1994 (Cth). 
4 3 	Section 68. 
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application or a complete application." If the application is provisional, the 
applicant can make one or more complete applications associated with the 
provisional application at any time within the prescribed period. 45 
3.2 Disclosure Requirements 
The application must include a specification, which, for a provisional 
application, need only describe the invention.46 The requirements for a 
complete specification are set out in section 40 (2). It must: 
(a) describe the invention fully, including the best method known to the 
applicant of performing the invention; and 
(b) where it relates to an application for a standard patent - end with a claim 
or claims defining the invention; and 
(c) where it relates to an application for a petty patent - end with a single 
claim, or a single independent claim and not more than 2 dependent claims, 
defining the invention. 
Section 40 further provides that the claim or claims must be clear and 
succinct and fairly based on the matter described in the specification, and must 
relate to one invention only. 
3.3 Invention Requirements 
Patents will only be granted for patentable inventions. Section 18(1) 
requires that four elements are satisfied: 
18. (1) 	Subject to subsection (2), a patentable invention is an invention that, so far 
as is claimed in any claim: 
(a) is a manner of manufacture within the meaning of section 6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies; and 
(b) when compared with the prior art base as it existed before the priority 
date of the claim: 
( i ) 	is novel; and 
(ii) 	involves an inventive step; and 
(c) is useful; and 
(d) was not secretly used in the patent area before the priority date of that 
claim by, or on behalf of, or with the authority of, the patentee or 
nominated person or the patentee's or nominated person's predecessor in 
title to the invention.47 
44 	Section 29. 
45 	Section 38. 
46 	Section 40(1). 
47 	Also refer to section 9 for acts which are not to be taken to be secret use. 
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Invention is further defined in the dictionary of terms in Schedule 1: 
"invention" means any manner of new manufacture the subject of letters patent and 
grant of privilege within section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies, and includes an 
alleged invention. 
3.4 Examination Requirements 
On request by the applicant, the Commissioner of Patents must examine 
the application to determine whether it is patentable. 48 Section 45 requires that 
the Commissioner report on whether the specification complies with section 40 
and whether, to the best of his or her knowledge, the invention satisfies the 
criteria in section 18(1)(a) and (b), the manner of manufacture, novelty and 
inventive step requirements. 
3.5 Challenges to Patent Validity 
Validity of the patent is not guaranteed by the Patent Office. 49 Validity 
may be challenged at three stages: 
• within the prescribed period after a complete specification has been filed for 
failure to comply with paragraph 18(1)(b), that is, the novelty or inventive 
step requirements.50 
• in opposition proceedings after acceptance but before granting, only on 
grounds that the nominated person is not entitled to grant and/or the 
invention is not patentable because it fails to comply with paragraph 18(1)(a) 
or (b) and/or the specification does not comply with subsection 40 (2) or 
(3). 51 Opposition hearings are heard by the Commissioner, but may be 
appealed to the Federal Court.52 
• or revocation proceedings at any time after grant. 53 The Minister or any 
other person may apply to a prescribed court of a revocation order. 
48 	Sections 44 and 45. 
49 	Section 20(1). 
50 	Section 27(1). 
51 	Section 59. 
52 	Section 60(4). 
53 	Section 138. 
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Subsection 138(3) sets out that there are only six allowable grounds for 
revocation, the most relevant of which for present purposes are: 
(b) that the invention is not a patentable invention; and 
(e) that the specification does not comply with subsection 40(2) or (3). 
3.6 Grant of Patent 
The Commissioner must grant the patent if a standard patent is in 
approved form and there is no opposition to grant, or in spite of opposition, the 
decision is that the patent should be granted. 54 The Commissioner should only 
refuse acceptance when "it is practically certain that the letters patent granted 
on the specification would be held invalid" 55 because refusal of acceptance is 
final but acceptance in itself is not. 56 In these circumstances it is the duty of the 
Commissioner to refuse the application. On the other hand, when validity is 
uncertain the applicant should be given the benefit of doubt. 57 
The grant of a patent gives the patentee the exclusive rights during the 
term of the patent to exploit the invention and authorise others to exploit the 
invention. 58 The patent can also be assigned by the patentee and devolved by 
la w. 59 The patentee or an exclusive licensee may start infringement 
proceedings.60 A defendant in infringement proceedings may counter-claim for 
revocation of the patent. 61 
3.7 Publication Requirements 
Publication requirements include prescribed information about the 
applicant and application in the Official Journal when the application is 
54 	Section 61. 
55 	Commissioner of Patents v Microcell Ltd (1959) 102 CLR 232, at 244. 
56 	Ibid. 
57 	International Business Machines Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1991) 22 IPR 417. 
58 	- Section 13(1). 
59 	Section 13(2). 
60 	Section 120(1). 
61 	Section 121. 
32 
ma de,62 notification in the Official Journal that the complete specification is 
open for public inspection, 63 and public inspection. 64 
Part 4: 	Testing the Validity of a Patent 
4.1 Construing the Patent Document 
Before a patent is granted the examiner must assess its validity. Validity 
is also open to question in both opposition and revocation proceedings. The 
first task in assessing the validity of a patent, whether it be at the examination 
stage, or in opposition, infringement or revocation proceedings, is to construe 
the patent document as a whole. It has been said many times that the patent 
specification should be construed in the same way as any other written 
document. But a patent is not a private agreement; it is a public document 
granting a monopoly to the patentee, and must therefore be capable of being 
interpreted in such a way that its meaning cannot be misunderstood. One of the 
most important considerations in construing the document is the different 
functions of the claims and the specification. Mummery J in Glaverbel v British 
Coal confirmed that the claims mark out the legal limit of the monopoly 
granted, whereas the specification describes how to carry out the process 
claimed and the best method known to the patentee for doing this. 65 The role 
of the specification in construing the claims is to supply background 
information and the meaning of technical terms and in resolving ambiguities 
on the face of the claims.66 
Lord Diplock in Catnic Components referred to the need for a purposive 
construction rather than a purely literal one. 67 Although this has been accepted 
as the appropriate method of patent construction in both England 68 and 
Australia,69 Gummow J has cast doubt on whether the result would be any 
62 	Section 53. 
63 	Section 54. 
64 	Sections 55, 56. 
65 	Glaverbel SA v British Coal Corp [1994] RPC 443, at 486. 
66 	Ibid. 
67 	Catnic Components Ltd v Hill & Smith Ltd [1982] RPC 183, at 243. 
68 	For example, Van Der Lely NV v Rushton's Engineering Co Ltd [1985] RPC 461. 
69 	For example, Windsurfing International Inc v Petit (1984) 3 IPR 449. 
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different using the previously accepted method in Australia." His Honour 
further cautioned that this approach does not justify any new category of non-
textual infringement.71 
The judgment of Sheppard J in Decor Corp v Dart Industries,72 gives 
more comprehensive guidance as to how a patent will be construed. His 
Honour distilled from the authorities ten relevant rules of construction. I have 
further summarised these rules, and present the crucial requirements below. 
1. The claims define the invention. Construe using ordinary principles. 
2. Do not confine the scope of the claims by reference to limitations in the 
specification which are not expressly or by proper - inference reduced to the 
claims themselves. 
3.Even so, read the specification as a whole. 
4. In some cases, it is permissible to refer to the specification to qualify or define 
words used in the claims. 
5. If a claim is clear, don't allow it to be obscured by obscurities elsewhere in the 
document. But where an expression is unclear or ambiguous, consult the body 
of the specification to define or clarify it. 
6.Give a purposive rather than a literal construction. 
7. Remember the document is not a written instrument inter partes but a public 
document. The monopoly claimed Should not be capable of being 
misunderstood. 
8. The aim is to instruct those skilled in the art in carrying out the invention. 
The language used is not important provided it is comprehensible and does not 
mislead the skilled reader. 
9. Since the claims define the monopoly, construe as carefully as for any other 
document defining a legal right. 
10.The invention will be invalid if it is impossible to ascertain what it is from a 
fair reading of the specification as a whole, but remember to construe in the 
light of the common general knowledge before the priority date. 
70 	In Nicaro Holdings Pty Ltd v Martin Engineering Co (1990) 16 IPR 545, referring to 
Commonwealth Industrial Gases Ltd v MWA Holdings Pty Ltd (1970) 44 ALJR 385. 
71 
	
	See also Gummow J's judgment in Rehm Pty Ltd v Websters Security Systems 
(International) Pty Ltd (1988) 11 IPR 289, at 301. 
72 	Decor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1989) 13 IPR 385, at 400. 
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The task of construing the patent is a matter for the examiner or for the 
court. It has been stated emphatically that this task should not be delegated to 
expert witnesses. 73 The role of expert witnesses is in informing the judge as to 
scientific or technical terms, or special meanings given to ordinary words by 
those skilled in the art. Further, the specification should be construed without 
reference to prior documents, or to subjective thoughts, intentions, etc of the 
patentee or his witnesses, or to actions of the patentee either pre- or post-
grant. 74 
4.2 Specification Requirements: Compliance with Section 40 
The specification is crucial to any inquiry into the validity of a patent. 
The purpose of the specification requirement is twofold: first it must describe 
the nature of the invention and secondly it must describe the manner in which 
it can be performed. Defects in the specification requirements, as set out in 
section 40 in both the 1990 and 1952 Acts, can be triggers for inquiry at 
examination, opposition and revocation stages. There are areas of overlap both 
between the different specification requirements and with the utility 
requirement. 
4.2.1 Full Description of the Invention, Including Best Method of 
Performance: Insufficiency (s40(2)(a)). 
In describing the best method of performing the invention, the 
description must be sufficient to enable the skilled person to work the 
invention. 75 Mistakes and omissions will not render the patent invalid for 
insufficiency provided that they can be rectified by the skilled addressee without 
the exercise of inventive faculty. 76 The description will be insufficient, 
however, if the addressee is required to undertake prolonged experimentation 
to make the invention work.77 In the case of inventions which are 
73 	Sartas No I Pty Ltd v Koukourou & Partners Pty Ltd (1995) 30 IPR 479, at 485-486, per 
Gummow j, adopting the propositions of Mummery J in Glaverbel SA v British Coal Corp 
[1994] RPC 443. 
74 	Ibid. 
75 	See Peptide Technology Ltd v The Wellcome Foundation Ltd (1992) 23 IPR 319, at 325. 
76 	No-Fume Ltd v Frank Pitchford & Co Ltd (1935) 52 RPC 231. 
77 	Valensi v British Radio Corp Ltd [1973] RFC 337, at 377. 
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improvements over the prior art, the true nature of the invention should be 
readily distinguishable from the prior art. 78 
4.2.2 Definition of the Invention in the Claims and Clarity of the Claims: 
Ambiguity and Lack of Clarity (s40(3)). 
The difference in function between the body of the specification and the 
claims is well recognised. 79 The claims must define the invention and in doing 
so must not go beyond it.80 The legislation requires that they do so clearly and 
succinctly, so that the precise extent of the monopoly claimed is known. Where 
the claims are ambiguous or otherwise unclear, resort may be had to the body of 
the specification to resolve the ambiguity. 81 If this is not possible the patent will 
be invalid. This is the case irrespective of whether the application was prepared 
in good faith or the ambiguity was purposely introduced.82 If the claims have a 
plain and unambiguous meaning, however, it is not permissible either to add a 
gloss or to confine the scope of the claims by reference to the specification. 83 
Terms will be interpreted in "a practical and commonsense way"84 from the 
perspective of those skilled in the art. A claim will be sufficiently clear if a 
skilled addressee can readily determine whether their act would or would not 
infringe the patent. 85 
4.2.3 Fair Basis (s40(3)). 
Patent claims cannot be made in isolation, but must be backed up by 
material presented in the specification, that is, they must be fairly based on the 
disclosure in the specification. The term "fair basing" is a recent concept, 
78 	Nelson v Hillmark Industries Pty Ltd (1991) 19 IPR 628, at 636. 
79 	See, for example, Lockhart j in Elconnex Pty Ltd v Gerard Industries Pty Ltd (1993) 25 IPR 
173, at 187. 
80 	See Sami S. Svendsen Inc v Independent Products Canada Ltd (1968) 119 CLR 156, at 165. 
81 	Interlego AG v Toltoys Pty Ltd (1973) 130 CLR 461; Rehm Pty Ltd v Websters Security 
Systems (International) Pty Ltd (1988) 11 IPR 289. 
82 	Martin v Scribal Pty Ltd (1954) 92 CLR 17, at 59. 
83 	Welch Perrin & Co Pty Ltd v Worrell (1961) 106 CLR 588. 
84 	Elconnex v Gerard Industries,(1993) 25 IPR 173 at 188. 
85 	See Glaverbel v British Coal [1994] RPC 443, at 495; Lumen yte International Corp v Light 
Transmission Cables Pty Ltd (1985) 31 IPR 527, at 540. 
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appearing for the first time in the Patents Act 1949 (UK) 86 and the Patents Act 
1952 (Cth). The Full Federal Court discussed the origin of the fair basing concept 
in CCOM v Jeijing,87 stating that it was derived from two propositions, first that 
the claim should be no wider than warranted by the disclosure in the 
specification, and secondly that the complete specification should conform with 
the provisional specification. The traditional justification for such a 
requirement is that since disclosure is the consideration that the patentee gives 
in return for protection of the article embodying the inventive idea, they 
should cover the same things. 88 The Court in CCOM expressed some concern 
about use of the Mullard rationale now that fair basing is firmly established in 
statutory form. It pointed to Barwick Cis words of caution, that the question of 
fair basing should be narrow one, focussing on whether the claims travel 
beyond the matter disclosed in the specification, and not by considering 
whether grant of a monopoly would be undue reward for the disclosure. 89 The 
Court in CCOM further cautioned against "an over meticulous verbal 
analysis." 90 A number of cases have considered the requirements for the two 
aspects of fair basing, first, of the complete specification, with regard to the 
provisional specification, and secondly, of the claims, with regard to the body of 
the complete specification. 
• Fair basing of the complete specification, with regard to the provisional 
specification. 
Where an application includes only a provisional specification, the 
complete specification must be lodged within 12 months. 91 It is often of vital 
importance to validate the link between the provisional specification and 
the complete specification, because in the interim between the two the prior 
art base or common general knowledge may have changed sufficiently to 
put the novelty and inventive step requirements in doubt. Challenges are 
usually made on the basis that the patent is not entitled to the priority date 
86 	Sections 4, 5 and 6. Note that the term does not appear in the Patents Act 1977 (UK), see 
Chapter 6. 
87 	(1994) 28 IPR 481, at 496-501. 
88 	See, for example, Lord Macmillan in Mullard Radio Valve Co Ltd v Philco Radio and 
Television Corp Of Great Britain Ltd [1936] RPC 323. 
89 	In Olin Corp v Super Cartridge Co Pty Ltd (1977) 14 ALR 149. 
90 	At 500-501. 
91 	Regulation 3.10. 
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in the provisional specification, because the complete specification is not 
fairly based on it. This becomes critical in the assessment of what was prior 
art or common general knowledge at the priority date. 
In answering the question of whether the complete specification in issue is 
fairly based on the provisional specification, the primary focus of inquiry is 
whether there is a "real and reasonably clear disclosure" of the invention in 
the provisional specification. 92 The task of the court is quite clearly not a 
matter of isolating the essential features of the invention claimed in the 
provisional specification and determining whether they correspond with 
those claimed in the complete specification. 93 This test is inappropriate 
because all that is required of the provisional specification is to "describe 
generally and fairly the nature of the invention". 94 The comparison that 
should be made is between the claims in the complete specification with the 
whole of the provisional specification: the provisional specification should 
reveal the "essence" of the invention claimed. 95 The Full Federal Court 
most recently endorsed these principles of interpretation of this aspect of the 
fair basis requirement in Leonardis v Sartas. 96 
• Fair basing of the claims, with regard to the body of the complete 
specification. 
As Lockhart J pointed out in Decor Corp v Dart Industries, the function of 
the claims is to precisely define the monopoly claimed, the primary object 
being to limit and not extend the monopoly. 97 In drawing up a claim, the 
patentee is faced with a trade-off. Narrowly drafted claims lower the 
likelihood of infringement, but are more likely to be novel than broadly 
based claims.98 Fair basing is designed to ensure that the invention claimed 
is the same as the invention disclosed in the specification. It would appear 
92 	CCOM v Jiejing, (1994) 28 IPR 481 at 501. 
9 3 	These types of comparisons are performed by the court in determining issues of 
infringement and novelty, see later. 
9 4 	Per Lockhart J in Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 28 IPR 383. 
9 5 	Ibid. 
96 	Leonardis v Sartas No 1 Pty Ltd (1996) 35 IPR 23. 
9 7 	Decor Corp Phi Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1989) 13 IPR 385, at 391. 
98 	See Gummow J in Sartas v Koukourou (1995) 30 IPR 479, at 497. 
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that three questions need to be asked to determine whether the claims are 
fairly based on the disclosure: 
whether the invention is broadly (generally) described in the 
specification; 
- whether the description of the invention is inconsistent with the claims; 
whether the claim includes a characteristic of the invention not included 
in the specification. 99 
Gummow J has pointed out that in the same way that fair basing is 
ascertained as between the complete and provisional specifications, so too 
here it is not appropriate to isolate and compare the essential integers of the 
specification and the claim in question. 100 It is sufficient for there to be a real 
and reasonably clear disclosure. 
Part 5: 	Elements of a Patentable Invention and Patent Validity 
For a invention to be patentable, it must not only fulfil the specification 
requirements, but must also satisfy each of the criteria set out in subsection 
18(1) Patents Act 1990. Only then does it become a patentable invention. To 
recapitulate, section 18(1) requires: 
• a manner of manufacture; 
• novelty; 
• inventive step; 
• usefulness; and 
• no secret use. 
There is no equivalent to subsection 18(1) in the 1952 Act. The only 
reference to the requirements for a patentable invention in that Act is in the 
Definitions in section 6. The same language is used for the definition of 
invention as in the 1990 Act. Although not explicitly recognised in the 
definition of invention, it is evident that by 1952 the notion of invention 
incorporated the separate elements of manner of manufacture, novelty, 
inventive step, utility and secret use, because these were recognised as grounds 
99 	See, for example, Rehm v Websters Security Systems (1988) 11 IPR 289, at 303; W.R. Grace 
& Co v Asahi Kasei Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha [1993] AIPC 1190-974, at 39,277. Adopted 
from Re Mond Nickel Co Ltd's Application [1956] RPC 189 at 194. 
100 	In Rehm v Websters Security Systems (1988) 11 IPR 289, at 304. 
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for challenging the validity of the patent, either in oppositionl 01 or 
revocation 102 proceedings. Note, however, that at the examination stage there 
was no requirement in the 1952 Act for the Examiner to ascertain whether the 
invention involved an inventive step. 103 In addition, prior to this in the 1903 
Patents Act inventive step was not even a ground for opposition, but could be 
raised in revocation proceedings. The lack of this requirement had considerable 
impact on judicial interpretations of the novelty requirement. 104 An extensive 
body of case law has considered each of the elements that is required to satisfy a 
valid patent claim in the 1952 Patents Act, 105 and much of this remains 
relevant to the 1990 Act. 
Differences between the 1952 Act and 1990 Act have been subject to some 
analysis. 106 Although the 1990 Act revoked the 1952 Act, regard must be had to 
the transitional provisions in section 233. These provisions are important, 
because patents that were granted under the 1952 Act are still open to challenge 
in revocation proceedings. Subsection 233(1) ensures that the 1990 Act applies to 
any patent granted under the 1952 Act as if it had been granted under the 1990 
Act. Through subsection 233(4), however, challenges to the validity of a patent 
can only be made on a ground that was also available under the 1952 Act. 107 
According to Wilcox J in Philips the purpose of subsection 233(4) "is to 
maintain the existing rights of the 1952 Act patent-holders, but no more." 108 
This requires that the relevant ground is made out under the provisions of 
101 	Section 59, 1952 Act. 
102 	Section 100, 1952 Act. 
103 	Section 48(1), 1952 Act. 
104 	See, for example, Gnffin v Isaacs (1938) 12 AU J 169 and the discussion by Gummow J in R.D. 
Werner & Co Inc v Bailey Aluminium Products Pty Ltd (1989) 13 IPR 513. 
105 	Reviewed in Ricketson, S., Intellectual Property Cases, Materials and Commentary (1994) 
Butterworths, Chapters 13 and 14. 
106 	Collins, T.J., "Patents Act 1990: Opposition to Grant of a Standard Patent" (1993) 4 
Australian Intellectual Property Journal 174; Montague, P.E., "Biotechnology Patents and 
the Problem of Obviousness" (1993) 4 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 3; Speagle, 
D. and M. Dowling, "The 1990 Patents Act: Unfinished Reform" (1993) 4 Australian 
Intellectual Property Journal 166. 
107 	See the judgment of Wilcox J in NV Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken v Mirabella 
International Pty Ltd (1992) 24 1PR 1; approved by the Full Court (1993) 26 IPR 513. 
108 	At 11. 
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both Acts. By these means, according to Lockhart J in the Full Court decision in 
the same case, the 1952 Act patentee clearly will be no worse off than if the 1952 
provisions had continued to operate, but may also be better off if a part of a 
ground in the 1952 Act does not appear in the 1990 Act.109 Subsection 233(4) is 
particularly relevant when the novelty and inventive step elements are under 
consideration (see below at 5.2). 
5.1 Manner of Manufacture 
Manner of manufacture can be thought of as the starting point in 
determining patentability. The Industrial Property Advisory Committee (IPAC) 
in its 1984 Report110 strongly urged that this test should be retained in its existing 
form in the new Act, rather than replacing it with a more explicit statement of 
what is patentable. The Committee argued that the manner of manufacture test 
has exhibited the capacity to respond to technological innovations through an 
extensive body of case law. The government endorsed this recommendation, 
stating in the Explanatory Memorandum to section 18 that this test was preferred 
over a more inflexible codified definition. In Europe, in contrast, a specific set of 
exclusions was opted for in the European Patent Convention, and adopted in the 
Patents Act 1977 (UK). 111 
Numerous attempts were made in the early English cases to define the 
term "manufacture", the tendency being to interpret it as having a flexible and 
expansive meaning, including both the products of manufacture and the process 
of manufacture itself. In Boulton v Bul1, 112 for example, Eyre CJ included in the 
concept "any new results of principles carried into practice" and also "new 
processes in any art producing effects useful to the public". 113 Furthermore, even 
if the products or processes were known, the novel combination of the two 
109 	At 518. 
110 	Industrial Property Advisory Committee Report on Patents, Innovation and Competition 
in Australia (1984). 
111 	Sections 1 and 4 of the Patents Act (1977) UK. These provisions are set out in full in 
Chapter 6. 
112 	(1795) 1 H B1 463; 126 ER 651. A number of the other early cases are discussed in National 
Research and Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252 
(henceforth referred to as NRDC). 
113 	Ibid., at 666. 
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together may be patentable. 114 Later, however, attempts were made to narrow the 
scope of manner of manufacture by introducing the requirement of a "vendible 
product" arising out of the process of manufacture, and in Re GEC's 
Application, 115 Morton J, while denying that he was laying down a hard and fast 
rule, proposed that 
"a method or process is a manner of manufacture if it (a) results in the production of 
some vendible product or (b) improves or restores to its former condition a vendible 
product or (c) has the effect of preserving from deterioration some vendible product to 
which it is applied." 116 
The Morton "rule", as it became known, was adopted in a number of 
subsequent cases, 117 and proved to be a major obstacle to patenting of biological 
processes, because of the difficulty in demonstrating that a vendible product had 
been produced. Although the rule could not prevent patenting of biological 
products, it created problems where attempts were made to patent a process 
where a previously described product was given a new, previously unknown or 
unthought of application. This difficulty was overcome in 1959 in the Australian 
High Court case of National Research and Development Corporation v 
Commissioner of Patents (NRDC). 118 The High Court widened the notion of 
vendible product, by treating the word "product" as any artificially created state of 
affairs and "vendible" as having an economic effect. Using these broad criteria, 
the High Court was able to approve the patent for a known herbicide which was 
used in a novel way to selectively kill weeds from crop areas. The Court 
emphasised that it is a mistake to ask whether a process or product is a manner of 
manufacture. 
"The right question is: 'Is this a proper subject of the letters patent according to the 
principles which have been developed for the application of s6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies?'" 119 
The decision in NRDC has been described as a watershed, 120 and has had 
important consequences. It has been adopted as the test for manner of 
114 	For example Crane v Price (1842) 1 Webb PC 393; 134 ER 239. 
115 	[1942] RPC 1. 
116 	Ibid., at 4. 
117 	Reviewed by Dixon CJ, Kitto and Windeyer H  in NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252. 
118 	Ibid. 
119 	Ibid., at 269. 
120 	By Barwick CJ in Joos v Commissioner of Patents (1972) 126 CLR 611. 
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manufacture in Australia 121 and New Zealand,122 and was accepted in England 
prior to enacting of the new Patents Act in 1977.123 For subject matter to be a 
manner of manufacture as interpreted in NRDC, it must belong to the useful 
rather than the fine arts, it must provide a material advantage and its value to 
the country must be in the field of economic endeavour. 124 Subject matter 
which may be considered to be suitable for patenting includes new products, 
new methods of producing old products, and new uses for old products. 
5.2 Novelty 
Perhaps novelty is the most obvious requirement for patenting: an 
invention must be new. Even so, novelty is very much a technical term in this 
area of the law and has lost much of its natural meaning. Novelty can also be 
referred to as anticipation, prior publication or disclosure. Novelty is lost when 
the invention has already been disclosed in recorded form, or orally, or by use. 
5.2.1 Novelty in Relation to the Other Patenting Requirements 
All three key requirements in the present Act of manner of manufacture, 
novelty and inventive step have their origin in the "manner of new 
manufacture" in section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. The three areas 
gradually became distinct entities through the 18th and 19th century case law, 
and are now recognised as such in section 18(1) of the 1990 Act. In many 
respects, however, the areas overlap and it is difficult to avoid the temptation 
of introducing aspects of one of the tests into another area. The problems 
associated with this were discussed in detail by Gummow and Lockhart JJ in 
R.D. Werner v Bailey Aluminium 125 with respect to novelty and inventive 
step, and reiterated in Nicaro Holdings v Martin Engineering. 126  The 
introduction of a requirement for inventiveness into the novelty ground arose 
121 	This view has been strongly endorsed in the recent cases of Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v 
Rescare Ltd (1994) 28 1PR 383 and CCOM Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd (1994) 28 IPR 481. 
122 
	
	Swift & Co's Application [1960] NZLR 775 and Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Commissioner 
of Patents [1979] 2 NZLR 591. 
123 	For example, Swift & Co's Application [1962] RPC 37. 
124 	These requirements are listed in NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252 at 275. 
125 	R.D. Werner & Co Inc v Bailey Aluminium Products Pty Ltd (1989) 13 1PR 513. 
126 	Nicaro Holdings Pty Ltd v Martin Engineering Co (1990) 16 IPR 545. 
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in the early patent cases because of the lack of an inventive step ground for 
challenging the validity of a patent in opposition proceedings in the 1903 Act. 
In R.D. Werner, Gummow J explained that where want of invention was 
manifest the courts were reluctant to allow the grant of the patent which could 
subsequently be revoked for lack of inventive step. 
The presence of an inventive step ground in opposition proceedings in 
both the 1952 and 1990 Acts 127 suggests that assessment of the novelty 
requirement should not now involve a need for there to be an inventive step. 
Even so, according to Lockhart J, where there is clearly no inventive merit 
whatsoever over the prior art there will be no novelty. What Lockhart J 
requires for a patentable invention is "something more than a mere workshop 
variation or mechanical equivalent". The requirement of inventiveness and 
use of the terms such as "workshop adjustment". "workshop improvement" 
and "workshop alteration" are usually restricted to consideration of the 
inventive step requirement. 128 Gummow J preferred to avoid all discussion of 
inventiveness under the novelty test. But even for him, the invention can still 
be categorised as a mere workshop improvement over the prior art without 
reliance being placed on the ground of obviousness. The invention will simply 
lack novelty because it is sufficiently disclosed in the prior art, 129 as required by 
the long-accepted formulation of Lord Westbury in Hills v Evans: 
"the antecedent statement must be such that a person of ordinary knowledge of the 
subject would at once perceive, understand, and be able practically to apply the 
discovery without the necessity of making further experiments and gaining further 
information before the invention can be made useful." 130 
5.2.2 Novelty Requirements 
The novelty requirements are set out in section 7(1) of the Patents Act 
1990. 
127 	Paragraph 59(1)(h) 1952 Act; subsection 59(b) 1990 Act. 
128 	See, for example, the comments of Gununow J in Nicaro Holdings v Martin Engineering 
(1990) 16 IPR 545, at 560 and 565. 
129 	See Gummow J in R.D. Werner v Bailey Aluminium (1989) 13 1PR 513, at 541 and in Nicaro 
Holdings v Martin Engineering (1990) 16 IPR 545, at 566. 
130 	Hills v Evans (1862) 31 LJ Ch 457. 
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	7. (1) 	For the purposes of this Act, an invention is to be taken to be novel when 
compared with the prior art base unless it is not novel in the light of any one of the 
following kinds of information, each of which must be considered separately: 
(a) prior art information (other than that mentioned in paragraph (c)) made 
publicly available in a single document or through doing a single act; 
(b) prior art information (other than that mentioned in paragraph (c)) made 
publicly available in 2 or more related documents or through doing 2 or more 
related acts, if the relationship between the documents or acts is such that 
a person skilled in the relevant art in the patent area would treat them as 
a single source of information; 
(c) prior art information contained in a single specification of the kind 
mentioned in subparagraph (b) (ii) of the definition of "prior art base" in 
Schedule 1. 
The definitions of prior art base and prior art information in Schedule 1 
are also pertinent: 
"prior art base" means: 
(a) 	in relation to deciding whether an invention does or does not involve an 
inventive step: 
(i) information in a document, being a document publicly available anywhere 
in the patent area; and 
(ii) information made publicly available through doing an act anywhere in the 
patent area; and 
(iii) where the invention is the subject of a standard patent or an application for 
a standard patent - information in a document publicly available outside 
the patent area; and 
(b) 	in relation to deciding whether an invention is or is not novel: 
(i) information of a kind mentioned in paragraph (a); and 
(ii) information contained in a published application filed in respect of a 
complete application where: 
(A) if the information is, or were to be, the subject of a claim of the 
specification, the claim has, or would have, a priority date earlier 
than that of the claim under consideration, and 
(B) the specification was published after the priority date of the 
claim under consideration; and 
(C) the information was contained in the specification on its filing date 
and when it was published; 
"Prior art information" means: 
( a) 	for the purposes of subsection 7 (1) - information that is part of the prior art 
base in relation to deciding whether an invention is or is not novel; and 
(b) 	for the purposes of subsection 7 (3) - information that is part of the prior art 
base in relation to deciding whether an invention does or does not involve 
an inventive step. 
For the definition of document section 7 refers to the Acts Interpretation 
Act 1901 (Cth): 
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25. 	In any Act, unless the contrary intention appears: 
"document" includes: 
(a) any paper or other material on which there is writing; 
(b) any paper or other material on which there are marks, figures, symbols or 
' perforations having a meaning for persons qualified to interpret them; and 
(c) any article or material from which sounds, images or writings are capable 
of being reproduced with or without the aid of any other article or device; 
"record" includes information stored or recorded by means of a computer; 
"writing" includes any mode of representing or reproducing words, figures, drawings or 
symbols in a visible form. 
Patent area is defined in Schedule 1 of the 1990 Act: 
"patent area" means: 
(a) Australia; and 
(b) the Australian Continental shelf; and 
(c) the waters above the Australian continental shelf; and 
(d) the airspace above Australia and the Australian continental shelf. 
5.2.3 Comparison Between the 1990 Act and the 1952 Act 
The considerations that the Examiner had to take into account in 
determining novelty were set out in s48(1) in the 1952 Act. Opposition and 
revocation grounds were set out in ss59 and 100, respectively. The main change 
in novelty requirements in the 1990 Act is the geographical area in which the 
prior art base is determined. Under the 1952 Act, the prior art base was restricted 
to those things published, orally disclosed or used within Australia, that is, 
there was a national standard of novelty. 131 At the time of the IPAC Report 
many countries had already adopted a universal standard. Europe has an 
absolute universal standard, which includes anything made public by any 
means anywhere in the world. In the USA, on the other hand, there is a 
limited universal standard, which includes publications from anywhere in the 
world, and national use. The Committee recommended adoption of the limited 
universal standard. This was justified on two bases: first, that the universal 
standard should apply because transfer of information was so improved that it 
was no longer sensible to assess publications on a national level; secondly, that 
an absolute universal standard would increase uncertainty of validity because 
of the impossibility of verifying the lack of prior oral disclosures or use 
131 	See IPAC Report at 44. 
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anywhere in the world by the patentee. 132 These recommendations were 
adopted in paragraph 7(1)(a) and paragraph (a) of the definition of prior art base 
in the 1990 Act. 
The other major change from the 1952 Act was the abolition of prior 
claiming, through which a prior claim in an earlier patent specification which 
was unpublished at the priority date of the patent in issue could be used to 
show lack of novelty. The opinion of IPAC was that this approach was too 
narrow and that a "whole contents" approach was preferable, through which 
any disclosure in an earlier unpublished patent specification, irrespective of 
whether it was in the claim or the body of the specification, could be used. This 
recommendation was adopted in paragraph 7(1)(c) and subparagraph (b)(ii) of 
the definition of prior art base of the 1990 Act. 
These changes have considerably broadened the scope of objection to 
patents on the ground of want of novelty, although the breadth of the prior art 
still does not match that in Europe. There is no case law to date through which 
to assess the effect of the changes. 
5.2.4 The Test for Novelty 
The accepted test for novelty probably remains the "reverse infringement 
test" as propounded by Aickin j  in Meyers Taylor: 
"The basic test for anticipation or want of novelty is the same as that for 
infringement and generally one can properly ask oneself whether the alleged 
anticipation would, if the patent were valid, constitute an infringement." 133 
The test is the same as that propounded by the English Court of Appeal 
in the General Tire case. 134 The same test applies whether the prior disclosure 
is in documentary form or through use. 135 The prior art in question must 
132 	Ibid., at 45. 
133 	Meyers Taylor Pty Ltd v Vicarr Industries (1977) 137 CLR 228 at 235. See also Minnesota 
Mining and Manufacturing Co v Briersdorf (Australia) Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 253; R.D. 
Werner v Bailey Aluminium (1989) 13 IPR 513; Nicaro Holdings v Martin Engineering 
(1990) 16 IPR 545. 
134 	General Tire & Rubber Co. v Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. Ltd. [1972] RPC 457. 
135 	Windsurfing International Inc v Petit [1984] 3 IPR 449. 
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disclose all of the features of the invention, in clear, unequivocal and 
unmistakable terms. According to the Court of Appeal: 
"To anticipate the patentee's claim the prior publication must contain clear and 
unmistakable directions to do what the patentee claims to have invented ... A 
signpost, however clear, upon the road to the patentee's invention will not suffice. 
The prior inventor must be clearly shown to have planted his flag at the precise 
destination before the patentee." 136 
Although the prior publication must disclose all of the relevant features, 
or essential integers of the invention, the authorities make it clear that it must 
be taken as being read by one skilled in the art. Provided that the prior 
publication gives enough information for a competent workman in the art to 
produce the invention there will be anticipation, even when the prior 
publication contains a minor defect, 137 or the invention in issue contains a 
slight modification of it. The accepted measure is whether the changes are to 
essential integers of the invention, or to inessential integers, for example by the 
mere substitution of mechanical equivalents which perform analogous 
purposes. 138 
In Advanced Building Systems v Ramset Fasteners, Hill J set out the task 
as determining the essential integers of the prior publication and the alleged 
invention, and if the only difference arises from an inessential integer there 
will be anticipation. 139 This requires reading and interpreting the prior 
publication and the patent specification in the light of what was generally 
known at their respective dates of publication. 140 Although construction of the 
material is a matter of law for the court, it must be construed from the 
perspective of the person skilled in the relevant art at the relevant date. The 
question of whether the patentee's claim is anticipated by the prior publication 
is a question of fact. If the directions contained in the prior publication would, if 
136 	General Tire v Firestone Tyre [1972] RPC 457, at 486. 
137 	Acme Bedstead Co Ltd v Newlands Bros Ltd (1937) 58 CLR 689. 
138 	Sunbeam Corp v Morphy Richards (Australia) Pty Ltd (1961) 35 ALJR 212 at 220; R.D. 
Werner v Bailey Aluminium (1989) 13 IPR 513; Dennison Manufacturing Co v Monarch 
Marking Systems Inc (1983) 66 ALR 265; Nicaro Holdings v Martin Engineering (1990) 16 
IPR 545. 
139 	Advanced Building Systems Pty Ltd v Ramset Fasteners (Aust) Pty Ltd (1993) 26 IPR 171 
at 182. 
140 	General Tire v Firestone Tyre [1972] RPC 457, at 485. 
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carried out after the grant of patent, inevitably infringe the patent there is 
anticipation. If, on the other hand, the directions can be carried out in ways 
which would not infringe the patent there is no anticipation. 141 
In assessing the prior art base for anticipation, it is only permissible to 
look at single documents, unless other documents are incorporated by 
reference. 142 That incorporation must be unequivocal and must demonstrate a 
clear intention on the part of the draftsman that the cross referencing system 
was merely used as a shorthand means of creating a single document. To do 
otherwise would be to make a mosaic by picking out individual items of 
information from of existing pieces prior art and assembling them together. 
According to Aickin J, "that is an understandable, though not permissible, 
process." 143 The degree of connection required to make two documents 
dependent or independent of one another depends on the case in question and 
the nature of the art. 144 
Where the claim is for a combination patent, that is, a patent which 
"combines a number of elements which interact with each other to produce a 
new result or product," 143 it is the combination that must be disclosed in the 
prior publication. This is because, although each of the integers may not be 
novel, it is the interaction of the combined integers to produce the new result 
which constitutes the invention. 146 Unless "each item of prior art, taken 
alone" 147 discloses all of the integers of the combination there will be no 
anticipation. 
141 	Ibid., at 486. 
142 	R.D. Werner v Bailey Aluminium (1989) 13 IPR 513; Nicaro Holdings v Martin 
Engineering (1990) 16 IPR 545. 
143 	Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing v Beiersdmf (1980) 144 CLR 253, at 293. 
144 	See Gummow J in Nicaro Holdings v Martin Engineering (1990) 16 IPR 545, at 570. 
145 	Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing v Beiersdorf (1980) 144 CLR 253, at 266 per Aickin J. 
146 	Nicaro Holdings v Martin Engineering (1990) 16 IPR 545. at 553. 
147 	Lockhart J in E Street Enterprises Inc v CPS Housewares Pty Ltd (1995) 32 IPR 465 at 476. 
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5.3 Inventive Step 
It is not enough for an invention to be novel. There must also be some 
inventive ingenuity, "some difficulty overcome, some barrier crossed." 148  In 
the terms of the statute, the invention must "involve an inventive step". 149 
This element has also been expressed in terms of the need for the invention to 
be non-obvious. 
5.3.1 Inventive Step Requirements 
The test for inventive step appears in subsections 7(2) and (3) of the 1990 
Act: 
	
7 (2) 	For the purposes of this Act an invention is to be taken to involve an 
inventive step when compared with the prior art base unless the invention would 
have been obvious to a person skilled in the relevant art in the light of the common 
general knowledge as it existed in the patent area before the priority date of the 
relevant claim whether the knowledge is considered separately or together with 
either of the kinds of information mentioned in subsection (3), each of which must be 
considered separately. 
(3) 	For the purposes of subsection (2), the kinds of information are: 
(a) prior art information made publicly available in a single document or 
through doing a single act; and 
(b) prior art information made publicly available in 2 or more related 
documents, or through doing 2 or more related acts, if the relationship 
between the documents or acts is such that a person skilled in the relevant 
art in the patent area would treat them as a single source of that 
information; 
being information that the skilled person mentioned in subsection (2) could, before the 
priority date of the relevant claim, be reasonably expected to have ascertained, 
, understood and regarded as relevant work in the relevant patent area. 
The expressions prior art base, prior art information and patent area are 
defined in Schedule 1 and documents are defined in section 25 of the Acts 
Interpretation Act. All of these are extracted in the novelty section, above. As 
for novelty, prior art base covers documentary disclosures from anywhere in 
the world and prior oral disclosures and prior use from within Australia. Note, 
however, that for inventive step the prior art base does not include prior 
patents which were unpublished at the priority date of the patent in issue. 
148 	R.D. Werner v Bailey Aluminium (1989) 13 IPR 513, at 523 per Lockhart J. 
149 	Section 18(1)(b)(ii). 
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This test for inventive step is somewhat different from that developed in 
the cases for the 1952 Act, and therefore the two Acts need to be considered 
separately. To reiterate section 7, the 1990 Act test includes reference to both the 
common general knowledge and to single items of prior art information which 
the skilled address could reasonably have been expected to have ascertained, 
understood and regarded as relevant. The 1952 Act test is restricted to the 
common general knowledge in the field, with no reference to documents in 
existence but not part of the common general knowledge. 150 Consequently, 
through subsection 233(4) of the 1990 Act, the broadened inventive step test in 
the 1990 Act cannot be used in relation to patents granted under the 1952 Act. 151 
5.3.2 Inventive Step under the 1952 Act: the Aickin Test 
Under the 1952 Act, the inventive step ground in both opposition and 
revocation proceedings required: 
that the invention, so far as claimed in any claim, was obvious and did not involve an 
inventive step, having regard to what was known or used in Australia on or before the 
priority date of the claim. 152 
The test for inventive step can be broken up into three considerations: 
• who is the hypothetical skilled addressee? 
• what is the state of their knowledge? 
• in the light of these considerations, what was obvious? 153 
5.3.3 The Hypothetical Skilled Addressee 
The focus of inquiry is not on the inventor but on the relevant skilled 
addressee. 154 That person must be both skilled in the art and non-inventive. 
Early patent cases described such people as being "not just skilled artisans... [but] 
150 	See, for example, E Street Enterprises v CPS Housewares (1995) IPR 465, at 474. 
151 	See, for example, NV Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken v Mirabella International Pty Ltd 
(1993) 24 IPR 1; Winner v Ammar Holdings Pty Ltd [1993] AIPC 190-971. 
152 	Paragraph 59(1)(g) (opposition); Paragraph 100(1)(e) (revocation). 
153 	See, for example, Brysland, G., "A Comment on Infringement and Obviousness in 
Australian Patent Law" (1981) 12 Federal Law Review 344, at 350. 
154 	W.R. Grace v Asahi Kasei Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha [1993] AIPC 1190-974, at 39,274. 
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trained engineers and scientists"155 or "highly qualified technologist[s] in the 
research department". 156 As technologies improve so too do the skills of the 
skilled worker in the field, who may now be a team of Ph.D. level researchers. It 
becomes difficult to credit such workers with no inventive faculty. According to 
Professor Ricketson, the notion of a skilled but uninventive addressee has an 
air of unreality about it. 157 This is particularly the case for genetic research 
which requires a very high level of skill of its researchers. Nevertheless, the 
requirement remains that there should be some inventiveness, no matter how 
small, that goes beyond the skill of the calling. 158 
5.3.4 Knowledge to Be Imputed to the Skilled Addressee 
According to Williams J in HPM Industries v Gerard Industries 159 the 
words "known or used" in the 1952 Act included not only the common general 
knowledge in the field but also prior publications which were not part of the 
common general knowledge. This test has been said to create a presumption of 
omniscience on the skilled addressee. 160 It was criticised, but not overruled, in a 
number of cases because it imposed too high a standard, by requiring that there 
be an inventive step when compared with all prior disclosures, albeit in only 
Australia. Moreover, it merged the novelty and inventive step 
requirements. 161 Ultimately, in the Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing case, 
the High Court was given the opportunity to overrule HPM Industries. Aickin J 
gave the leading judgment. After reviewing the history of the Australian 
legislation, he was satisfied that the observations of Williams J should not be 
regarded as "correctly stating the law in Australia."162 
For Aickin J the proper question is: "is the invention itself obvious, not 
whether a diligent searcher might find pieces from which there might have 
155 	Sunbeam Corp v Morphy-Richards (Australia) Pty Ltd (1961) 35 ALJR at 212. 
156 	Johns-Manville Corporation's Patent [1967] RPC 479. 
157 	Ricketson, S., Cases and Materials on Intellectual Property (1994) Butterworths, at 684. 
158 	See Allsop Inc v Bintag Ltd (1989) 15 IFR 686. 
159 	HPM Industries Pty Ltd v Gerard Industries Ltd (1957) 98 CLR 427. 
160 	For example, Brysland at 352. 
161 	For example, Windeyer J in Sunbeam Corp. v Morphy-Richards (1961) 35 ALJR. 
162 	Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing v Beiersdorf (1980) 144 CLR 253, at 292. 
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been selected the elements which make up the patent." 163 If it were otherwise, 
new combinations of old integers would always be obvious. For combination 
patents, therefore, it is the selection of integers that must be shown to be 
obvious. 164 It is inappropriate to separate out the integers and determine 
whether each one individually was obvious. 165 The focus of inquiry, according 
to Aickin J is: 
"whether the invention would have been obvious to a non-inventive worker in the 
field, equipped with the common general knowledge in that particular field as at 
the priority date, without regard to documents in existence but not part of such 
common general knowledge." 
Justice Aickin's reworking of the test for inventive step was generally 
accepted in subsequent cases. For example, Waddell J in Windsurfing 
International Inc v Petit affirmed that the same test applies whether the prior 
art in issue is publication or use, that is, both must have become part of the 
common general knowledge of the hypothetical skilled addressee in the field 
for them to be relevant to the consideration of obviousness. 167 
Common general knowledge must be clearly distinguished from public 
knowledge. Public knowledge incorporates any prior publication whereas 
common general knowledge includes only that which would be known to the 
ordinary skilled addressee. According to the Full Federal Court in W.R. Grace v 
Asahi, 
"[it] represents the matters that the skilled person will have at the back of his or 
her mind when coming to consider the prior art, so that each document alleged to 
constitute the prior art is to be regarded as the addressee would regard it in the light 
of common general lcnowledge." 168 
163 	Ibid., at 293. 
164 	Ibid. 
165 	Ibid. See also Elconnex Pty Ltd v Gerard Industries Pty Ltd (1992) 25 1PR 173. 
166 	Aickin J in Wellcome Foundation Ltd. v VR Laboratories (Aust) Pty Ltd (1981) 148 CLR 
262, at 270. 
167 	[1984] 3 lPR 449. 
168 	Northrop, Lockhart and Cooper D, W.R. Grace v Asahi [1993] AIPC 190-974. 
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For material in the prior art to be relevant it must have become part of 
the stock of common general knowledge in Australia. 169 This depends very 
much on the art in question. It may be that in a particular art patent 
specifications would be read routinely and would therefore be part of the 
common general knowledge. But this is not the case for all areas. 170 A 1991 
Practice Notice on Inventive Step 171 indicates the types of evidence that the 
examiner should consider in determining the common general knowledge. 
These include standard texts and handbooks, standard and some technical 
dictionaries, concessions made in the application itself, other publications and, 
under certain conditions, other patent specifications. It is for the examiner to 
use his or her judgment to determine whether new concepts in these 
documents are part of the common general knowledge. 
5.3.5 Obviousness 
A "scintilla of inventiveness" is enough for an invention to be non-
obv ious. 172 It is irrelevant that the idea is simple, or that once the idea is 
conceived it is simple to put it into effect. A number of tests have been 
suggested in the cases. A 1991 Practice Note of the Patent Office refers to some of 
the tests for establishing obviousness, including "whether the invention would 
in effect suggest itself", "... not, could the invention be derived from the prior 
proposal, but, would it?" and whether it was "so obvious that it would at once 
occur to anyone acquainted with the subject, and desirous of accomplishing that 
end." 173 
The test is objective and is a question of fact to be determined on the 
evidence admitted. The burden of proof is on the person challenging the 
validity of the patent. Relevant evidence includes: expert evidence; evidence of 
long felt want; commercial success of the invention; and research and 
experiments of the patentee. 
169 	Wellcome Foundation v VR Laboratories (1981) 148 CLR 262, at 284. 
170 	See the comments of Aickin J in Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing v Beiersdorf (1980) 
144 CLR 253, at 293. 
171 	Australian Industrial Property Organisation, Practice Note 1991 (No. 10) Inventive Step. 
172 	Aickin J in Meyers Taylor v Vicarr Industries (1977) 137 CLR 228, at 249. 
173 	Practice Note 1991 (No. 10) Inventive Step, at 16,123:16,124. 
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• Expert evidence 
Expert evidence from people skilled in the field is admissible in 
determining both the common general knowledge of the non-inventive 
skilled worker in the field and whether the invention is obvious in the light 
of that common general knowledge. 174 Indeed, it has been suggested that 
expert evidence will almost invariably be required and will largely be 
determinative of the common general knowledge. 175 It is for the court to 
decide whether the invention was obvious, although it is within the 
competence of the expert witness to say, for example, that the invention was 
a routine variation of what was already known in the field. 176 
The evidence of experts in the field is likely to dominate any trial in which 
inventive step is raised as a ground for invalidating a patent. My viewing of 
the affidavit evidence in the Murex v Chiron case 177 supports this 
proposition. 178 
The level of qualification of the expert will go to the weight of the evidence, 
and not to admissibility. 179 In Molnlycke v Proctor and Gamble, the English 
Court of Appeal referred to expert evidence as primary and all other 
evidence as secondary. 18° There are some problems, however, with reliance 
on expert evidence because of the so-called trap of hindsight. Once a thing 
becomes known and used, it becomes easy to say that the initial idea was 
obvious. Many judges, and particularly Aickin J, have warned of the dangers 
of hindsight and "ex post facto dissection of the invention". Secondary 
174 	Winner v Ammar Holdings Pty Ltd [1993] AIPC 190-971. 
175 	See the decision of the delegate of the Commissioner of Patents in Bodenseewerk Perkin- 
Elmer Gmbh v Varian Australia Pty Ltd (1996) IPR 110, at 152, following the English case 
of Molnlycice AB v Proctor and Gamble [1994] RPC 49. 
176 	See Lockhart J in Elconnex v Gerard Industries (1992) 25 IPR 173, at 187. 
177 	Murex Diagnostics Australia Pty Ltd v Chiron Corporation No. G106 of 1994. Note that 
the case was ultimately settled out of court. Argued before Burchett J in July and August 
1996. 
178 	I would like to thank Mr. Luigi Palombi, solicitor for Murex, for allowing me access to this 
affidavit material. 
179 	Elconnex v Gerard Industries (1992) 25 IPR 173. 
180 	Molnlycice AB v Proctor and Gamble [1994] RPC 49, at 113. 
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evidence is important in rebutting the hindsight argument. 181 The weight 
to be attached to this secondary evidence will vary from case to case. 
• Long felt want 
According to Lockhart J, evidence of failure of attempts to solve a well 
known problem may be a powerful indication of non-obviousness, by 
indicating a "long felt want". 182  Where others have failed to solve the 
problem for themselves and immediately produce an infringing article, "the 
inference may be irresistible that the invention was not obvious." 183 
• Commercial success of the invention 
Of itself, commercial success can never be decisive of inventiveness, but is a 
material consideration. 184 
• Research and experiments of the patentee 
Although the inventive step test is objective and the focus of inquiry is on 
the notional addressee, evidence of the patentee's experiments has been 
admitted by the courts. According to Aickin J, admission of such evidence 
may show either that the experiments were part of the inventive step, or 
that they were routine work. 185 That evidence will not be determinative, 
but is merely suggestive of whether the invention could have been reached 
by trial and error. Use of such material to attack the patent may turn out to 
be unhelpful, because it will often draw on hindsight and ex post facto 
analysis of the invention. 186 It should therefore be used with caution. 
In all cases in which obviousness is in issue, it is up to the parties to 
provide the evidence. For example, without evidence of a "long felt want" and 
commercial success, actual copying of the invention may weigh in neither 
party's favour. 187 In the end the focus must always be whether the invention 
was obvious. 
181 	See Sheppard J in Elconnex v Gerard Industries (1992) 25 IPR 173, at 193-194. 
182 	Lockhart J in Elconnex v Gerard Industries (1992) 25 EPR 173, at 182. 
183 	Ibid., at 183. 
184 	Aickin J in Meyers Taylor v Vicarr Industries (1977) 137 CLR 228, at 239. 
185 	In Wellcome Foundation v VR Laboratories (1981) 148 CLR 262, at 280-281. 
186 	Wellcome Foundation v VR Laboratories (1981) 148 CLR 262, at 286. 
187 	See, for example, Lockhart J in Elconnex v Gerard Industries (1992) 25 1PR 173, at 183. 
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5.3.6 Reform under the 1990 Act 
By the time of the IPAC Report in 1984, the Aickin test was generally 
accepted as the test for inventive step under the existing legislation. The focus 
of inquiry of the test, restricted as it was to the common general knowledge, was 
much narrower than equivalent tests in other countries. A number of options 
were available to IPAC in its recommendations to the Government: 
• The Aickin test could be retained. Only common general knowledge could 
be considered, and common general knowledge only comprised what was 
known and used by the hypothetical skilled addressee. 
• The presumption of omniscience could be resurrected. All prior 
publications could be considered. 188 
• The test could include common general knowledge and prior publications 
which the diligent searcher would have ascertained, understood and 
regarded as relevant. 189 
• A hybrid test could be formulated. 
IPAC recommended a hybrid test falling between the diligent searcher 
and omniscient artisan tests. First, the focus should not only be on the common 
general knowledge but also single prior recorded disclosures from anywhere in 
the world, or single prior uses from within Australia (but not two or more of 
both or either). Secondly, common general knowledge should include that 
which is generally known and used and that which is publicly available in 
recorded form anywhere in the world which a skilled person in the art at the 
188 	This would appear to be the accepted English test, both in the 1949 and 1977 Patents Acts: 
for the 1949 Act see the judgment of Lord Diplock in Technograph Printed Circuits Ltd v 
Mills & Rockley (Electronics) Ltd [1972] RPC 346, at 361, approved in Windsurfing 
International Inc v Tabur Marine (Great Britain) Ltd [1985] RPC 59, at 72. For the 1977 Act 
see section 3 and subsection 2(2), which set out expressly that regard is to be had to any 
matter which forms part of the state of the art, and the state of the art includes anything 
which has been made available to the public anywhere, by any means. Note, however, 
that even though these sections would seem to expressly adopt the omniscient artisan test, 
Thomson, in her Ph.D. thesis at 228, interprets the cases of Genentech Inc's Patent [1989] 
RPC 147 and Genentech Inc's(Human Growth Hormone) Patent [1989] RPC 613 as applying 
the common general knowledge test. 
189 	Lord Reid preferred this test in Technograph v Mills & Rockley [1972] RPC 346, at 355. 
57 
time should reasonably have been expected to find, understand and regard as 
relevant. 
This recommendation was rejected and what appeared in the 1990 Act is 
a hybrid between Justice Aickin's test and the diligent searcher test. The 
common general knowledge accords with the Aickin formulation, but in 
addition a single item of public information (or two or more related items) can 
be included in accordance with the diligent searcher formulation. 
This test is no more consistent than was Justice Aickin's test with those 
in Europe and the USA, which have adopted the presumption of omniscience. 
I suggest that Australia's anomalous position in this regard is contrary to the 
desire expressed in the GATT TRIPS Agreement for international 
harmonisation in patent law. On the other hand, if it encourages foreign 
investment in Australia in the commercialisation of inventions which are 
patentable in Australia but not elsewhere, then the lower standard may have 
some merit. 
5.4 Utility 
The term usefulness, or, as it is more often referred to, utility, has 
different breadths of meaning in different jurisdictions. In the USA utility 
requires that the invention is practically useful. 190 This overlaps with both the 
manner of manufacture and utility requirements in Australian legislation and 
industrial applicability requirement in Europe. 
The US utility requirement has attracted considerable attention of late. 
Some of the most highly contested claims to patents in recent years were made 
by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in the USA for patents for the 
sequences of many fragments of DNA known as expressed sequence tags 
(ESTs). 191 The precise function of ESTs is unknown, but they are thought to be 
likely to incorporate whole genes or parts of genes. The NIH applications were 
190 	Brenner v Manson 383 US 519 (1966). See also Maebius, S.B., "Novel DNA Sequences and 
the Utility Requirement: the Human Genome Initiative" (1992) Journal of the Patent and 
Trademark Office Society 652. 
191 	ESTs are fragments of cDNA generated in vitro from messenger RNA isolated from a range 
of human tissues. 
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rejected by the Patents and Trademarks Office, one of the main reasons being 
that they were considered to be lacking in practical utility because until function 
was ascribed to the sequences they were considered to lack commercial value. 
In Australia utility requires only that "the invention does what it was 
intended by the patentee to do, and the end in itself is useful". 192 The intention 
of the patentee can be gleaned from the title of the patent and the body of the 
specification. Commercial practicality or viability is not a necessary 
requirement, except that if a particular result is claimed, that result must be 
achievable. 193 The issue, then, is not whether the invention is commercially 
viable, but whether the invention as claimed does or does not attain the result 
promised by the patentee. 194 As such, if EST patent applications were lodged in 
Australia, they would be more likely to fail on the manner of manufacture 
ground than on the basis of lack of utility. 
Usefulness is explicitly listed as one of the requirements for a patentable 
invention in s18(1)(c). Even so, it is not necessary for presence or absence of 
utility to be determined at the examination stage, nor is utility a ground for 
opposition. It can be challenged in revocation proceedings through the 
"patentable invention" head in s138(3)(b). 
There is some overlap between the utility requirement (that the result 
cannot be achieved) and the insufficiency requirement (that the result is 
insufficiently described to be achievable). Gummow J succinctly pointed out the 
difference between the two: 
"insufficiency occurs when the apparatus cannot be made, and inutility occurs when 
the apparatus can be made, but when made, doesn't work." 195 
But His Honour went on to say that the difference is often less clear in 
practice. 196 Gummow J also pointed out in Rescare that even though the result 
192 	Fawcett v Homan [1896] RPC 398, at 405. 
193 	Rehm v Websters Security Systems (1988) 11 IPR 289, at 305; Rescare Ltd v Anaesthetic 
Supplies Pty Ltd (1993) 25 IPR 119, at 143. 
194 	Decor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1989) 13 IPR 385, at 394, per Lockhart J; Rescare 
Ltd v Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd (1993) 25 IPR 119, at 143. 
195 	Rescare Ltd v Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd (1993) 25 IPR 119, at 142. 
196 	Ibid. 
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promised in the patent is not be achievable in all cases the requisite utility may 
still be present. 197 Utility will always be determined on the facts of the case in 
question. 
5.5 Secret Use 
Public use of an invention prior to the priority date will invalidate the 
patent for want of novelty. Although mere "closet use" will not ground an 
attack on the basis of lack of novelty,198 in some circumstances, secret use of the 
invention prior to the priority date will also threaten the validity of the patent 
through s18(1)(d). As for utility, challenges can only be made to patent validity 
on the secret use ground in revocation proceedings through s138(3)(b). Section 9 
sets out the types of secret use that do not threaten validity through the secret 
use provision in s18(1)(d). These include use by the patentee or with his or her 
authority: for reasonable trial or experiment; in the course of confidential 
disclosure; for any purpose other than "the purpose of trade or commerce"; by 
or on behalf of the Commonwealth, a state or territory where the patentee has 
disclosed the invention to the Commonwealth, State or Territory. 
Invalidity for secret use is justified on the basis that the inventor has 
made a commercial decision between protection through the patent system or 
through trade secrecy, and should not have the benefit of both. 
5.6 The Philips Threshold: an Invention 
An additional layer has recently been added to the requirements for a 
valid patent by the High Court in NV Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken v 
Mirabella International Pty Ltd. 199 Before the requirements for a patentable 
invention in s18(1) are assessed, the patentee must first show that there is an 
invention, as defined in Schedule 1. • 
In Philips v Mirabella the Federal Court and High Court were faced with 
infringement and revocation proceedings on a patent granted under the 1952 
Act for the manufacture of compact fluorescent lamps. At first instance Wilcox 
197 	Ibid. 
198 	Cornish v Keene (1935) 1 WPC 501. 
199 	(1995) 32 IPR 449. 
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J held that there was no infringement of the patent. 200 On appeal, Lockhart J, 
with whom Northrop J agreed, found that had the patent been valid there 
would have been infringement. 201 The issue of infringement was not in 
question in the High Court. The general conclusion of the judges in relation to 
the call for revocation was that the claim was for nothing more than a new use 
of an old substance. Difficulties arose for Mirabella because the inventive step 
ground was conceded at trial and the invention was found to satisfy the novelty 
requirement. The issue was that even though the claim was found to lack the 
required inventiveness or newness there may not exist a recognised ground for 
revoking the patent. 
At first instance Wilcox J held that the patent was not an invention or 
manner of new manufacture. His Honour interpreted s18 as requiring that a 
"patentable invention" be a manner of manufacture within the meaning of the 
Statute of Monopolies, which he referred to as a "true invention". 202 The 
patent was therefore revocable because it lacked the requisite newness. On 
appeal Philips argued that the omission of the word "new" from "manner of 
manufacture" in paragraph 18(1)(a) was deliberate so as to separate out the 
novelty and inventive step requirements. Consequently, the issue of newness 
could only be raised through s18(1)(b). Lockhart J, with whom Northrop J 
agreed, rejected this argument. Their preferred interpretation was that 
paragraph 18(1)(a) together with the definition of invention in Schedule 1 
retains the notion of "manner of new manufacture". Accordingly, change in 
the wording of this provision from "manner of new manufacture", as it 
appears in the definition of invention in s6 of the 1952 Act and Schedule 1 of 
the 1990 Act to "manner of manufacture" in paragraph 18(1)(a) was without 
effect. Lockhart J inferred that this was the intention of Parliament from the 
explanatory memorandum attached to the Patents Bill 1990, as well as the 
second reading speech and the IPAC recommendation. 
Burchett J dissented. His Honour's rationale was that Parliament had set 
out the requirements for novelty and inventive step and it would be odd if, 
having done this, it also allowed for either unfettered or duplicated 
determination of the same issues through use of the word "new" in the 
200 	NV Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken v Mirabella International Pty Ltd (1993) 24 IPR 1. 
201 	NV Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken v Mirabella International Pty Ltd (1993) 26 IPR 513. 
202 	At 7. 
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definition of invention. Burchett J referred to the comment of IPAC that the 
term manner of manufa cture involves little more than that the invention 
must belong to the useful rather than the fine arts. His Honour added that any 
attack on the newness of the invention must be through s18(1)(b) and not 
s18(1)(a), and here it was not possible to do so. 
On appeal to the High Court,203 Philips again put forward the argument 
that omission of the word "new" from paragraph 18(1)(a) was deliberate, and 
that all that was required was for there to be a manner or kind of manufacture. 
Mirabella counter-argued that manner of manufacture in s18(1)(a) should be 
read as manner of new manufacture in accordance with the Statute of 
Monopolies. 
The majority in the High Court (Brennan J, as he then was, Deane and 
Toohey JJ) came to a conclusion similar to that of the courts below, but through 
a radically different interpretation of subsection 18(1), For them, the words "a 
patentable invention is an invention that" required, as a starting point, that 
there be an invention, before the question of whether there be a patentable 
invention was determined. On this interpretation, it was necessary to 
determine whether, on the face of the specification, there was an invention that 
was the proper subject of the letters patent before the technical requirements of 
manner of manufacture, novelty, inventive step, were assessed. Where the 
claim in question was merely the new use of an old product it was not 
necessary to go any further. But where otherwise, it would still be necessary to 
determine whether the technical requirements had been met. 
The majority backed up this interpretation by referring to three aspects of 
traditional patent law: 
• Claims for new uses of old substances lay outside the scope of invention. 
These were the words used by Lord Bucicmaster in Re BA's Application204 
and approved by the High Court in Australia in Microce11205 and NRDC. 206 
• The reference to "alleged invention" in the definition of invention focuses 
on the newness requirement in "manner of new manufacture". 
203 	(1995) 32 IPR 449. 
204 	[1915] RPC 348, at 349. 
205 	Commissioner of Patents v Microcell Ltd (1959) 102 CLR 232. 
206 	NRDC v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252. 
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• In relation to the second point, in examining a patent application, the 
Commissioner is not bound to accept an allegation by the applicant that the 
claim is new where it is apparent on the face of the specification that thing 
claimed is not new. 
According to their Honours' judgment, therefore, where the 
specification discloses that the claim is nothing more than new use of an old 
product, the alleged invention requirement is absent and the application can be 
rejected by the Commissioner, or if it has been granted, it becomes susceptible to 
opposition or revocation. If this is the case it is not necessary to go beyond this 
and assess the novelty and inventive step requirements. It is only where, on its 
face, the specification indicates that the requisite inventiveness is not lacking, 
that the specific elements become the focus for analysis. 
The majority added that, although they did not have to decide the 
matter, their interpretation of s18(1)(a) was that it should be understood as 
referring to proper subject matter of the letters patent. As such, the 
interpretations of this provision by the trial judge and majority on appeal were 
correct. 
Dawson and McHugh JJ in dissent accepted Philips argument that a 
patentable invention must be new in the sense that it is novel and involves an 
inventive step when compared to the prior art, but that there was no additional 
newness requirement. Like Burchett J in the Federal Court, their Honours 
justified this on the ground that the basis for comparison with the prior art was 
precisely set out in section 7, and since the legislature had not set out a basis for 
comparison of any newness requirement in s18(1)(a) it was unlikely that such a 
requirement was intended. Their Honours referred to the explanatory 
memorandum of the Patents Bill 1990 to support this interpretation, and 
emphasised the clear distinction that was made in NRDC between invention, 
incorporated in the term "new manufactures" and subject matter, in the word 
"manufacture". The minority thereby clearly rejected the interpretations of the 
trial judge at first instance and the Full Court, but did not assess the 
interpretation of the majority. 
I submit that the decision of the majority of the High Court has 
considerable appeal. Philips should not have been able to enforce its patent 
when the only thing that was claimed was the new use of an old product. To do 
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otherwise would be to run counter to well established authority. Decisions such 
as Microcell and NRDC establish the ground rules for much modem patent law 
in Australia. Given that the IPAC Report placed so great an emphasis on 
existing case law, and the legislature accepted those recommendations, it seems 
inappropriate to ignore the binding authority of cases such as these. Recent 
cases such as W.R. Grace v Asahi 207 and Winner v Morey Haigh208 affirm that 
the definition of invention in s6 of the 1952 Act does not incorporate mere new 
uses of known products. The 1990 Act was aimed at more clearly setting out the 
requirements for an invention and grounds for challenging its validity. There 
can be no doubt that in doing so the legislature did not intend to make things 
which could not be patented under the 1952 Act patentable through the 1990 
Act. 
The arguments raised by the majority of the High Court in Philips are 
not without precedent in other jurisdictions. In particular, in the English Court 
of Appeal in Genentech Mustill LJ also required that there be an invention 
before a patent can be granted. 209 For Mustill LJ, as for the majority of the High 
Court, it is necessary for this requirement to be answered in the affirmative 
before the technical issues are addressed. In the case of the Patents Act 1977 (UK) 
those technical issues are set out in sl(1)(a)-(d), that the invention is new, 
involves an inventive step, is capable of industrial application and is not 
excluded by subsections (2) and (3). Mustill LJ. specifically applied his 
formulation to naturally occurring substances, including human genes and 
proteins (see Chapter 6). Lord Mustill affirmed his views on this matter in 
Biogen Inc v Medeva Plc. 210 In contrast, Lord Hoffman, who gave the leading 
judgment in that case, stated that: 
"Judges would therefore be well advised to put on one side their intuitive sense of 
what constitutes an invention until they have considered the questions of novelty, 
inventiveness and so forth"211 
207 	At 39,275. 
208 	Winner v Morey Haigh and Associated (A 'Asia) Pty Ltd (1996) IPR 215, at 230. 
209 	Genentech Inc's Patent [1989] RPC 147 at 262. 
210 	(1996) Unreported judgment of the House of Lords 31 October 1996. An abridged version of 
the judgment was reported in The Times 1 November 1996. 
211 	House of Lords Unreported Opinions, at 14. 
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The conflicting viewpoints of the Law Lords in the Biogen case suggest 
that it is not certain whether the requirements of novelty, inventive step, and 
so on, are the determinants of the patentability of an invention or of the 
invention itself. The High Court decision in Philips indicates that in Australia 
the former view is preferred. Judges and patent examiners in Australia will 
now have to do precisely what Lord Hoffman cautioned against: they must 
intuitively sense whether or not an invention is present before they go on to 
assess novelty and inventiveness. I submit that it is not entirely inappropriate 
for them to do so. Logically, a patentable invention must fulfil both the criteria 
of being an invention and being patentable. " A thing may be an invention even 
though it may be obvious to the skilled addressee, or may be disclosed in the 
prior art, but it will not be a patentable invention. In theory, the Philips test 
could save a great deal of unnecessary searching through the prior art base 
where a claim on its face has no inventive merit whatsoever. In the right 
circumstances, this should considerably speed both the examination process 
and opposition and revocation proceedings. 
There are two continuing difficulties with the High Court's decision, 
which may make it difficult to apply in practice: 
• The High Court omitted to prescribe parameters for how the newness 
requirement is to be measured. In both of the dissenting judgments it was 
recognised that the legislature had been explicit in setting out how 
objections based on lack of novelty or inventive step must be proved. The 
new test cannot be stated with anywhere near such precision. In Philips it 
was clear that even though the novelty and inventive step grounds could 
not be made out, what was claimed was merely the new use of an old 
product. It may be that this is a rare and exceptional case, and that generally 
if a patent is bad according to the Philips formulation it will also be bad for 
want of novelty or inventive step. In such circumstances it may be 
preferable to restrict the analysis to the precise formulation recommended by 
the legislature rather than taking the Philips short cut and leaving open the 
likelihood of prolonged appeals on the basis of improper application of the 
test. If this is the case then Philips may largely be ignored by counsel in 
opposition or revocation proceedings. Patent Office examiners may not so 
easily avoid Philips if Patent Office practice is modified to take it into 
account. 
• Although the High Court made it clear that the novelty and inventive step 
grounds survive untouched by Philips, the position is less clear for the 
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manner of manufacture ground. According to the IPAC Report, all that is 
required for s18(1)(a) to be satisfied is that the invention belong to the useful 
rather than the fine arts. The majority briefly discussed how this provision 
should be interpreted, concluding that the invention should be proper 
subject matter for the letters patent. This is the same requirement as that in 
the definition of invention in Schedule 1. The Philips test requires that the 
invention criterion is met before the rest of s18 is considered. As such, the 
requirement in s18(1)(a) will only need to be assessed once that same 
requirement has already been met. It is unclear where else the analysis of the 
s18(1)(a) requirement could go. IPAC acknowledged that the term manner of 
manufacture was underpinned by a substantial body of case law and this 
should continue to apply. The case law is discussed in some detail in 
Chapter 6. It provides that certain claims are not to be considered as 
inventions. Do these case law exclusions from patentability now apply 
through the definition of invention or through s18(1)(a)? 
Conclusion 
This chapter provides the first of a series of arguments leading to the 
conclusion that inventions created out of human genetic material should 
remain within the patent system. The patent system is set up to provide an 
incentive for innovation in new technologies. I will argue in later chapters that 
biotechnology, particularly human genetic research and its applications, is one 
of the most important new technologies in terms of its benefit to the nation. 
Therefore a continuing and guaranteed source of incentive for innovation is 
both necessary and justifiable. This is not to say that the system is working 
perfectly at present. But I aim to demonstrate that the system has the potential 
to cope with the challenges of modern biotechnology without the need for a 
major statutory overhaul. I will present a number of conclusions in Chapter 7 
suggesting means by which the limitations on patent rights already existing 
within the patent system can be better made use of to moderate the adverse 
effects of patenting in this area. These limitations are in addition to the normal 
patenting criteria which have been assessed in this chapter. 
Inventions are only patentable in Australian law if they satisfy the 
specification requirements in s40 and the patenting requirements in s18, as well 
as the invention requirement in Philips. Each of these requirements, apart 
from Philips, has been subjected to extensive consideration by the judiciary. 
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There are some differences between the 1952 and 1990 Act requirements, chiefly 
associated with the geographical extent of the prior art base. These differences 
are unlikely to impugn existing case law to any great extent. That case law has 
decided that the dominant test for each of the requirements for a valid patent is 
as follows. 
• Invention. 
Before the question of whether there is a patentable invention is 
determined, it must be shown on the face of the specification that there is an 
invention that is the proper subject of the letters patent. Mere new uses of 
old products will not satisfy this requirement. 212 
• Manner of manufacture. 
A patentable invention must belong to the useful rather than the fine arts 
and must provide a material advantage, its value to the country being in the 
field of economic endeavour, that is, it must have commercial 
applicability. 213 
• Novelty. 
Novelty will be destroyed when a prior disclosure contains clear and 
unmistakable directions to do what the patentee claims to have invented. 
The prior disclosure must disclose all of the essential integers of the 
invention. For documentary prior disclosure it is only permissible to look at 
single documents unless others are incorporated by reference. 214 
• Inventive step. 
Under the 1952 Act there will be no inventive step if the invention would 
have been obvious to a non-inventive skilled worker equipped with the 
common general knowledge of the field. The 1990 Act allows reference to 
single documents or two or more related documents that are not part of the 
common general knowledge, provided they would reasonably be expected to 
212 	As per the majority decision of the High Court in NV Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken v 
Mirabella International Pty Ltd (1995) 32 IPR 449. 
213 	The leading case on the interpretation of this provision is the decision of the High Court 
in National Research and Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 
CLR 252. 
214 	The leading recent cases on interpretation of the novelty requirement are the decisions of 
the Full Federal Court in R.D. Werner & Co Inc v Bailey Aluminium Products Pty Ltd 
(1989) 13 IPR 513 and Nicaro Holdings Pty Ltd v Martin Engineering Co (1990) 16 IPR 545. 
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have been ascertained, understood and regarded as relevant by the skilled 
person.215 
• Usefulness. 
The usefulness requirement is not to be equated with commercial 
practicability. It requires only that the invention as claimed attains the result 
promised by the patentee. 216 
• Secret use. 
Secret use of the invention prior to application for a patent could threaten 
the validity of the patent unless it falls into one of the exceptions listed in 
section 9, Patents Act 1990 (Cth). 
• Specification. 
- for a specification to be sufficient it must fully describe the invention and 
the best method for performing it, which requires that a skilled person in 
the field can work the invention. 217 
- in determining the extent of the claimed monopoly, resort can only be 
had to the body of the specification where there is ambiguity and lack of 
clarity. Terms are to be interpreted in a common sense way from the 
perspective of those skilled in the field.218 
- the claims must be fairly based on the specification in that there must be 
a real and reasonably clear disclosure of the claimed invention in the 
specification. 219 
- the complete specification must be fairly based on the provisional 
specification, where relevant. Again, this only requires a real and reasonably 
clear disclosure of the claimed invention in the provisional specification.220 
The changes made in the 1990 Act have not been wholly successful in 
achieving the goal of harmonisation with other jurisdictions. In particular the 
215 	See particularly Aickin J's judgment in Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co v 
Briersdorf (Australia) Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 253 and W.R. Grace & Co v Asahi Kasei Kogyo 
Kabushiki Kaisha [1993] AIPC 1190-974. 
216 	See particularly Rescare Ltd v Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd (1993) 25 IPR 119. 
217 	A useful recent case in this area is Peptide Technology Ltd v The Wellcome Foundation 
Ltd (1992) 23 IPR 319. 
218 	See Elconnex Pty Ltd v Gerard Industries Pty Ltd (1993) 25 IPR 173. 
219 	See Gununow J's judgment in Rehm v Websters Security Systems (1988) 11 IPR 289. 
220 	The history of the fair basing requirement was reviewed in CCOM v Jiejing (1994) 28 IPR 
481. 
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geographical extent within which prior use can be determined for novelty and 
inventive step, and the range of prior documents that can be consulted to 
determine inventive step both are narrower than in Europe and the range of 
prior documents that can be consulted is narrower than in the USA. As such, 
the validity of a particular patent cannot necessarily be inferred from the 
inquiries made in other jurisdictions, but must be determined de novo b y 
exploring the requirements under Australian law. This is particularly difficult 
in the area of patents for genes and gene sequences because there has been no 
judicial consideration of their ambit. As such, it is necessary to resort to first 
principles. In this chapter I have presented the fundamental principles of 
patent law in Australia. My focus in the next chapter is on the scope of research 
and practice in the field of human genetics. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH AND PRACTICE OF HUMAN 
GENETICS 
Introduction 
Two premises are central to many of the ethical objections to patenting 
human genes: first, that genes are to be equated with life; and secondly, that 
human genes are equated with humanity. First, it is true to say that the sum 
total of an individual's genes in the form of the genome is the hereditary 
material of the cell, the individual, the species, and, indeed, all living things. 
But genes do not, of themselves, create life. It is simply not possible to create a 
living organism by knowing all of its genes. As an organism develops from a 
single egg and sperm cell, each of its cells contain the same combination of 
genes derived from those two cells. Yet as the organism grows and develops its 
cells gradually differentiate. This can only be achieved with the cocktail of 
chemicals that comes from the mother in the cytoplasm of the egg cell, and by 
the subtle environmental cues that different cells are exposed to as they 
develop. Moreover, very few of the physical traits that become manifested in 
individuals as they grow and mature are solely genetic. Almost all will be 
influenced by environmental factors to a greater or lesser extent. In this regard, 
then, genes are only in part responsible for making individuals what they are. 
Many commentators have expressed concern about the geneticisation of 
society, in that we are being conditioned to believe that all we are is our genes 
and our fate is sealed by our inheritance. 1 This is not the case. All aspects of 
our physical and behavioural development are influenced by environmental 
as well as genetic factors. 
The second premise can also be challenged. The human genome is 
uniquely human, but there is only slightly less variability within the human 
genome than there is between the human genome and that of other closely 
related species. On the level of the individual gene, there is even less to mark 
it out as being uniquely human than there is at the level of the genome. Many 
genes are much the same whether they come from humans, chimpanzees or 
.1 	A number of speakers voiced this concern at a major conference on legal and policy aspects 
of human genetic research in Montreal, Canada in 1996. See Chalmers, D.R.C. and L. 
Skene, "First International Conference on DNA Sampling: Human Genetic Research: Legal 
and Policy Aspects" (1996) Journal of Law and Medicine (in press). 
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mice. Some genes even cross the major boundaries between animal groups. 
Genes that are active during the development of the nervous system, for 
example have many similarities in mammals and insects. 2 Genes produce 
proteins which are vital components of living things. Proteins are enzymes, 
hormones, antibodies, blood clotting factors, and so on. In part, humanness 
arises out of the unique combinations of proteins that are present in all 
humans and the way in which those proteins interact, but there is nothing 
much that is uniquely human about the individual proteins. 
In order to understand fully the issues associated with patenting of 
human genes it is first necessary to have an understanding of the nature of 
human genes and human genetics, and precisely what it is that can be 
achieved through human genetic research and its clinical applications. 
Genetics is the study of the structure and function of the genome. It is a science 
that is shrouded in obtuse terminology, but because that terminology is so 
much a part of any discussion on genetics it is difficult to avoid. Some general 
comments are made in this chapter to give an overview of the most salient 
points for future reference throughout the body of this work. It is important to 
remember that although the basic building blocks of the genome are the same 
in all organisms, the details of how these are put together do vary. The 
descriptions that follow refer mainly to human genetics, although much of it 
applies equally to many other species. For simplicity, some generalisations 
have been made which may not apply universally. 
The main justification for funding and carrying out genetic research is 
based on the long term goal of finding cures for genetic diseases. Genetic disease 
has proved to be one of the most intractable forms of human malaise, no 
member of society being able to claim immunity from its broad sweep. The 
costs to society are great, both in terms of human suffering and from an 
economic perspective, and there is a pressing need to find ways to reduce both 
forms of cost. 
2 	A number of experiments have recently been performed in which a genes controlling the 
development of the nervous system have been transplanted between phyla. One example 
is of a gene that was discovered in flies, identified by homology in mice, and then inserted 
back into the fly: Martin, P., and J. Lewis, "From Flies To Mice and Back Again" (1991) 1 
Current Biology 33. 
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Genetic research has a long and respected history. The work of the 
Austrian monk Gregor Mendel in the late nineteenth century laid the 
foundation for the science of genetics and subsequently, early in this century, 
the way in which the inherited factors, or genes, behaved was elucidated. It was 
not until the 1950s, however, that the chemical nature of genes was described, 
with the Nobel Prize winning discovery of the double helix structure of 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) by Francis Crick and James Watson. 3 In the first 
part of this chapter I look at these traditional notions of genetics, which I refer 
to as "the old genetics". 
The next major landmark in the study of genetics was the advent of "the 
new genetics" which was brought about by the discovery that genes could be 
spliced and cloned. The first gene splicing was performed by Herbert Boyer and 
Stanley Cohen in 1973. Gene splicing led to the development of recombinant 
DNA technology, through which short strands of DNA from one species could 
be spliced with the DNA from other species and by these means could be mass 
produced. This breakthrough had a number of important implications, one in 
particular standing out. Genetic diseases are manifested when there are defects 
in one or more of the proteins that are required for individuals to function 
normally. Recombinant DNA technology enables the production of useable 
quantities of these proteins and the genes that produce them, through which it 
is possible to discover their chemical structures and hence the way in which 
they function and become defective. Now, as we approach the end of this 
century, geneticists have developed the technical capabilities to identify, isolate 
and manipulate individual genes and to understand the ways in which some of 
those genes malfunction to cause genetic disease. Much of the impetus for these 
developments has been provided by a huge commitment of funds to a number 
of international collaborative research ventures known collectively as the 
Human Genome Project. 
Even though our knowledge of genes and genetic disease has increased 
greatly, many thousands of people continue to suffer from its effects. Genetic 
diseases do not discriminate; the famous American folk singer Woody Guthrie 
died of Huntington's Disease in 1967, after suffering the typical genetically 
programmed deterioration of his nervous system. In the USA alone this 
3 	Watson gives a personal account of this discovery in The Double Helix (1970) Penguin, 
London. 
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disease still affects one in every 10,000 people.4 One in every 2,500 people is 
afflicted by the equally pernicious disease of cystic fibrosis. 5 There are around 
5,000 other genetic diseases that are caused by defects in single genes, and many 
of the more common diseases, including the major killers like heart disease 
and a number of cancers also have a hereditary genetic component. As yet, 
there is very little real hope or realistic expectation of cure for the sufferers of 
these genetic diseases, at least for the next decade or two. 
Although therapies for curing genetic diseases may not be available for 
some time, there are nevertheless immediate and important health care 
implications arising out of the ability to identify and isolate the genes that 
cause disease. Possible applications include the diagnosis of some genetic 
diseases and the provision of replacements for some of the defective proteins 
that cause those diseases. These are discussed in the final part of this chapter. 
The two most successful uses of genetic engineering at present in the 
clinical practice arena are the use of genetically engineered proteins to alleviate 
the symptoms of genetic disease (in the form of enzyme or hormone 
replacement therapy) and the production • of vaccines to prevent viral 
infection. Neither of these is strictly human genetic research. Nevertheless, 
they are important models, because these are the first examples of the routine 
application of genetic engineering in clinical practice. Furthermore, these are 
the subject matter of the first patent battles over the patentability of genes and 
gene sequences. These models will set the benchmark, both in terms of what is 
achievable through genetic engineering on humans and in the assessment of 
the extent to which those achievements are patentable. 
Part 1: 	"The Old Genetics" 
Any discussion on genetics necessarily includes a description of the 
unique structure of the DNA molecule. DNA is made up of a sequence of 
nucleotides, each of which contains one of the four bases adenine, cytosine, 
guanine and thymine. Each nucleotide can be identified by the base it contains, 
A, C, G, or T. In humans there are around 3 billion of these nucleotides 
4 	Miller. S.K., "To Catch a Killer Gene" (1993) New Scientist 24 April, 37. 
5 	Delaney, S. and B. Wainwright, "Molecular Biology of Cystic Fibrosis" (1993) Today's 
Life Science September, 22. 
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arranged in precise order along the chromosomes. Each cell in a particular 
individual carries an identical sequence of bases, but no two individuals will 
have precisely the same sequence. 
In all but the most simple organisms each molecule of DNA exists as a 
"double helix". A combination of sugar and phosphate forms the backbone of 
the helix, with the bases facing inwards. The two strands of the double helix 
are held together by weak hydrogen bonds between the bases. The chemical 
structure of the bases is such that cytosine and guanine have affinity only for 
one another, as do adenine and thymine. In this way the two strands are 
complementary to each other. When DNA replicates during cell division the 
two strands separate and new complementary strands are built onto them. 
DNA functions by producing all of the proteins required by an 
organism, each protein being produced by a single gene. The protein is 
produced by a two step process: first, the two strands of DNA separate in the 
region of the gene and a precise copy of the gene is made by messenger RNA 
(transcription); secondly groups of three bases on the mRNA, known as codons 
each match up with (or code for) particular ,  amino acid and the amino acids are 
joined together to form the protein (translation). It is important to note that 
there is some redundancy in the code, because there are 64 codons and only 20 
amino acids. Most amino acids are therefore complementary to more than one 
mRNA codon. This is known as degeneracy of the code. 
Each gene is consists of a unique sequence of bases and is always located 
in an exact position on one of the chromosomes. In humans the genome 
comprises the 46 chromosomes in the nucleus of each non-reproductive ce11. 6 
Of those 46 chromosomes, there are 22 pairs of autosomes and two sex 
chromosomes. Females have a matching pair of X chromosomes whereas 
males have one X and one Y chromosome. Because each chromosome is 
paired in humans, there are two copies of every gene, which may or may not 
produce the same protein. When the copies are identical, the individual is 
homozygous for that particular gene, and heterozygous when they are 
different. Generally, when the two copies of the same gene are different, one 
6 	Note that there are some exceptions. The red blood cells, for example, lose their 
complement of chromosomes before they reach maturity. Furthermore, DNA is found in 
regions of the cell other than the chromosomes, for example in the mitochondria. 
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will be dominant (for example the gene for brown eye colour) and the other 
will be recessive (for example blue eye colour). The genotype describes the 
combination of dominant and recessive genes, and the phenotype describes 
their physical manifestation. A person possessing a genotype of two dominant 
genes (a homozygote) will have the same phenotype as a person carrying one 
dominant and one recessive gene (a heterozygote), but a different phenotype 
from someone carrying two recessive genes (a homozygote). 
Not all of the genes are active at any one time. Different cells will have 
different genes switched on or off at different stages of their life cycle. It is only 
when a gene is switched on that transcription can occur. The story has been 
complicated recently because it has been found that there is not a straight copy 
of DNA to mRNA to protein, but considerable modification is required. For 
example, the DNA in the region of the gene is made up of groups of bases 
called exons and introns, and only the exons code for amino acids, so the 
introns have to be removed. It has also been realised that the genes make up 
very little of the total DNA, only about 5%. The remaining DNA has been 
termed "junk" DNA, although this is very unlikely to be an accurate title as 
further research unfolds. 7 One of the functions of the remaining DNA is in 
switching the genes on and off. 
When sexual reproduction occurs, the offspring inherits only one of 
each pair of chromosomes from its mother and one from its father. In this 
way, the offspring inherits a combination of some of the characteristics of its 
mother and others of its father. The cell division that produces the egg and 
sperm cells is known as meiosis. Separation of the pairs of chromosomes 
occurs during meiosis. This segregation is random; it is impossible to predict 
which of each pair of chromosomes will end up in each daughter egg or sperm 
cell. In addition the pairs of chromosomes often exchange chromosomal 
material during meiosis by the process of crossing over. This means that a 
dominant gene on one chromosome might change places with the equivalent 
recessive gene on its pair. In consequence, the offspring that is produced by the 
fusion of an egg and a sperm cell will inherit a unique set of chromosomes, 
and hence a unique set of dominant and recessive genes, making the offspring 
itself unique. 
7 	For example, Nowak, R., "Mining Treasures from 'Junk DNA - (1994) 263 Science 608. 
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Genetic disease most commonly occurs either through chromosomal 
abnormalities (e.g. Down's syndrome), or through abnormalities in the base 
sequence of a particular gene, which are the so-called monogenetic diseases 
(e.g. Huntington's disease, which is a dominant disorder, and cystic fibrosis, 
which is recessive). It has been known for some time that many of these 
diseases are genetically based. Precise details as to the location of the genes and 
the nature of the defects have also been elucidated for some of these diseases. It 
is only the advent of the "new genetics", however, that has brought about the 
possibility of routinely locating the genes responsible for disease, determining 
their gene sequences, identifying the defect causing the disease and developing 
methods for curing the disease. This is not to say that all monogenetic diseases 
are now known or that cures are at hand. But a number of these diseases are 
now well characterised, and there is every possibility that some of these 
options will eventuate for many others in the near future. 
It is becoming apparent that other diseases which traditionally have 
been thought of as non-genetic also have genetic components, some forms of 
cancer and heart disease being the prime examples. These are the polygenic 
and stochastic diseases which are caused by a combination of changes in a 
number of genes (polygenic) or interaction with different environmental 
factors (stochastic). The "new genetics" is becoming increasingly important in 
the research into the identification and treatment of these diseases. 
Part 2: 	"The New Genetics" 
The new genetics lies at the heart of the modem biotechnology industry. 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development considers 
biotechnology to be the third technological revolution of this century, after 
nuclear energy and information technology. 8 Biotechnology has been 
recognised as encompassing any "exploitation of biological processes for 
industrial purposes". 9 Using this broad definition, it is clear that biotechnology 
has existed in one form or another for centuries. The brewing of beer in 
8 	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Biotechnology - Economic and 
Wider Impacts (1989) 22. 
9 	Montague, P.E., "Biotechnology Patents and the Problem of Obviousness" (1993) 4 
Australian Intellectual Property Journal 3. 
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Mesopotamia over 8,000 years ago has been cited as one good example. 1 ° 
Modern biotechnology, however, is more narrowly construed. Its main focus is 
recombinant DNA technology," whereby isolated pieces of DNA are 
introduced into other living organisms. As the DNA of the host organism 
replicates, so too does the inserted foreign DNA fragment. This technology is 
also known as genetic engineering. The terms "recombination" and 
"engineering" exemplify the value of this technique, through which fragments 
of DNA are artificially induced to replicate by human intervention. At the 
early stages of its development, recombinant DNA technology was restricted to 
the insertion of DNA fragments into simple single-celled organisms, like 
bacteria, but now the capabilities exist to introduce genes into the cells of plants 
and animals, including humans. 
Biotechnology has a wide range of applications: 
• in health care and pharmaceuticals, in the production of such materials as 
insulin, antibiotics, vaccines and drugs, as well as developments specifically 
related to human genetic research; 
• in agriculture, in the improvement of particular plant and animal 
characteristics, including disease resistance and growth enhancement; and 
• in environmental applications, including pollution control, toxic waste 
treatment, hydrocarbon break down. 
Some of the more important applications in the areas of health care and 
pharmaceuticals are assessed below. 
2.1 Scenario for Making a Protein 
There are numerous examples of therapeutic proteins that are necessary 
for the treatment of disease that, until recently, have had to be extracted from 
human tissue. Examples include insulin, a number of blood clotting factors, 
human growth hormone, and many others. Generally extracts of therapeutic 
proteins can only be recovered in small amounts and the risk of 
10 	By Richards, J., "International Aspects of Patent Protection for Biotechnology" (1993) 4 
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 433. 
11 	The Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Directive on the 
Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions (1988) also includes gene transfer, embryo 
manipulation and transfer, plant regeneration, cell culture, monoclonal antibodies and 
bioprocess engineering. 
contamination cannot always be avoided. The transfusion of AIDS infected 
blood to people suffering from haemophilia is one of the more tragic 
examples. Recombinant DNA technology can be used to produce larger 
amounts of uncontaminated proteins. An example of the sequence of events 
that might be required to produce a protein in this way is outlined below. The 
scenario that is presented is similar to that used by the pharmaceutical 
company Genentech to produce tissue plasminogen activator (t-PA), which is 
one of the essential enzymes in the blood clotting process. Purchas 1_,J described 
the procedure in some detail during the course of his judgment as to the 
validity of Genentech's patent for producing t-PA using recombinant DNA 
technology. 12 
• The first step is to select cells or tissues which are known to produce the 
protein in substantial amounts. Genentech found that Bowes melanoma 
cells were rich in t-PA, and were therefore also rich in the mRNA coding 
for t-PA. 
• The mRNA strands which are required to translate the protein are extracted 
from the cells. At this stage the mRNA of interest cannot be separated out 
from other types of mRNA. As such, there will be many different types. 
• One of the critical factors is the ability to produce complementary copies of 
DNA, known as cDNA, from strands of mRNA. This is the reverse of the 
transcription process described in Part 1. It is achieved using enzymes found 
only in viruses, and known as reverse transcriptases. 
• The cDNA so produced is made into a double strand using another enzyme 
known as DNA polymerase. 
• The cDNA is then incorporated into a vector, usually a virus or a plasmid, 
by a process called ligation, using other enzymes. First, a restriction 
endonuclease makes a cut in the vector's DNA at a particular site, and the 
cDNA is incorporated at this site using DNA ligase. 
• The vector is capable of introducing the DNA it contains, including the 
cDNA, into a host cell, which may be a bacterial cell, or a cell isolated from a 
multicellular organism. 
• The host cell then undergoes cell division, during which both the host and 
the foreign DNA replicate and are passed on to both daughter cells, which 
also divide, and so on. In this way, a clone of the cDNA is produced. 
12 	Genentech Inc's Patent [1989] RPC 147. 
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• Clones can be produced of cDNA copies of all the mRNA in a particular 
cell. These are known as clone libraries. 
• Clone libraries can then be screened and clones containing strands of cDNA 
that code for the protein of interest can be isolated. This is one of the most 
time consuming stages. One of the ways that screening is achieved is by 
using oligonucleotide probes. This requires that parts of the protein 
sequence have already been characterised. It is possible to synthetically 
produce a strand of nucleotides complementary to a short sequence of 
amino acids from the protein. Because most amino acids are coded for by 
more than one mRNA codon, however, the strand has to be carefully 
selected to include only those amino acids that are coded for by one or two 
codons. The oligonucleotide probe produced by this technique then has a 
radioactive label attached. Because it is also complementary to the cDNA, it 
will recognise it and hybridise to it. By these means the appropriate cDNA 
clone can be identified. 
• The cDNA is then incorporated into an expression vector which then has 
the capacity to produce the same protein that would have been translated 
from the original strand of mRNA. 
• In order to achieve this end, not only must the cDNA for the protein be 
incorporated but also the special promoter sequence that gives a signal to 
the enzyme RNA polymerase to start transcription. The promoter and 
other essential signals are often built in to the expression vector. 
Each step in this process is complex to perform. Many years of work by 
highly skilled technicians are involved in getting to the stage of commercial 
production of a known therapeutic protein. On the other hand, each of the 
steps is now known. Only minor variations to the general theme may be 
required, depending on the particular protein that is being produced. 
2.2 Scenario for Making a Vaccine 
A typical scenario of the steps required to make a vaccine to prevent 
viral infection is described below. The example described is similar to that used 
by Biogen in its successful attempt to produce a vaccine against the Hepatitis B 
virus (HBV). Hobhouse J discussed the steps taken by Biogen in the Court of 
Appeal judgment as to the validity of Biogen's patent for the virus and 
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vaccine. 13 Chiron undertook a similar challenge in its successful attempts to 
isolate the Hepatitis C virus (HCV). A vaccine to HCV is not yet available. 
Morritt U described the steps taken by Chiron in the Court's judgment as to 
the validity of Chiron's HCV patent. 14 
Some knowledge of the nature of the human body's response to viral 
infection is required to understand how a virus is isolated and a vaccine 
produced. Part of the immune response to viral infection is the production of 
antibodies which bind to proteins in the virus known as antigens. The 
antibodies bind to discrete binding sites within the antigen, known as epitopes. 
A particular antigen may contain more than one epitope and may therefore 
elicit the production of more than one antibody by the infected host. Vaccines 
contain these viral antigens, the aim of vaccination being to stimulate antibody 
production to give the person the pre-existing ability to fight off viral attack. 
The aims of Biogen and Chiron, therefore, were to determine the structure of 
the HBV antigens and the HCV antigens. This required some knowledge of the 
nature of the virus. 
HBV was known to have an outer protein coat, which was a surface 
antigen of HBV (HBsAg) and an inner protein core (HBcAg) as well as a 
polymerase enzyme. Biogen had to sequence the genome of HBV so that it 
could produce a synthetic vaccine. The task of Chiron was more complicated 
because HCV had not been described. At the outset it was not even known if 
the infective agent was a virus. Once characterised, it was further discovered 
that the HCV genome was RNA instead of DNA (a number of viruses have 
this feature). Since cloning is carried out in a host cell, usually a bacterium, it 
can only be done using DNA. 
• The first step requires cloning of the viral DNA. The same scenario is 
followed as for producing a protein. Critical choices are required to be made 
as to the host, the vector and the restriction enzymes. In addition, for HCV, 
the viral RNA had to be converted into DNA. 
• The success of the cloning experiment is determined by hybridisation of the 
recombinant DNA, and by testing whether the antigens produced by the 
recombinant DNA bind to antibodies isolated from carriers. 
13 	Biogen Inc v Medeva Plc [1995] FSR 4. 
14 	Chiron Corp v Murex Diagnostics Ltd (No. 12) [1996] FSR 153. 
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• The antigenicity of the antigens produced from the recombinant DNA, that 
is, their effectiveness in stimulating production of antibodies, also has to be 
tested. 
As with the production of proteins using recombinant DNA technology, 
the task of cloning viral DNA or RNA and producing vaccines is formidable 
and requires a high level of expertise. But again, although time consuming and 
apt to fail, the steps themselves are relatively predictable. The same sort of steps 
are also required in order to improve traits or introduce new traits into living 
organisms using recombinant DNA technology. 
2.3 Scenario for Locating a Gene: The Human Genome Project 
The "new genetics" fundamentally changed our approach to research 
into and treatment of human genetic disease, through the use of such 
techniques as recombinant DNA technology, automated DNA sequencing and 
the polymerase chain reaction. 15 That technology has made it possible to locate 
genes more precisely within the genome and sequence their bases. By the mid-
1980s there was a realisation within the scientific community that it was 
possible to locate the position of every gene in the human genome (the low 
resolution map) and read out the sequence of bases that form the entire 
human genetic code (the high resolution map). The creation of such maps is 
vital as a reference system with which to compare aberrant gene sequences that 
give rise to genetic disease. The Human Genome Project is a collaborative 
international venture, the aim of which is to map the human genome both at 
low resolution (mapping) and high resolution (sequencing). A possible 
scenario for doing this is outlined below. 
• The first step in determining the precise location of a gene on a 
chromosome is to split the chromosomes up into smaller pieces, or 
fragments by means of restriction enzymes which break the strand of DNA 
when they meet a precise sequence of 4, 6 or 8 bases. 
• These fragments can then be replicated in one of two ways, either by 
cloning or by the polymerase chain reaction. 
• The procedure for cloning is described above, at 2.1. The limitation of the 
technique is the size of DNA fragment that can be cloned. Recently yeast 
15 	This technique allows for amplification of minute pieces of DNA. 
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has been used instead of bacteria and much bigger fragments have been 
cloned in the form of yeast artificial chromosomes. These can be up to 1 
million bases long. 
• The polymerase chain reaction is another way of replicating fragments of 
DNA, but this time the process takes place in a test tube. First the two 
strands are separated by breaking the hydrogen bonds between them. Then 
nucleotide primers initiate copying of each strand, and as the process is 
repeated the amount of DNA doubles at each cycle. 
• Recombinant DNA fragments can then be selected from the library using 
probes, as described at 2.1. Particular fragments can be identified on the basis 
of the proteins they produce. For example, a fragment may produce a 
protein which is known to contribute to a particular genetic disease. 
• These fragments are valuable tools that can be used to locate genes. For 
example, using in situ hybridisation, a fragment can be radioactively 
labelled and introduced into a cell. It finds its complementary sequence of 
bases and hybridises to them. This identifies the chromosome that the 
fragment arose from, and its position on that chromosome. 
• The base sequences of the fragments can then be determined using 
automated sequencing methods. The clones that are produced in yeast 
artificial chromosomes have insufficient resolution to be used as templates 
for sequencing because they contain internal deletions and therefore new 
clones have to be made using different techniques. 16 
The Human Genome Project itself is in fact not a single project but a 
number of different related projects which are aimed at: 
• mapping the 100, 000 genes of the human genome; and 
• determining the complete base sequence of the 3 billion base pairs of the 
human genome.17 
The Human Genome Project was formally initiated in October 1990. 
Funding was guaranteed for the Human Genome Project by the Department of 
16 	Some of the problems with yeast artificial chromosomes were discussed by David Cox in 
his talk "Status and Future of the Human Genome Project" at the 2nd International 
Genome Summit (1996) 16-18 October, Canberra. His preferred options were to use 
radiation based hybrids or bacterial artificial chromosomes. 
17 	The HGP is also doing the same thing for other organisms, including bacteria, yeast, 
nematode, fruit fly, mouse and the plant Arabidopsis. 
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Energy (DoE) and National Institutes of Health (NIH) in the USA and similar 
guarantees of funding were made elsewhere. The rationale for the project was 
that if we know where all the genes are on the human chromosomes, and we 
know their sequences of bases then we will be able to understand issues such as 
the way in which the genome functions, how organisms develop and evolve 
and the genetic basis of inherited diseases. From the outset it was decided that 
the project should be a collaborative venture, both between institutes in the 
same country and between countries, and the international Human Genome 
Organisation (HUGO) was founded. This organisation has been termed the 
United Nations for the human genome. HUGO has the object of coordinating 
developments and advances in molecular biology and genetics. Professor 
Grant Sutherland from the Adelaide Women's and Children's Hospital is 
president of HUGO. He is one of the few Australians directly involved in the 
Human Genome Project, receiving funding from the USA to map 
chromosome 16. 
2.4 Goals of the Human Genome Project 
In 1990 goals were set for the following five years of operation of the 
Human Genome Project. These were to: produce genetic maps that cover all 
human chromosomes; produce a set of overlapping cloned fragments for large 
parts of the human genome; improve the current sequencing techniques; and 
develop software and a data base system to support this research. 
2.4.1 Produce Genetic Maps That Cover All Human Chromosomes 
Two types of maps are being produced by the Human Genome Project: 
genetic linkage maps and physical maps. 
• Genetic linkage maps show the distance between genes, like towns on a 
road map. The distance between the genes is estimated by the frequency 
with which they are inherited together. Genes which are far apart on the 
same chromosome are likely to be separated by cross-over at meiosis more 
frequently than genes that are closer together on the chromosome. 
Consequently, genes that are far apart on the chromosome are inherited 
together less frequently than those close together. The detail of the road 
map depends on the number of known genes and their distance apart. The 
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maps are produced through pedigree studies. Information is derived from 
families with known propensities to develop particular genetic diseases. 
• Physical maps, on the other hand, indicate the actual physical distance 
between genes, usually by the number of nucleotides. The goal of the HGP 
was to generate recognisable markers for the physical map. which will be 
thousands of bases apart. The markers are in the form of a short identifiable 
sequence of bases. Low resolution physical maps have already been 
produced for the entire human genome by a group in France. 18 The aim is 
now to increase the resolution of those maps. Original expectations were 
that a high resolution map would require markers to be around 100,000 
bases apart, but as technical capabilities have improved so too have 
expectations as to the level of resolution that can be achieved. 19 
2.4.2 Produce a Set of Overlapping Cloned Fragments for Large Parts of the 
Human Genome 
What is desired in the Human Genome Project is for there to be a library 
of cloned fragments of DNA that overlap and cover the entire length of each 
chromosome. Such clones can be used in many of the techniques used to 
physically map genes and to determine the sequence of their bases. 
2.4.3 Improve the Current Sequencing Techniques 
When the Human Genome Project was initiated sequencing cost 
around $1 to $2 per base and it was estimated that to sequence all the bases 
would take 30,000 work years. It was clearly necessary to find ways both to 
increase the speed of sequencing and reduce costs. For the sequencing to be a 
viable prospect, it must cost no more than 50 cents per base. A number of 
automated sequencing machines now exist and it is predicted that their further 
18 	Cohen, D., I. Chumakov and J. Weissenbach, "A First-Generation Physical Map of the 
Human Genome" (1993) 366 Nature 698. 
19 	See, for example, Nowak, R., "Genome Mappers Have a Hot Time at Cold Spring Harbor" 
(1995) 268 Science 1134. 
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development will allow sequencing to proceed on schedule and within 
budget.2° 
2.4.4 Develop Software and a Data Base System to Support this Research 
It has been estimated that the base sequence of the human genome 
would fill 200 telephone books of 1000 pages each. One of the major tasks of the 
Human Genome Project is to develop an electronic data base storage and 
management system. This need has spawned a new field of science known as 
bioinformatics. 
For the last five years the research effort has concentrated on the first 
two goals and has been remarkably successful. There are indications that both 
the genetic researchers and the funding agencies believe that it is now 
appropriate to focus research efforts on large scale sequencing. Some have 
raised the possibility that the project may even be completed before the 
expected date of 2005. 21 It has been estimated that the cost of the sequencing 
will be around $3 billion (US). The cost and the time consuming nature of the 
task suggest that collaboration is essential, which has been recognised by both 
the scientists and the funding agencies. Agreements have been reached not 
only between laboratories in the same countries but also between a wide range 
of countries as to who should sequence which parts of which chromosomes. 22 
Despite the obvious feasibility of the Human Genome Project, it has 
received extensive criticism. A particular problem is that little effort is being 
expended in determining gene function: the protein that the gene makes, the 
function of that protein, how the gene is switched on and off and what 
20 	See for example, the recent articles by two of the pioneers in sequencing: Olson, M.V., "A 
Time to Sequence" (1995) 270 Science 394; Venter, J.C., H.O. Smith and L. Hood, "A New 
Strategy for Genome Sequencing" (1996) 381 Nature 364. 
21 	As testimony to the success of the HGP, see "The Genome Directory" (1995) 377 Nature 
Supplement 28 September 1995. 
22 	At the Second International Genome Summit of the Human Genome Organisation in 
Canberra, 16-18 October 1996, progress reports were received from the People's Republic of 
China, the European Commission, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, 
the USA, Australia, Brazil, Egypt, India, Israel, Korea, Mexico, South Africa, Thailand 
and the Netherlands. 
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regulates the timing of such events. This point was forcefully made by Dr. 
Victor McKusick, founder president of the Human Genome Organisation, at a 
conference on legal and policy aspects of human genetic research in Montreal, 
Canada in 1996, when he said that: 
"Finishing the HGP is merely the end of the beginning. We will not know the function 
of all those 70,000 genes in isolation let alone in concert; we will not know the 
variation in the structure and therefore the function of those genes among the 6 
billion inhabitants of this globe."23 
Nevertheless the Human Genome Project does have much to offer. In 
biology, for example, it will provide valuable information for evolutionary 
studies. By comparing genomes, it will be possible to identify such things as 
which genes are essential for multicellular organisms, for the development of 
the nervous system, and so on. 24 In medicine there will be many offshoots of 
the Human Genome Project and other genetic research, particularly in the 
areas of diagnosis and treatment of monogenetic diseases as well as other 
diseases with a genetic component. Although the creation of the reference 
maps offers little in the way of improving health care per se, the knowledge 
gained from the maps is being used to dramatically increase the range of 
diagnostic tests for genetic diseases and, to a more limited extent, to improve 
the options for therapeutic intervention. The Human Genome Project has 
been likened to the moon shot, the Manhattan Project and even the Holy 
Grail, but perhaps a more appropriate analogy is with the discovery of the 
periodic table of atoms. Eric Lander has explained that: 
"The Human Genome Project aims to produce biology's periodic table - not 100 
elements, but 100,000 genes, not a rectangle of electron valences, but a tree structure 
depicting ancestral and functional affinities among the human genes." 25 
The end product of the Human Genome Project will be a record of the 
sequence of bases in the human genome. The material used to create this record 
will have been taken from a number of individuals from around the world, but 
23 	McKusick, V.A., "DNA Sampling: What Would Osler Say?" (1996) Keynote Address, 
First International Conference on DNA Sampling: Human Genetic Research: Legal and 
Policy Aspects, Montreal, Canada, 6-8 September. 
24 	The genomes of a number of other species are also being sequenced. These include the 
mouse, the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster, the nematode Caenorhabditis elegans, 
yeast and a number of bacteria. 
25 	Lander, E.S., "The New Genomics: Global Views of Biology" (1996) 274 Science 536, at 536. 
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chiefly from western cultures. Although there is little variability in the 
sequence of bases over large tracts of the human genome between individuals 
(and indeed between humans and other species), variation does exist. It has 
been estimated that the variability between humans is approximately one base 
per thousand.26 Since the human genome has around 3,000 million base pairs, 
then, if the estimate as to the extent of variability is correct, there must be 
around 3 million differences between individual genomes. The more closely 
related particular individuals are, the more similar their sequences will be. 
2.5 The Human Genome Diversity Project 
The variation in base sequences between individuals and groups of 
humans is interesting for several reasons. One of the main proponents of this 
type of research, Professor Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza, has identified a number 
of uses.27 First, it can be used to explore the relationship between genetic 
profiles and linguistic and cultural characteristics of various groups 
throughout the world. Secondly, it could provide a more balanced perspective 
of the world's human genetic resources. Thirdly it could provide information 
about the genetic basis for disease susceptibility and immunity. Some 
populations have a much higher or lower propensity to contract particular 
diseases than the human population as' a whole. In China, for example, there 
is a much higher incidence of stomach and bowel cancer than elsewhere in the 
world. Women from the Ashkenazi Jewish population also suffer a higher 
rate of breast cancer than the general population. In that particular case, the 
increased occurrence of the disease has been matched with an increased 
occurrence of mutations in two genes which are believed to be associated with 
hereditary breast cancer, the BRCA genes.28 
The Human Genome Diversity Project (HGDP) was established by 
Cavalli-Sforza to elucidate these scientific questions. The aim of the HGDP is to 
collect samples of blood and hair from groups of peoples around the world and 
26 	These figures were presented by Dr. Jaume Bertrandpetite in his talk "Genome Diversity, 
the Science" at the Human Genome Organisation's 2nd International Genome Summit 
(1996) 16-18 October, Canberra. 
27 	Reported in Lehrman, S., "Diversity Project: Cavalli-Sforza Answers His Critics" (1996) 
381 Nature 14. 
28 	Kahn, P., "Coming to Grips with Genes and Risk" (1996) 274 Science 496. 
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create cell lines in order to determine variation in the base sequences between 
groups. Although some information has already been collected for the HGDP, 
its future viability must be seen as doubtful given the deep ethical concerns 
expressed about the project from a range of quarters (see Chapter 4). 
Indigenous groups would appear to be more willing to contribute to 
work of this nature when it is coordinated and conducted by their national 
governments rather than foreign interests. A number of spokespeople for 
participant countries at the 1996 HUGO Genome Summit indicated that 
samples were already being collected for diversity studies. Importantly, two of 
those countries are Israel and China, both of which have much to contribute 
because of the increased incidence of particular diseases in their indigenous 
populations. 
Part 3: 	Clinical Applications of Genetic Research 
3.1 Enzyme and Hormone Replacement Therapies, Diagnostics and 
Vaccines 
The main clinical benefit of recombinant DNA is in producing useable 
quantities of therapeutic proteins, as outlined above at 2.1. There are many 
examples of such therapeutic proteins that are now routinely applied in 
clinical practice to aid those suffering deficiencies or abnormalities in the 
production of their own proteins. Further, recombinant DNA technology has 
been employed to produce diagnostic tests and vaccines. Every blood sample is 
now tested for HAV, HBV and HCV, and vaccines for HBV have recently 
become available. 
3.2 Genetic Testing and Screening 
Genetic screening refers to the systematic study of a specific gene or 
chromosome composition in a population or section of a population. 29 Testing 
refers to the examination of an individual for diseases or traits. There are three 
main goals to genetic screening and testing: 
29 	See Dawson, K. and P. Singer "The Human Genome Project: For Better or For Worse?" 
(1990) 152 Medical Journal of Australia 484. 
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• to identify asymptomatic individuals who may have a predisposition to a 
particular genetic disease; 
• to identify asymptomatic individuals who carry disease-related genes which 
may result in their offspring developing a particular genetic disease; and 
• to study the frequency of occurrence of a particular genetic disease in a 
particular population. 
The methods which are used to achieve these goals require a 
comparison between the so-called normal condition and the diseased 
condition. Three main methods exist: chromosomal analysis, protein analysis, 
and gene sequencing, the first two of which have been available for a 
considerable period of time. 
3.2.1 Chromosome Analysis. 
Chromosome analysis detects gross malformations in the chromosomal 
complement. For example, chromosomes can be analysed prenatally for Down 
Syndrome through chorionic villus biopsy (9-11 weeks) or amniocentesis (14- 
16 week of gestation). Further tests are also available for detecting other rarer 
chromosomal disorders. 
3.2.2 Protein Analysis 
Gene malfunction can be inferred using tests which have been 
developed to detect the end products of gene function. For example, the heel 
prick test is performed routinely in neonates to detect phenylketonuria (PKU). 
The disease results from low activity of the enzyme phenylalanine 
hydroxylase, and can be detected by build up in the blood of the amino acid 
phenylalanine. 
3.2.3 Gene Sequencing 
Once the fundamental structure of a gene is known at the level of its 
base sequence, the presence of monogenetic diseases can be determined by a 
comparison between normal and aberrant base sequences. Recombinant DNA 
technology has been used to develop test kits for Huntington's disease, the 
major manifestations of the cystic fibrosis disease (which is now identified in 
around 300 mutations), as well as a range of other monogenetic diseases. In 
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addition, tests are now being developed for aberrant gene sequences which 
indicate an increased likelihood that the individual will develop certain forms 
of cancer, including breast cancer (BRCA 1 and 2) and colorectal cancer. Clearly, 
as the HGP and associated genetic research increases our knowledge of gene 
sequences, the range of screening tests will also increase. 
Genetic testing and screening only serve a purpose if some action can be 
taken in response to a positive test. At present testing for late onset diseases 
may allow those who test positive to make plans for their future. Pre-
conception testing allows for informed reproductive decision-making. Pre-
natal testing offers the opportunity for an informed choice to be made between 
termination and continuation of the pregnancy. Testing for stochastic diseases 
allows the individual to make certain lifestyle decisions. The preferred option, 
however, is for there to be some opportunity for rectifying the diseased state, 
i.e. a cure. Recombinant DNA technology may offer this possibility, in the 
form of human gene therapy. 
3.3 Human Gene Therapy 
The types of genetic engineering that have been described above require 
human genes to be inserted into cells from other species, usually bacteria or 
mammalian cell lines. The therapeutic proteins so produced are then extracted 
from the foreign cells and used to treat disease. There is no reason why the 
foreign species intermediary cannot be avoided. Gene therapy seeks to insert 
human genes directly into human cells in living people, so that the proteins 
can be produced in situ. 
At its widest, human gene therapy can be thought of as the insertion of 
any human genes into human cells, and it has a range of possible applications. 
It can be segregated into three broad categories of somatic cell, germ line and 
enhancement gene therapy. Each of these creates different ethical issues, and it 
is important that these should be considered separately. It is also crucial to bear 
in mind the technical feasibility of each of the three categories. To paraphrase 
Professor David Danks, somatic cell gene therapy is important but difficult, 
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germ line gene therapy is simple but useless, and enhancement gene therapy is 
straight out of fantasy land. 3° 
3.3.1 Enhancement Gene Therapy 
The main public fear about gene therapy is that it will offer the 
opportunity to insert genes for non-disease related traits, such as intelligence, 
height, musical ability, looks etc. This is termed enhancement gene therapy. It 
is regarded by both geneticists and ethicists as being totally unacceptable, 
because it interferes with our notions of humanness and human identity and 
could be thought of as "playing God". It also harks back to eugenics 
programmes performed earlier this century, not only by the Nazis but also in 
other countries. The USA for example had an established eugenics programme 
in the 1920s. 31 Since those times any suggestion of eugenic practice has been 
treated with disdain and abhorrence. 
Irrespective of any linkage with eugenic philosophy, it is very unlikely 
that enhancement gene therapy will ever be feasible, because such traits are far 
too complex to be modified by the intervention of a single gene, but are 
stochastic, arising from the combined effect of multiple genes and the 
individual's interaction with his or her environment. Insertion of single 
genes will, at best, produce only subtle modifications of these traits. 32 The 
other forms of gene therapy offer more promise. 
3.3.2 Germ Line Gene Therapy 
This technique involves inserting genes into the germ line cells, the 
eggs, sperm or early embryos. As the cells divide and the embryo develops, 
each cell will carry a copy of the inserted gene, as well as the complete set of the 
genes from both the egg and sperm cells. So, as the person develops all the cells 
30 	Danks, D.M., "Human Gene Therapy The Present and the Foreseeable Future" (1989) 
Collaborating in Health Care. Liberty Rights and Policy-Making, Proceedings of 1989 
Annual Conference on Bioethics, St Vincent's Bioethics Centre, Melbourne, 157. 
31 The history of eugenics in the USA is reviewed in Smith, G.P., "Eugenics and Family 
Planning: Exploring the Yin and the Yang" (1984) 8 University of Tasmania Law Review 
4. 
32 	Selective breeding, practised for centuries, is much more effective. 
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in his or her body will have a copy of the inserted gene. Consequently, the 
inserted gene will also be present in the germ line cells and will be passed on to 
future generations. Although the insertion of genes into germ line cells is 
possible, the technical capability for safely conducting germ line gene therapy 
on humans has not yet been achieved, nor is it likely to be in the near future. 
3.3.3 Somatic Cell Gene Therapy 
Unlike the other forms of gene therapy, somatic cell gene therapy has 
actually been performed on humans. The first approvals for its use were given 
in 1990 in the USA, for the treatment of adenosine deaminase deficiency 
(ADA). This disease is sometimes referred to as "bubble baby syndrome" 
because it causes children to have no immunity to fight disease and 
consequently they have a very short life span unless kept in a totally disease 
free environment. Approvals were also given for gene therapy on brain 
tumours.33 Since then just over 100 other somatic cell gene therapy trials have 
been approved in the USA, mostly for various forms of cancer and also for 
cystic fibrosis. 34 Europe has been much slower to take advantage of the 
technique, and in Britain only two trials were approved in 1993.35 In Australia, 
the first trial was approved in 1995. 36 
The principal reason for the delay in implementing somatic cell gene 
therapy technology appears to be associated with technical problems. 37 Many of 
these problems would seem to be as far from being resolved now as they were 
at the outset six years ago. In 1995 Harold Varmus, the Director of the USA 
National Institutes of Health (NTH) commissioned two committees to review 
gene therapy research. The first of these was to review funding of basic 
research and clinical trials and the second was to review the current mode of 
33 	Anderson, W.F., "Human Gene Therapy" (1992) 256 Science 808. 
34 	Thompson, L. "Cystic Fibrosis Trials Approved" (1992) 258 Science 1728. 
35 	Brown, P., "Britain Dithers Over Gene Therapy" (1992) New Scientist 12 December 4; 
Dickson, D., "Britain Plans Broad Strategy on Genome, Approves Therapy" (1993) 361 
Nature 387; Brown, P., "Bubble Baby' to Get Gene Therapy" (1993) New Scientist 6 
February 8. 
36 	Two trials are currently underway in Australia: a pilot study for gene therapy on the 
mesothelioma cancer; and a study for gene therapy on the melanoma cancer. 
37 	Mulligan, R.C., "The Basic Science of Gene Therapy" (1993) 260 Science 926-932. 
92 
regulation. The report of the first committee was handed down in December 
1995. Its principal recommendation was that greater emphasis should be placed 
on funding of basic research and less on clinical trials. 38 
The success of somatic cell gene therapy depends on the targeting of a 
specific set of cells for insertion. These are the cells in which the disease 
manifests itself. Examples include the cells lining the lungs for cystic fibrosis, 
muscle cells for muscular dystrophy, white blood cells or the bone marrow 
cells they arise from for ADA or tumorous cancer cells. The technique can be 
carried out both ex vivo and in vivo, and the genes introduced may be 
designed to have a therapeutic effect, or may solely serve as cell markers. The 
principal limitation is the ability to have access to the right cells. Either the 
tissue must be accessible for in vivo insertion, for example the lungs for cystic 
fibrosis, or the cells must be easily removable for ex vivo insertion and 
reintroduction into the body, for example white blood cells for ADA. 
Consequently, diseases like muscular dystrophy or neurological diseases are 
much more difficult to treat using this technique. Gene therapy is further 
restricted to recessive diseases at the present time, because the technology exists 
only to add genes, and not to remove defective genes. Therefore it is not 
possible to treat Huntington's Disease using currently available gene therapy 
technology. 
Somatic cell gene therapy can be seen as an alternative to conventional 
drug treatment, enzyme replacement therapy, chemotherapy, and radiotherapy 
and for some diseases it offers the only available form of treatment. Generally 
the aims of gene therapy trials have been modest to date: to assess whether 
treatments have measurable effects, rather than attempting to cure, or even 
improve conditions. The research effort has been concentrated in two main 
areas: cancer and monogenetic diseases. At the moment gene therapy trials for 
cancer treatment predominate. Indeed, it is becoming apparent that the main 
role that gene therapy may play in the future is in the treatment of cancer and 
38 	National Institutes of Health, Report and Recommendations of the Panel to Assess the 
NIH Investment in Research on Gene Therapy (1995) S.H. Orkin and A.G. Motulsky co-
chairs. 
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other multi-factorial environmental ailments and not in the treatment of 
monogenetic diseases.39 
The main technical problems associated with somatic cell gene therapy 
are getting the genes into the appropriate cells and monitoring what they do 
once there. Genes can be directly injected, but the preferred option is to use a 
vector. If the vector is a virus, the virus then inserts the gene into the cells in 
the same way as it does for normal viral infections. For example, the cold virus 
is used for cystic fibrosis, because it normally attacks the very cells in the lungs 
that need to be treated. 
The problem with using a virus is that, even though all of its own DNA 
is removed, it may still be dangerous, for example, it may be able to combine 
with naturally occurring viruses to create an infection. The gene may be 
inserted into the wrong cell type, or be expressed at the wrong time or in the 
wrong amount. It may somehow find its way into the germ line cells. Two 
main types of viruses are used in gene therapy: retroviruses insert the gene 
into the DNA of the host cell; adenoviruses, like the cold virus, on the other 
hand, insert the gene into cells but it does not become incorporated into the 
host DNA. Consequently, genes inserted using adenoviruses remain active in 
the system for a much shorter period than those using retroviruses. But 
because retroviruses insert into the host genome in an uncontrolled way, they 
may cause a new mutation by upsetting another gene's function or may 
activate cancer causing genes.° 
39 	Professor Bob Williamson, head of the Murdoch Institute has said that "[it is a] major 
misconception that gene therapy is aimed at genetic defects" (lecture, Royal Melbourne 
Hospital on 23 October 1996, entitled "Gene Therapy"). 
40 	Because of all these problems, it has been recommended that gene therapy should 
primarily be regarded as research rather than medical treatment, and as such should be 
subject to high levels of scrutiny scientifically, medically and ethically. See, for 
example, Medical Research Council of Canada, Guidelines for Research on Somatic Cell 
Gene Therapy in Humans (1990); UK Report of the Committee on the Ethics of Gene 
Therapy (1992) HMSO (the Clothier Committee Report). This is reflected in national 
research guidelines in Australia: NHMRC Statement on Human Experimentation and 
Supplementary Notes (1992) AGPS, note 7. 
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Even though the function of the gene therapy trials conducted to date 
was only exploratory the fact that over 100 trials have been conducted and over 
600 people have now received gene therapy creates the obvious expectation 
that it will produce measurable effects in the near future. Yet this appears not 
to be the case. According to the NIH Report on funding of gene therapy, its 
efficacy has not been definitively demonstrated in any gene therapy protocol, 
and significant problems remain in all basic aspects of gene therapy. The 
principal recommendation of the Report was that more funding should be 
channelled into basic research and less into the clinical trial phase. In 
particular, more basic research needs to be done in the areas of gene transfer 
and gene expression. Even so, it was recognised that gene therapy has 
"extraordinary potential in the long term for the management and correction 
of human disease, inherited and acquired disorders, cancer and AIDS", and 
that clinical trials were necessary to evaluate various aspects of gene therapy 
approaches. 
Conclusion 
Knowledge of the genetic basis of human disease is increasing rapidly. 
Recombinant DNA technology is largely responsible for this increase. Much 
has been made of this technology and of its ability to produce genetically 
enhanced plants and animals and to cure human genetic disease. Though not 
without promise, its present capabilities must be viewed with some caution. 
The task of producing a therapeutic protein using this technology, or of 
producing a diagnostic test kit for a particular genetic disease, though feasible, 
is both laborious and complex. The prospect of developing routine cures for 
genetic disease is still remote. A great deal more basic research is required 
before many aspects of the technology are implemented into practice. 
Nonetheless, the prospect does exist that our knowledge of genetics will 
ultimately be used to alleviate much of the human suffering caused by genetic 
disease and other diseases with genetic components. In the meantime, the 
exploitation of our current knowledge of genetics in the form of recombinant 
DNA technology already has a wide range of clinical applications. 
There is no doubt that basic research into genetics and the clinical 
application of that research must continue to be supported. The time 
consuming, expensive and highly skilled nature of that ,research, however, 
suggests that the public purse by itself will be inadequate. Private sources may 
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be willing to contribute to the research effort only if there is some guarantee 
that they will recoup their expenditure. The patent system would appear to be 
the obvious means for providing this guarantee. Whether it can do so without 
adversely affecting the benefits to the community of genetic research remains 
to be seen. What must be recognised is that patenting genes does not equate 
with patenting life or patenting humanity, and therefore objections to 
patenting based on these premises do not justify the exclusion of genes from 
the patent system. I suggest that rather than using these emotive and 
erroneous premises to base decisions on the exclusion of particular inventions 
from patenting, it is more appropriate to take into account more general public 
interest considerations. I will discuss means for introducing such 
considerations in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 4: REGULATION OF GENETIC RESEARCH AND 
PRACTICE 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I considered the benefits of human genetic 
research in terms of its actual and potential clinical application. It is well 
recognised that research of this nature should be allowed to proceed only after 
the necessary checks and balances have been put in place to ensure that it is 
carried out in a way that is ethically appropriate. The patent system has been 
used a forum for addressing concerns associated with the adequacy of these 
checks and balances in the area of genetic engineering. Many of the arguments 
raised against patenting of genes are actually objections to the science itself, 
both in terms of its ethical appropriateness and its safety. This is unfortunate, 
both because it detracts from genuine concerns that are more directly related to 
the patenting of genes, and also because the patent system may not be the 
appropriate forum to address such issues. The patent system has never been 
seen as a regulator of science, nor is it equipped to do so. 
The aim of this chapter is to unravel the threads of the debates about 
regulation and patenting, and to demonstrate that it is both inappropriate and 
unnecessary for patent law to play a regulatory role as well as an incentive role 
in human genetic research or in other, non-human genetic research that has 
clinical applications. A range of regulatory processes are already in place, and it 
is not for the patent system to fill any shortfalls in those processes. It is the task 
of the government to ensure that the regulatory processes are adequate, both in 
the form of legislation and research guidelines. 
In general, mechanisms have been put in place to ensure the safety of all 
work involving genetic manipulation. Further, animal ethics committees 
review all experiments involving vertebrate animals to ensure that there is no 
undue suffering. But it is only in the area of biomedical research involving 
humans that an extra layer of regulation exists to ensure that fundamental 
ethical principles are followed. The five main principles are autonomy (the 
right of the subject to accept or refuse treatment on an informed basis), 
beneficence (the duty to help others), non-maleficence (the duty to do no 
harm), confidentiality, and distributive justice (the principle that benefits and 
burdens should be distributed equitably). Human genetic research and its 
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applications, just as much as any other forms of biomedical research and 
practice, must be carried out in such a way as to ensure that these underlying 
ethical principles are respected. 
There is a growing international debate about the types of regulatory 
regimes that should be established for new areas of biomedical research. Some 
argue that national regulation should reflect international bioethical 
principles, 1 whereas others propose that international guidelines must be 
derived from national practice. 2 While the World Health Organisation and the 
Council of International Organisations of Medical Sciences have been 
instrumental in achieving consensus in a number of areas of bioethics,3 there 
are also pitfalls in a fully international prospective approach to regulation of 
biomedical research, chiefly because of the impossibility of agreement between 
nations on these issues. 4 As an alternative, Professor Bartha Knoppers has 
suggested an "interactive normative approach" 5 as a means by which cultural 
and political differences can be reflected in national responses to international 
"principled" guidance. According to Knoppers, biopolicy will be shaped by both 
international principles and national practice. I would argue that this sort of 
approach is already established practice in biomedical research. Much has been 
learnt from the disparate approaches taken to the regulation of IVF 
technology. 6 The lesson has been sufficiently instructive that such mistakes 
1 	See, for example, Knoppers, B.M. and S. Le Bris, "Recent Advances in Medically Assisted 
Conception: Legal, Ethical and Social Issues" (1991) 27 American Journal of Law and 
Medicine 329; Macer, D., "Universal Bioethics and the Human Germ-Line" (1994) 13 
Politics and the Life Sciences 243. 
2 	Particularly Bonnicksen, A.L., "National and International Approaches to Human Germ- 
Line Gene Therapy" (1994) 13 Politics and the Life Sciences 39. 
3 	See, for example, CIOMS International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research 
Involving Human Subjects (1993); and International Guidelines for Ethical Review of 
Epidemiological Studies (1991). 
4 	See Knoppers, B.M. "Professional Norms: Towards a Canadian Consensus?" (1995) 3 
Health Law Journal 1. 
5 	Ibid., at 5. 
6 	A variety of disparate approaches have been taken by the States of Australia, see 
Chalmers, D.R.C., "Governments' Role in Human Sexuality & Reproduction" (1994) 
conference proceedings, Reproductive Medicine: Beyond 2000, Monash University, 
Melbourne, 24-26 November 1994. 
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will hopefully not be repeated. A new regulatory regime will only be 
successfully implemented if it has regard to existing professional practices and 
national structures that have been developed to meet the unique social and 
cultural features of individual nations. At the same time, however, proper 
account must be accorded to international norms and established best practices. 
Another thread of the regulation debate is the overlap between research 
and practice. In human genetics, as in other areas of innovative medical 
endeavour, it is difficult and often artificial to draw the line between research 
and practice. Medical practice is regulated by professional codes of conduct, 
common law actions in contract and tort and specific legislative regimes 
including product liability and consumer protection. Although the same forms 
of regulation apply to biomedical research, these are further overlaid by more 
stringent oversight of the research task, the methodology and the consent 
procedures by institutional ethics committees which are specifically constituted 
to undertake these tasks. This distinction between research and innovative 
practice is clearly enunciated in a recent report to the Minister of Health and 
Community Services, which proposed that: 
"a) 	Where a particular experimental treatment/intervention is expected to 
benefit an individual patient it may be considered to be innovative practice rather 
than research. Where this is the case, the treatment should be governed by doctor-
patient ethical considerations. 
b) 	Where any innovative therapy/intervention is trialed on more than one 
patient, or undergoes some other form of systematic investigation it should be 
presented for similar ethical assessment to any other research protocol." 7 
In the first part of this chapter I focus on the regulation of research, and 
include a detailed analysis of gene therapy regulation, since there is 
international consensus that this should still be classified as research rather 
than innovative therapy. Drug trials are also included, since these fall within 
the jurisdiction of the bodies whose responsibility it is to monitor biomedical 
research. In the second part, the regulation of medical practice in areas that 
impinge on human genetics will be reviewed. I start with a brief review of the 
general area of legal liability and self regulation, and follow with a more 
detailed consideration of the areas of product development, genetic screening 
and testing, and use of human tissue. 
7 	Report of the Review of the Role and Function of Institutional Ethics Committees (1996) 
AGPS (Professor D.R.C. Chalmers, Chair), at 17. 
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Part 1: 	Research 
1.1 Regulation of Biomedical Research 
The Nuremburg Code and the later Declaration of Helsinki set out the 
core principles that must be followed in all research involving human subjects 
to ensure protection of the human dignity of those subjects. Principle 2 of the 
Declaration of Helsinki states that: 
"..the design and performance of each experimental procedure involving human 
subjects should be clearly formulated in an experimental protocol which should be 
transmitted for consideration, comment and guidance to a specially appointed 
committee independent of the investigator and sponsor provided that this 
independent committee is in conformity with the laws and regulations of the country 
in which the research experiment is performed". 
This and other key principles have been implemented worldwide in the 
various national codes and statements on research involving hurrians 8 and by 
the establishment of institutional or local review bodies. In the USA, for 
example Institutional Review Boards review proposals for biomedical research 
prior to funding, and monitor progress of the research. The Boards follow 
guidelines set out in the Department of Health and Hum.an Services 
Regulations for the Protection of Human Subjects. In Britain this function is 
served by Local Research Ethics Committees, which are guided to the Royal 
College of Physicians Guidelines on the Practice of Ethics Committees in 
Research Involving Human Subjects. In Australia Institutional Ethics 
Committees are guided by the NHMRC Statement on Human 
Experimentation and Supplementary Notes. I will refer to these bodies as 
institutional ethics committees, because of my familiarity with the Australian 
system. 
According to the NHMRC, the role of institutional ethics committees is: 
• to ensure that all proposed research projects are acceptable on ethical 
grounds; 
• to maintain surveillance of approved research; 
8 	As an example, see the Council of Europe Draft Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Dignity of Human Beings with Regard to the Application of Biology and 
Medicine: Bioethics Convention (1996). 
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• to maintain a register of all proposed research projects; and 
• to establish and maintain communication with the relevant national 
committee charged with oversight of bioethical issues. 9 
Membership must at least include: 
• a laywoman not associated with the institution; 
• a layman not associated with the institution; 
• a minister of religion; 
• a lawyer; and 
• a medical graduate with research experience. 10 
In carrying out its functions, an institutional ethics committee is 
directed to follow the requisite guidelines and also to give consideration to 
local, cultural and social attitudes. The committee will generally be required to 
conduct a risk-benefit analysis for each research proposal, and to be satisfied 
that informed consent procedures are adequate. It must ensure that the rights 
of the individual subject takes precedence over the expected benefits to science 
or to the community. In some countries the performance of institutional 
ethics committees is monitored by national bioethics committees. In Australia 
this function is served by the Australian Health Ethics Committee, which 
receives compliance reports annually from the institutional ethics committees. 
There are some concerns that the institutional ethics committee system 
needs to be more rigorous." In my experience on an ethics committee of the 
Red Cross Blood Transfusion Service, however, I have found the committee 
members to be dedicated and well informed. They are able to critically evaluate 
research proposals and may make a number of requests for additional 
information or for modifications until all concerns are adequately addressed. 
9 	NHMRC Statement on Human Experimentation and Supplementary Notes (1992) note 1, 
point 5. 
10 	Supplementary Note 1, point 4 (i). 
11 	McNeill, P.M, The Ethics and Politics of Human Experimentation. (1993) Cambridge 
University Press; McNeill, P.M., C.A. Berglund and LW. Webster, Reviewing the 
Reviewers: A Survey of Institutional Ethics Committees in Australia(1990) 152 Medical 
Journal of Australia 289. See also the review of McNeill's book: McCaughey D., "Review 
of The Ethics and Politics of Human Experimentation. by Paul McNeill, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1993" (1995) 9 Bioethics 437. 
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Realistically, much will depend on the composition of each individual 
committee. 
The sanctions for non-compliance with NHMRC guidelines include 
withdrawal of funding from the researchers involved, naming the researchers 
and their institution, and potentially, withdrawal of funding for all projects at 
that institution. The withdrawal of funding is a powerful weapon to be used 
against miscreant researchers, although its adequacy has never been put to the 
test in Australia. 
The efficiency and adequacy of the institutional ethics committee system 
has recently been the subject of a major review. 12 Submissions to the review 
generally supported the need for separate ethical review, and the current 
institutional ethics committee system. Problems appear to arise out of 
inadequate resourcing and lack of consistency in the role and functioning of 
the 180 or so committees. The most relevant recommendation of the review 
committee to the present discussion is the need to amend the Statement on 
Human Experimentation so that the systematic use of innovative treatment or 
therapy is treated as research and subject to overview by IECs. Accordingly, 
treatment or therapy of this nature would only be recognised as practice rather 
than research when there is benefit to the individual patient. 13 The report 
further recommended that the role of institutional ethics committees in 
monitoring research should be refocused so that ethical scrutiny is tailored to 
the risks faced by the individual participant. 14 
1.2 Regulation of Drug Trials 
Before any new therapeutic goods are allowed to be manufactured and 
marketed they are required to undergo rigorous testing to ensure their quality, 
safety and efficacy. Once adequate experiments have been conducted on animal 
subjects or in vitro, testing is conducted on human subjects, usually in the 
form of clinical trials. National bodies have been established throughout the 
world with responsibility for oversight of the safety and efficacy of drugs used 
12 	Report of the Review of the Role and Functioning of Institutional Ethics Committees 
(1996) AGPS (Professor D.R.C. Chalmers, Chair). 
13 	Ibid., Recommendation 1, section 4.2. 
14 	Ibid., Recommendation 4, section 4.9. 
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in clinical trials. In the USA the relevant body is the Food and Drugs 
Administration (FDA), and in Australia, the Therapeutic Goods 
Administration (TGA). The TGA describes a clinical trial as "an experiment 
conducted in humans in order to assess the effects, efficacy and/or safety of a 
substance, product or procedure." 15 In the first instance these bodies must be 
satisfied of the lack of toxicology of the drug, and subsequently that the drug is 
effective. 
In many instances institutional bodies are given primary responsibility 
for review of the protocols for proposed clinical trials and for monitoring the 
progress of the trial procedure in order to improve the efficiency of the 
approval process. In Australia, two types of schemes exist for drug trials: the 
clinical trials exemption scheme (CTX) and the clinical trials notification 
scheme (CTN). Drugs that are trialed through the CTN and CTX schemes are 
exempt form the registration requirements of the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 
(Cth): section 18 for the CTN scheme; section 19 for the CTX scheme.16 
Under the CTX scheme proposals are initially submitted to the TGA for 
approval. The TGA must be assured of the safety of the proposal. Where the 
proposal includes supporting material relating only to pharmaceutical data, 
there is a 30 working day period for evaluation. If no objections are found 
during this time notification will be given by the TGA that the trial may 
proceed subject to institutional ethics committee approval. If the proposal 
includes pre-clinical and clinical data the period is 60 days. The task of the 
institutional ethics committee is to assess and approve the proposed protocol 
of the clinical trial. 
The input of the TGA into the CTN scheme is minimal, its 
responsibility in relation to safety being handed down to the relevant 
institutional ethics committee. The institutional ethics committee is also 
required to assess all other aspects of the trial. The sponsor of the trial has only 
15 	Therapeutic Goods Administration, Clinical Trials of Drugs in Australia (1991), at 2. 
16 	Unless exempt, all therapeutic goods for human use must be included on the Australian 
Register of Therapeutic Goods, and all manufacturers must be licensed and comply with 
principles of good manufacturing practice: Therapeutic Goods Administration, What You 
Need To Know About the Regulatory Requirements for Manufacture and Supply of 
Medical Products in, or from, Australia (1992) AGPS, Canberra, at 2. 
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to notify the TGA that the trial is to be conducted after approval by the relevant 
institutional ethics committee. The CTX scheme will generally be used for 
early phase trials, whereas the CTN scheme is more appropriate for later trials, 
and for products that have already been in clinical use. 
Any clinical investigation using drug products not listed on the 
Australian Register of Therapeutic Goods or using listed products for new 
purposes must satisfy notification requirements under the CTN scheme or 
application requirements under the CTX scheme. 17 Drugs are given a broad 
definition, covering any "substance or preparation intended for administration 
to humans in order to prevent, diagnose, alleviate, or cure disease or cure 
disease or symptoms of disease." 18 
Since introduction in 1991, the CTN system and structure has been 
subject to review. 19 Generally, participating institutional ethics committees 
would appear to have appropriate procedures in place. This structure, 
however, has been criticised because, it is claimed, the capacity of institutional 
ethics committees to undertake these additional responsibilities has not been 
assessed.2° 
1.3 Regulation of Human Genetic Research 
Human genetics sparks serious and emotionally charged debate in many 
sections of the community. The laudable goal of alleviating the suffering of 
those subjected to genetic disease has at times been misconstrued and seen as a 
desire to rid the population of the genetically infirm. The attempt by the Nazis 
to implement their eugenic philosophy is often cited as a portentous image of 
the consequences of such desires. It is not surprising that concerns have been 
17 	Ibid., at 5. Note that minor changes not affecting safety or efficacy will not require 
clinical trials, ibid, at 6. 
18 	Ibid., appendix 1/2. 
19 	On the CTN scheme see A Question of Balance, a Report on the Future of Drug Evaluation 
in Australia (1991) (Professor P. Baume, Chair); on the review of the scheme see Review 
of the Clinical Trials Notification Scheme: Report to the National Manager of the 
Therapeutic Goods Administration (1993) (Professor R. Day, Chair). 
20 	Darvall, L., "Deregulating Clinical Trials: In Whose Best Interests?" (1994) 1 Journal of 
Law and Medicine 229. 
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expressed about the consequences stemming from the Human Genome 
Project, especially in the areas of law, ethics and sociology. From the outset it 
was decided in the USA that a portion of the funding for the Human Genome 
Project (around 5% from the NIH and 3% from the DoE) should go to a 
separate program called Ethical, Legal and Social Implications (ELSI). 21 
Subsequently, in December, 1989, the European Community (EC) Council of 
Ministers adopted a resolution endorsing European participation in the 
Human Genome Project, and, at the same time the Council also determined 
that the EC should participate in research on ethical, social and legal aspects of 
the project. 22 No such formal framework exists in Australia at the present 
time. To date, the ELSI program has focused almost exclusively on education 
and issues of confidentiality and privacy raised by the potential increase in 
genetic data about individuals. 23 
A number of respected international bodies have addressed the ethical 
issues associated with human genetic research. These include the International 
Bioethics Committee of UNESCO 324 and the International Bar Association. 25 
Regionally, the Council of Europe and the Group of Advisers on the Ethical 
Implications of Biotechnology (GAEIB) have assessed a range of issues, as have 
the President's Commission in the United States 26 and the Nuffield Council 
on Bioethics in the United Kingdom.27 In 1995 the Shaw Committee Report on 
Human Genetics: The Science and its Consequences was published in the 
21 	Alums, G.J. and S. Elias (eds.), Gene Mapping: Using Law and Ethics as Guides (1992) 
Oxford University Press. 
22 	MacKenzie, D., "European Commission Tables New Proposals on Genome Research" (1989) 
New Scientist 25 Nov. 1989, 6. 
23 	United States Department of Energy, Human Genome. 1991-92 Program Report (1992) US 
Government Printing Service. 
24 	See, for example, "UNESCO Revised Outline of a Declaration on the Human Genome and 
its Protection in Relation to Human Dignity and Human Rights" (1995). Reprinted in 5 
Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 150. 
25 	Draft International Convention on the Human Genome. Reported in Coghlan, A., "Gene 
Treaty Promises Rewards for Unique Peoples" (1996) New Scientist 2 November, 8. 
26 President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical 
and Behavioural Research, Splicing Life. A Report on the Social and Ethical Issues of 
Genetic Engineering with Human Beings (1992), herein after referred to as Splicing Life. 
27 	Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Report on Genetic Screening: Ethical Issues (1993) 
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United Kingdom.28 The legal aspects of the Human Genome Project were also 
discussed at a major conference convened in Bilbao in 1993. 29 Prior to the 
Bilbao conference, the BBV Foundation published the Valencia Declaration on 
the Human Genome Project in 1990. 30 
The dominant theme in much of the literature is that the Human 
Genome Project, of itself, creates few new ethical concerns that are any 
different from those raised by other forms of biomedical research. It is the 
application of the knowledge gained from the Human Genome Project into 
clinical practice that raises a range of ethical considerations. 
All aspects of human genetic research clearly must be subjected to the 
same level of scrutiny as for any other form of biomedical research. This 
necessity will usually be met by the requirements that research protocols are 
submitted to the relevant ethics committee prior to funding approval, and that 
the progress of the research is monitored by the same committee. It is 
questionable, however, whether this level of scrutiny is sufficient for all forms 
of human genetic research, particularly when the research involves 
manipulation of the human genome. 
The unique safety issues created by genetic manipulation work were 
recognised by the scientists involved from the outset. In 1975, at the Asimolar 
Conference, scientists recommended a moratorium on some aspects of this 
type of research. Expert bodies were established in a number of countries to vet 
all genetic manipulation work. In Australia, this function is carried out by the 
Genetic Manipulation Advisory Committee (GMAC). Its primary concern is to 
prevent the escape of genetically modified organisms into the environment. 
GMAC was formed in 1987 to replace the Recombinant DNA Monitoring 
28 	United Kingdom House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Human Genetics: 
The Science and its Consequences (1995) HMSO, London. 
29 	Legal Problems: Human Genome Project. The conference was organised by the B13V 
Foundation which is a research institute established by a leading Spanish bank. This 
conference followed two earlier meetings organised by the Foundation in 1988 and 1990 
both in Valencia, Spain which dealt with the scientific and ethical implications of the 
Human Genome Project. 
30 	See Hon Justice Michael Kirby, "Legal Problems: Human Genome Project" (1993) 67 
Australian Law Journal 894 at 903. 
106 
Committee. The terms of reference were enlarged to cover techniques other 
than recombinant DNA technology. The function of GMAC is to oversee the 
development and use of novel genetic manipulation techniques. It assesses 
hazards posed by such techniques to the community and the environment and 
recommends safety procedures. GMAC assesses all proposals for research 
involving genetic manipulation and requires any institution involved in such 
work to abide by GMAC guidelines and to establish its own institutional 
biosafety committee (IBC). 
The regulatory regime for safety aspects of genetic manipulation in 
Australia is undergoing change at the present time. GMAC is in the process of 
becoming a statutory body, on the recommendation of the 1992 House of 
Representatives Report: Genetic Manipulation: The Threat or the Glory. 
1.4 Regulation of Gene Therapy Research 
1.4.1 Germ Line Gene Therapy 
The general view about germ line gene therapy until very recently was 
that it should be banned in some way or other because of its effect on future 
generations. The GAEIB, for example, attempted an ethical evaluation of germ 
line gene therapy but concluded that scientific uncertainties prevented them 
from evaluating risks and benefits. It recommended that the technique should 
be forbidden on humans until the situation is scientifically clarified, at which 
point it should be ethically reevaluated. 31 
The early 1990s heralded a willingness to debate these hard questions in 
some quarters. John Fletcher and W. French Anderson pointed out that the 
morally relevant differences between somatic cell gene therapy and germ line 
gene therapy are less significant than the differences between these techniques 
and enhancement gene therapy. 32 They believe that the time is ripe for 
detailed public discussion. The Declaration of Inuyama, 33 which arose out of a 
31 	GAEIB Press Dossier, 28. 
32 	Fletcher, J. C. and W.F. Anderson, "Germ-line Gene Therapy: A New Stage of Debate" 
(1992) 20 Law, Medicine and Health Care 26. 
33 	"The Declaration of Inuyama and Reports of Working Groups" (1991) 2 Human Gene 
Therapy 123. 
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conference in Japan of the Council for International Organisations of Medical 
Sciences, endorsed this view. It was stated in the Declaration that germ line 
gene therapy is technically difficult and presently not possible. However, it 
may be the only means of treating some diseases and so discussion should 
continue. 
Others, including the Council for Responsible Genetics34 are 
unconditionally opposed to germ line gene therapy. They have argued that the 
target population is future people, not those already suffering, and therefore 
consent is impossible and accountability is unlikely. In addition they also 
raised the issue that germ line gene therapy could be seen as treating people as 
"biologically perfectible artefacts" and those who are not perfect will be seen as 
damaged goods, thereby reinforcing prejudice and discrimination. Indeed, it 
has been argued that the consequences of gene therapy could extend to 
changing human identity, although this suggestion has been refuted. 35 Others 
also urge caution and restraint, arguing that somatic cell gene therapy is barely 
off the ground and it needs to be meticulously tested before any such 
techniques should be applied where there is any chance that they can be passed 
on to future generations. 
But Fletcher and Anderson have actually raised similar issues 
themselves. Their argument is that, because research money is being invested 
in developing appropriate techniques for germ line gene therapy, there should 
be public debate at this stage to assess if research into its potential use in 
humans should continue. If the outcome of the debate is that it will never be 
ethically acceptable to perform germ line gene therapy, then such research 
should cease. 36 A recent symposium on regulating germ line gene therapy 37 is 
testimony to the increasing willingness of the international community to 
34 	Council for Responsible Genetics, Human Genetics Committee, "Position Paper on Human 
Germ Line Manipulation" (1993) 4 Human Gene Therapy 35. 
35 	See Persson, I., "Genetic Therapy, Identity and the Person-Regarding Reasons" (1995) 9 
Bioethics 16. 
36 	See also Walters, L. "Human Gene Therapy: Ethics and Public Policy" (1991) 2 Human 
Gene Therapy 115; Wivel, N. and L. Walters, "Germ-Line Gene Modification and Disease 
Prevention: Some Medical and Ethical Perspectives" (1993) 262 Science 533. 
37 	"Symposium, Regulating Germ-Line Gene Therapy" (1994) 13(2) Politics and the Life 
Sciences 217-248. 
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debate the issue, although that debate is not yet at the stage of providing 
definitive answers. 
For the time being Australia has rejected germ line gene therapy 
through NHMRC guidelines. 38 This mirrors the position in other countries, 
which either ban the technique through research guidelines or prohibit it 
through legislation. 
1.4.2 Somatic Cell Gene Therapy 
Recent reviews have suggested that there is an ethical imperative to 
pursue research into somatic cell gene therapy in order to alleviate suffering 39 
and it can be justified readily in terms of welfare of the individual and fairness 
to society. On the other hand, it is also clear that somatic cell gene therapy 
should not be unregulated, and a number of restrictions have been suggested. 
It is generally accepted that somatic cell gene therapy requires the 
creation of no new ethical principles but heightens familiar ethical concerns, 
particularly autonomy, beneficence and non-maleficence. In particular, the UK 
Clothier Report stated that somatic cell gene therapy is nc) different ethically 
from organ transplantation and blood transfusion. While there may be an 
ethical obligation to pursue such research in order to alleviate suffering, it 
should be clearly limited to the treatment of serious or life—threatening disease 
in individual patients and where there is no other effective treatment. A 
Report by the Canadian Medical Research Council stated that ethical concerns 
could be met by a detailed risk benefit analysis of each individual case and by 
ensuring informed consent of the patient. The GAEIB opinion added that 
special care would be required for children and incapacitated persons. This 
troublesome aspect of informed consent is particularly relevant given that 
most somatic cell gene therapy trials to date have been performed on 
children.40 
38 	See Supplementary Note 7. 
39 	One of the best examples is the UK Clothier Committee Report: Report of the Committee 
on the Ethics of Gene Therapy (1992) HMSO. 
40 	Children are often favoured subjects for gene therapy trials because there is less 
likelihood that their tissues have been permanently damaged as a result of their 
particular ailment, and therefore greater probability of alleviating suffering. 
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The GAEIB opinion outlined some of the more pertinent points: 
continued research into and clinical application of the technique should be 
encouraged; ethical evaluation is required and must have the three features of 
quality, transparency and efficiency, without introducing unnecessary delays; 
evaluation processes should be harmonised and standardised across Europe; 
appropriate measures should be taken to ensure equal access across Europe; 
and the technique should be restricted to serious diseases because of its present 
risk assessment.41 
Although a number of clinical trials have been conducted using somatic 
cell gene therapy, the lack of positive outcomes and the technical problems 
that still need to be solved suggest that, despite the name, the technique must 
be described as research rather than innovative therapy. Consequently, it must 
at least be subjected to the same form of regulation as for all other biomedical 
research, as well as legal and professional requirements. The international 
consensus is that further layers of regulation should be imposed on gene 
therapy research because of the unique safety and ethical issues it creates. 42 
These layers are can be categorised as three levels of review. In summary these 
are: 
• level 1: product safety, quality and efficiency: two tier review by 
institutional ethics committee and national drug evaluation committee; 43 
• level 2: release of genetically modified organisms: two tier review by 
institutional biosafety committee and national committee with expertise in 
recombinant DNA technology; and 
• level 3: science, ethics and safety of clinical trials: review by institutional 
ethics committee and national gene therapy committee. 
• Level 1: Safety and Efficacy of the Products Used in Clinical Trials 
41 	See generally Gustafson, J., "Genetic Therapy: Ethical and Religious Reflections" (1992) 8 
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 183. 
42 	In this respect, most countries with an interest in gene therapy have adopted the US 
position, as stated in the President's Commission Report, Splicing Life. 
43 	This level of review is discussed in some detail by Cohen-Haguenauer, 0., "Overview of 
Gene Therapy in Europe: A Current Statement Including Reference to US Regulation" 
(1995) 6 Human Gene Therapy 773. 
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Since the products used in gene therapy trials come within the definition of 
drugs, their oversight falls naturally within the ambit of the national body 
with that responsibility. In Australia somatic cell gene therapy falls within 
the ambit of the TGA system and therefore all trials must go through either 
the CTN or CTX scheme. At the present time the CTN scheme is preferred. 
• Level 2: Safety of Recombinant DNA Technology 
Since gene therapy involves the use of recombinant DNA technology, 
approval should be required in Australia by the relevant IBC and from 
GMAC. A recent change to GMAC guidelines, however, provides that most 
proposals for human gene therapy work are exempted from GMAC 
review," because this aspect of the trial is seen to be adequately reviewed 
elsewhere. 
• Level 3: Ethics, Science and Safety of Gene Therapy 
Somatic cell gene therapy must be subject to the same scrutiny at this level 
as other forms of biomedical research, which is achieved by the 
institutional ethics committee review system. For most forms of 
biomedical research, review by institutional ethics committees is 
considered to be sufficient. In a number of countries, a more stringent 
regulatory framework has been imposed for somatic cell gene therapy by 
creating a second tier of review for scientific ethical and safety aspects of 
clinical trials. This is justified on the basis that the technique is complex 
and difficult to perform safely and also because of the ethical concerns 
expressed by the population about gene therapy. The USA has been the lead 
country in the implementation of gene therapy trials. Other countries, 
including Australia, have also followed the lead taken by the USA in the 
implementation of a regime for scrutinising proposals for gene therapy 
trials. 
44 	Genetic Manipulation Advisory Committee, Guidelines for Small Scale Genetic 
Manipulation Work (1995) sections 1.12 to 1.2.11. 
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1.5 Review of Regulation of Somatic Cell Gene Therapy 
1.5.1 The Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee, USA. 
The first application of gene therapy on humans in the USA was for 13- 
thalassaemia in 1980. Not only was the trial unsuccessful, but it provoked 
general outrage because no approval had been granted. The inadequacy of 
government oversight of human gene therapy was also glaringly obvious. As a 
direct consequence, the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioural Research was given 
the mandate to study the social and ethical issues of genetic engineering with 
human beings. It handed down its Report in 1982. 45 That Report 
recommended that Institutional Review Boards, charged with reviewing 
proposals for gene therapy research in humans, should have access to expert 
advice during their review process from the Recombinant DNA Advisory 
Committee (RAC). The RAC was created at the NIH in the mid-1970s to assess 
the risks of unintended exposure to hazards through experimental genetic 
engineering techniques. 46 The President's Commission Report also stressed 
the need for an unusual degree of care in vetting novel applications. 
Furthermore, it recommended that the RAC should broaden its area of 
scrutiny to include risks arising from intended uses of genetic engineering 
techniques and not just unintended exposure. The Report recommended that 
the RAC should be independent and involve a range of participants, stressing 
that such an oversight committee is required because of "the profound nature 
of the implications of gene splicing as applied to human beings".47 
The chief outcome of the Report was that a Human Gene Therapy 
Subcommittee of the RAC was established in 1984. In 1985 that subcommittee 
published guidelines for submission of research proposals, which were revised 
in 1990. 48 Proposals were required to be reviewed by the Human Gene Therapy 
45 	Splicing Life. 
46 	That is, tier 2, level 2 review. 
47 	Splicing Life, 5. 
48 	National Institutes of Health, Points to Consider in the Design and Submission of 
Somatic-Cell Human Gene Therapy Protocols (1985); Points to consider in the Design and 
Submission of Protocols for the Transfer of Recombinant DNA into the Genome of Human 
Subjects (1990). 
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Subcommittee, 49 as well as the full RAC. 5° Institutional Review Boards and 
Institutional Biosafety Committees provided the first tier of review at all 
levels. The US Food and Drug Administration was responsible for tier 2, level 
1 review. In total six hearings were required, those of the Human Gene 
Therapy Subcommittee and RAC being in public and the rest in private. The 
first review began in 1988, that protocol ultimately being accepted in 1989. 
During the first few years in which the approval process for gene 
therapy trials operated in the USA it became obvious that the process was 
cumbersome and repetitive. The role of each of the review bodies was never 
clearly defined. The Human Gene Therapy Subcommittee was, from the 
outset, thought of as a stop-gap, a mechanism for regulation that could be 
established quickly and replaced by a more independent body at a later stage. 
Already in 1991 there were calls for the RAC to streamline its review process, 51 
and by 1992 the Human Gene Therapy Subcommittee had been disbanded, 
leaving the RAC as the principal expert body to vet gene therapy protocols. 52 
The RAC was subjected to considerable scrutiny in 1995. In particular the 
mandate of the RAC was questioned: should it focus on the safety and ethics of 
the clinical trial, or the quality of the science? 53 The review process was 
recognised as being unnecessarily unwieldy, and it was recommended that 
where protocols were very similar to previously approved trials they should 
go directly to the FDA after initial screening by the RAC, thereby giving the 
FDA responsibility for all levels of tier 2 review. New protocols would still 
receive full public review by the RAC. 54 At that time it was suggested by some 
that the RAC should not play any further role in the regulation of individual 
49 	For tier 2 review at level 3. 
50 	Tier 2, level 2 review. 
51 	Gershon, D., "Cracks in the NIH" (1991) 353 Nature 591. 
52 	That is, tier 2 review at both level 2 and level 3. See Gershon, D., "NIH Merger to 
Shorten Review" (1992) 355 Nature 664. 
53 	Marshall, E., "RAC's Identity Crisis" (1995) 269 Science 1054. 
54 	See for example, Taylor, R., "NIH Review to Suggest Streamlined Handling of Gene 
Therapy Bids" (1995) 375 Nature 713; Marshall, E., "One Less Hoop for Gene Therapy" 
(1995) 265 Science 599. 
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gene therapy protocols,55 although RAC members strongly disagreed with this 
viewp oint. 56 Since the recommended changes were adopted the RAC has 
found itself with little work to do. In May 1996 the Director of the NIH 
announced that it would be closed down, 57 although since then that decision 
has in part been reversed. 58 In future the RAC will exist solely as a forum for 
public debate on gene therapy, but will not be involved in the approval 
process. 
1.5.2 International Regulation 
The RAC type of review process is clearly held in high regard elsewhere. 
Government reports in a number of other countries have recommended the 
implementation of similar review mechanisms. Most countries that are 
undertaking or are likely to undertake somatic cell gene therapy trials now 
have, or are in the process of creating, national bodies for tier 2 review at level 
3. These include Australia, 59 the United Kingdom,6° Canada/61 Japan,62 and 
countries of the European Community 63 Both the European Medical Research 
Councils in 1988 and the Council of Europe in 1989 also recommended that 
national bodies should be established to consider level 3 review of all human 
gene therapy proposals. 64 In this respect, as with all other aspects of the trialing 
of somatic cell gene therapy, other countries lag behind the USA. New 
55 	McGarrity, G.J. and W.F. Anderson, "Human Gene Therapy Protocols: RAC Review" 
(1995) 268 Science 1261. 
56 	Chase, G.A. et al, "Regulation of Gene Therapy" (1995) 269 Science 14. 
57 	"Gene Panel to be Disbanded" (1996) 381 Nature 359. 
58 	Wadman, M., "Gene Panel Reprieved after Public Outcry ..." (1996) 384 Nature 297. 
59 	See Chalmers, D.R.C. and D. Nicol, "Current Regulation of Human Gene Therapy in 
Australia" (1997) Today's Life Science (in press). 
60 	Hodgson, J. "UK Rules Out New Gene Therapy Laws" (1993) 366 Nature 194. 
61 	Medical Research Council of Canada, Guidelines for Research on Somatic Cell Gene 
Therapy in Humans (1990). 
62 	Swinbanks, D. "Japan Reviews First Guidelines for Gene Therapy Trials" (1993) 362 
Nature 684; Swinbanks, D., "Gene Therapists Face Double Check" (1994) 369 Nature 5. 
63 
	
	GAEIB, The Ethical Aspects of Gene Therapy. Press Dossier Relative to the Opinion from 
the GAEIB (1994), 21. 
64 	Ibid., at 22. 
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national bodies are being created for level 3 review at a time when the role of 
the equivalent US body is seen as unnecessary. 
1.5.3 Regulation in Australia 
In Australia, the NHMRC established a centralised gene therapy 
committee (GTC) in 1994.65 Guidelines for gene therapy protocols have recently 
been drafted by the GTC, which largely (although not completely) follow those of 
the RAC and the United Kingdom Gene Therapy Advisory Committee. 
Generally institutional ethics committees are required to undertake an initial 
review of gene therapy protocols, the main function of the GTC being to act as an 
advisory body to institutional ethics committees. The GTC has three other 
functions: 
• to provide advice to researchers to facilitate the design of protocols; 
• to act as a source of information to the community; and 
• to maintain a register of trials in this country. 
Membership of the GTC includes scientists, clinicians, representatives 
from GMAC and the TGA as well as an ethicist,66 and a lay person. 67 As such, it 
can provide broadly based advice over a range of areas. The GTC provides advice 
to individual chief investigators, institutional ethics committees, and other 
relevant bodies on the processing of applications. Decisions are relayed to the 
institutional ethics committee ultimately responsible for the proposal. 
Modifications may be required to individual protocols before they can be 
supported by the GTC. 68 
There is considerable overlap in the tasks of the GTC and GMAC with 
respect to safety issues, and for this reason four individuals are members of 
both committees, and have been given the mandate to act on behalf of GMAC 
when reviewing gene therapy proposals. In consequence, the GTC conducts 
65 	Professor Ron Trent from the University of Sydney is the chair. 
66 	Sister Regis Dunne from the Provincial Bioethics Centre in Queensland. 
67 	Associate Professor Loarte Skene from the University of Melbourne. 
68 	This has been the case for all studies reviewed to date. As of 27 May 1996 three trials 
have been approved, one has been postponed because insufficient information was given to 
the GTC and two have been rejected. Personal communication with Professor Ron Trent, 27 
May 1996. 
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tier 2 review for both levels 2 and 3. In addition, the TGA plays only a minor 
role in level 1 review, because gene therapy trials currently go through the 
CTN drug safety system. As such, the GTC has primary responsibility for tier 2 
review of gene therapy protocols. This is quite different from the USA 
approach, in which the RAC was only ever given limited jurisdiction over tier 
2 review. The changes to the regulatory process in the USA mean that the FDA 
is now responsible for all tier 2 review. 
1.5.4 The Need for Public Access to the Review Process 
Few countries other than the USA have opted for public review by 
bodies equivalent to the RAC. This decision has been seen as regrettable by 
some. In the United Kingdom Shaw Committee Report the problems of 
holding meetings in public were recognised. Nevertheless, it was 
recommended that, at the very least, approved proposals should be available to 
the public, provided that patients' confidentiality was protected. This was 
believed to be necessary in order to ensure public support for and alleviate 
public unease about gene therapy. In the USA this level of review has always 
been subject to public scrutiny and it could be argued that the main reason for 
setting up this form of review in the first place was to ensure public input. 69 
Indeed, the decision to disband the RAC elicited so much concern because it 
was seen to be depriving the public of a forum for discussing gene therapy and 
of access to information about gene therapy trials that ultimately the decision 
had to be reversed." The rejection of open meetings by other countries could 
be seen as weakening the process. It may well make the role of the tier 2 body 
harder to justify, and begs the question of what exactly this body is supposed to 
achieve. In Australia it appears that the role of the GTC was only ever to be in 
the provision of expert advice to institutional ethics committees and 
researchers.71 
69 	Kaiser, J.,  "Gene Therapy Panel Gets a Thumbs Up" (1995) 270 Science 1287. 
70 	Wadman, M., "Gene Panel Reprieved after Public Outcry ..." (1996) 384 Nature 297. 
71 	Personal communication from Professor Ron Trent, chair of the Australian Gene Therapy 
Committee. 
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1.5.5 Comment 
• In general the national bodies that have been formed to conduct tier 2, 
level 3 review have been recognised for their effectiveness." In the USA, the 
review process found favour principally because it was open to the public and 
consistent nationally." On the other hand, the RAC was a committee of the 
NIH, the main funding body for this sort of research. This creates three major 
problems: technically the RAC could only review NIH-funded research; it 
could only review proposals for funding; and the NIH thus became both the 
promoter and regulator of such research. Nevertheless, the RAC appears to 
have fulfilled its role critically, independently and professionally. 74 
Furthermore, bodies external to the NIH have been willing to submit their 
protocols voluntarily to the RAC for review. 
The adequacy of the review process in Australia remains to be tested. It 
can be said with some confidence that to date gene therapy trials in this 
country are proceeding with deliberative caution. Australia has in place a two-
tier system of research review that is consistent with the model "best-practice" 
of regulation in all countries either currently undertaking gene therapy trials, 
or likely to undertake them in the future. It is essential that this two-tier 
review process both displays and is seen to display the three vital 
characteristics of quality, transparency and efficiency." Some areas warrant 
attention within the present regulatory system: 
• The principle of transparency demands public consultation, because of the 
perceived social impacts of gene therapy, particularly on human identity 
72 	See, for example, para 110 of the United Kingdom House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee Report Human Genetics: The Science and Its Consequences (1995) 
HMSO, London (the Shaw Committee Report). 
73 	Such considerations are discussed in Walters, L., "Human Gene Therapy: Ethics and 
Public Policy" (1991) 2 Human Gene Therapy 115. 
74 	Ibid., 117. 
75 	Set out by the European Group of Advisers on Ethical Implications of Biotechnology in its 
opinion on The Ethical Implications of Gene Therapy (1994) GAEIB Opinion No. 4, 13 
December 1994. 
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and human rights. 76 The NHMRC, with its statutory public consultation 
functions, is perhaps the appropriate body to undertake such work. 
• This two-tier review process overlies existing frameworks for oversight of 
release of genetically modified organisms by GMAC, drug trials by the TGA 
and institutional ethics committees, and medical practice by the legal 
system and professional bodies, and may thereby reduce efficiency of the 
regulatory system. Overlap in the review process is alleviated to a certain 
extent by exemption of gene therapy from GMAC review and by choice of 
the CTN scheme. Irrespective of the validity of these efficiency arguments, 
they should never take precedence over the rights of individual patients or 
subjects. 
• The ethical assessment of human gene therapy requires input from 
individuals outside the field of human genetics because many of the issues 
involved have ethical, social and legal as well as scientific dimensions. 
Through the present system, decisions as to whether to approve a trial 
ultimately rest with the relevant institutional ethics committee. 
Impartiality and independence of the institutional ethics committee are of 
paramount importance in this process. 
Part 2: 	Medical Practice 
2.1 Legal Duties and Professional Standards of Practice in Relation 
to Human Genetics 
The cornerstones upon which the legal duty of the medical profession 
are based are the duty to exercise reasonable skill and care, the requirement of 
informed consent to the risks and benefits of any proposed treatment, and the 
duty of confidentiality. Each of these relates directly to the ethical principles 
outlined at the start of this chapter. 
The tendency in the Canadian and US courts has been to require that a 
doctor generally acts with "utmost good faith and loyalty". 77 The majority in 
76 	See Maclean, S.A.M. and D. Giesen, "Legal and Ethical Consideration of the Human 
Genome Project" (1994) 1 Medical Law International 159. 
77 	Using the words of La Forest J in McInerney v MacDonald (1992) 93 DLR (4th) 415, at 423. 
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the Australian High Court in Breen v Williams 78 refused to adopt the notion 
that the entire doctor-patient relationship should be fiduciary in nature, 79 
whilst not denying that some fiduciary-like duties may be imposed on a doctor. 
These include the duty of confidentiality and the presumption that if the 
doctor receives substantial benefit in excess of proper remuneration it is a 
result of undue influence. 80 According to Dawson and Toohey JJ, whether 
such requirements are classified as fiduciary is open to debate. 81 Gummow J, 
on the other hand, saw these duties as being more clearly fiduciary in nature. 82 
Specifically, Breen v Williams decides that a doctor will not be required 
to provide access to a patient to the doctor's own medical records compiled in 
relation to that patient. More generally, it also means that a doctor will not 
necessarily be liable for "any act that objectively was not in the best interests of 
the patient". 83 Liability will only arise when there is breach of the duty to 
exercise reasonable skill and care. This duty arises in both contract and tort. 
The contractual duty of the doctor, unless otherwise expressly restricted 
or expanded, is to exercise reasonable skill and care in the advice and treatment 
of the patient. According to Brennan CJ, this obligation requires that the doctor 
act to maintain or improve the health of the patient generally. 84 Gaudron and 
McHugh JJ give a number of reasons why it is inappropriate to imply a term 
into all doctor-patient contracts that the doctor should act in the best interests 
of the patient. In particular, they see that it would be inconsistent with the 
existing duty in contract and tort to exercise reasonable skill and care.83 
78 	Breen v Williams (1996) 138 ALR 259. 
79 	Judgments of Dawson and Toohey JJ, at 273; Gaudron and McHugh JJ, at 284, and 287-289. 
Brennan CJ, at 265-266 and Gummow J at 304-308 were more willing to recognise the 
fiduciary nature of the relationship between the doctor and patient. It is less clear from 
their judgments precisely how far they see the fiduciary relationship extending. Note 
that Kirby J did not sit because he sat on the NSW Court of Appeal decision of the same 
case: Breen v Williams (1994) 35 NSWLR 522. 
80 	Dawson and Toohey JJ's judgment at 273. 
81 	Ibid. 
82 	At 306. 
83 	Gaudron and McHugh JJ's judgment, at 282. 
84 	Brennan CJ's judgment, at 262. 
85 	Gaudron and McHugh H's judgment, at 282 and 286-287. 
119 
Breach of the duty to exercise reasonable skill and care which results in 
loss or damage to the patient is also actionable in negligence, unless the 
damage suffered was not actually caused by the breach, or was too remote from 
the breach.86 Tortious redress is also available in battery for lack of consent and 
in negligence for failure of the doctor to fully inform the patient of the risks 
involved in a proposed treatment." The requirement that the doctor fully 
inform the patient of the risks operates in both the clinical and research 
setting. As Professor Dieter Giesen has pointed out, 
"every [research] subject's basic human right to self-determination dictates that he 
submit to the experiment on a purely voluntary basis and that his consent be fully 
informed". 88 
Some variation exists between countries as to the exact nature of the 
requirements for fully informed consent to the risks and benefits of a proposed 
treatment. In Australia,89 the patient-oriented principle has been adopted from 
the USA9(1 and Canada,91 for actions in negligence, whereas in the United 
Kingdom the Bolam test92 prevails, the focus of inquiry remaining with the 
responsible body of medical opinion. 93 The patient-oriented approach should 
apply when the consent sought is to medical research, and arguably there 
should be an even higher duty of disclosure. According to Hall JA of the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal: 
"The subject of medical experimentation is entitled to a full and frank disclosure of 
all the facts, probabilities and opinions which a reasonable man might be expected 
to consider before giving his consent." 94 
86 	Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 67 ALJR 47. 
87 	Ibid. 
88 	Giesen, D., "Civil Liability of Physicians for New Methods of Treatment and 
Experimentation: A Comparative Examination" (1995) 3 Medical Law 
89 In Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 67 ALJR 47. See Chalmers, D.R.C. and R • 
v Whitaker Informed Consent in Australia: A Fair Dinkum Duty to 
Medical Law Review 139. 
90 	Canterbury v Spence 464 F.2d 772 (1972). 
91 	Reibl v Hughes (1980) 114 DLR (3d) 1. 
92 	Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
93 	Sidaway v Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985]1 AC 871. 
94 	Halushka v University of Saskatchewan (1965) 53 DLR (2d) 436, 617. 
Review 22. 
Schwartz, "Rogers 
Disclose" (1993) 1 
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The extent to which consent is required for subsequent use of removed 
tissue is an area of increasing concern. This issue is discussed in some detail in 
section 2.4 on use of human tissue. 
The legal basis for the duty of confidentiality arises either out of an 
implied term in the contract between the doctor and patient, or through 
equitable relief for abuse of confidential information. 95 It may also arise out of 
a limited fiduciary relationship between the doctor and patient. 96 The duty of 
confidentiality is particularly relevant with respect to genetic screening and 
testing, and is discussed in more detail in section 2.3. 
The value of peer review and professional standards of practice cannot 
be discounted in all innovative areas of medical endeavour.97 In Australia 
there is in place a whole series of formal review procedures. Medical 
practitioners are answerable to the relevant state Medical Board. Specialist 
Colleges apply further specific standards as set out in their Articles. Other 
bodies, such as the Australian Medical Association, State Health Departments 
and individual hospitals also supervise and quality audit the conduct of 
practitioners. Aside from legal proceedings for malpractice, dissatisfied patients 
have the options of formal or informal complaints procedures. Finally, and 
most importantly, as a result of the 1992 Medicare Agreement between the 
federal and state governments, most states either have appointed or are in the 
process of appointing Health Complaints Commissioners. 98 
Professional self-regulation standards are relevant as they apply to 
genetic research on humans in the same fashion as for all other forms of 
medical practice. 
95 	Discussed in Abadee, A., "The Medical Duty of Confidentiality and Prospective Duty of 
Disclosure: Can They Co-exist" (1995) 3 Journal of Law and Medicine 75. See W v Edgell 
[1990] Ch 359. 
96 	Breen v Williams (1996) 138 ALR 259, Gaudron and McHugh JJ, at 285. 
97 	See Giesen (1995) 3 Medical Law Review 22. 
98 	The complaints procedures available in Australia are set out in some detail in Chalmers, 
D.R.C., Australian Medical Law. In: Encyclopaedia of Medical Law (1994) Kluwer Press, 
Belgium, 168p. 
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2.2 Regulation of Product Development 
2.2.1 Registration of Therapeutic Goods 
The TGA has set up a system of registration, the Australian Register of 
Therapeutic Goods, for all therapeutic drugs and devices. The TGA has three 
further tasks: 
• to set standards for drugs and devices and their importation; 
• to test function through a drug evaluation branch for prescription drugs, a 
compliance branch for non-prescription drugs; and a therapeutic devices 
branch; and 
• to set standards for advertising. 
Manufacturers of drugs and devices in Australia are required to obtain licences 
from the TGA.99 Licences will only be granted to manufacture drugs or devices 
included on the Register, unless they are exempt from registration. 100 Goods 
are required to be evaluated and approved before being included on the 
Register. They will be included if, amongst other things, quality, safety and 
efficacy of the goods for the purposes for which they are to be used has been 
satisfactorily established. 101 This will usually be achieved through the clinical 
trial process, discussed in section 1.2. State Poisons Acts and other associated 
legislation deal with the process of distribution and licence chemists and other 
drug outlets. 
Manufacturers of therapeutic goods are required to follow certain 
manufacturing principles, including codes of good manufacturing practice. 102 
The Code of Good Manufacturing Practice for medicinal products outlines the 
requirements as to buildings, environment, equipment and procedure for 
manufacture. 103 
99 	With a few exceptions, see Therapeutic Goods Administration, What You Need To Know 
About the Regulatory Requirements for Manufacture and Supply of Medical Products in, 
or from, Australia (1992) AGPS, Canberra, at 19. 
100 	Drugs used for experimental purposes in humans being one notable exemption. These are 
subject to the CTN and CTX schemes, as outlined in section 1.2, above. 
101 	Section 25(1)(d) Therapeutic Goods Act. 
102 	Section 36. 
103 	Therapeutic Goods Administration, Australian Code of Good Manufacturing Practice for 
Therapeutic Goods: Medicinal Products (1990), reprinted in 1996. 
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2.2.2 Product Liability 
Despite the detailed requirements for testing and manufacture of new 
medical products, there will always be some risk to the consumer from side 
effects associated with the product. The advent of genetic engineering has 
reduced many of the risks of contamination associated with the use of products 
that would otherwise have to be obtained from human tissue. One of the more 
compelling examples of the problems associated with the use of contaminated 
human tissue is human growth hormone. Human growth hormone was 
previously extracted from the human pituitary gland and such extracts carried 
with them the serious risk of contamination with the agents causing 
Creutzfeldt Jakob disease. 104 Genetically engineered growth hormone is now 
available and is free of such contaminants. Nevertheless, there may yet be 
serious defects associated with genetically engineered products and these may 
become apparent only some years after supply. 
Where injury or damage occurs as a result of misdiagnosis or 
mistranscription, action may be available in negligence for breach of duty of 
care. Further, an action may be brought to remove a practitioner who has 
made an error in the transcription of a medical dosage from the register of 
medical practitioners, but only in circumstances when the mistranscription 
amounts to misconduct. 105 
A range of options is available to persons who suffer loss or damage as a 
result of defective products. Foremost amongst these is Part VA of the Trade 
Practices Act (TPA) 1974 (Cth), which was introduced in 1992. This Part creates 
a right to compensation to persons injured or whose property is damaged by a 
defective product, as against the manufacturer of the product. This is a form of 
strict liability, and is a major advance on the common law position, which 
requires negligence on the part of the manufacturer to be proved by the 
plaintiff. 106 Section 75AK creates a number of defences, the most relevant of 
104 	See the Inquiry into the Use of Pituitary Drug Hormones in Australia and the 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, Report (1994) AGPS (Chair Dr Margaret Allars). 
105 	See Pillai v Messiter (No 2) (1989) 16 NSWLR 197. 
106 	The classic formulation of this type of negligence being that in Donoghue v Stevenson 
[1932] AC 562. 
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which in terms of supply of genetically engineered products is the state of the 
art defence. 107 This enables the manufacturer to raise as a defence that the state 
of scientific or technical knowledge at the time of supply of the product was 
not such as to enable the defect to be discovered. In addition the consumer 
must bring an action within ten years after supply of the goods.108 Since defects 
in genetically engineered products may not yet be part of the state of the art, 
and may not emerge for many years after supply, the extent to which product 
liability provisions provide adequate protection of the consumer in this area 
should be carefully scrutinised. 
Other options for legal redress, including contract, negligence and the 
consumer protection provisions in Part V of the TPA all suffer the same sorts 
of shortcomings.109 Moreover, for negligence and consumer protection, fault 
on the part of the manufacturer must be proved by the consumer. Taking s52 
TPA as an example, the consumer has to prove that the manufacturer engaged 
in misleading and deceptive conduct. Such requirements may be particularly 
difficult for consumers to prove because a number of intermediaries may be 
involved in the chain of supply. 
2.3 Regulation of Genetic Screening and Testing and Protection of 
Human Rights 
Many of the ethical issues associated with screening and testing are 
inextricably linked to other major ethical debates associated with reproductive 
technology, abortion, neonatal euthanasia and care of the disabled. Because 
some forms of genetic screening have been available for a considerable time, 
the ethical issues associated with genetic screening have also been extensively 
debated. 
The identification of genes which are supposedly linked to particular 
traits brings with it the expectation that screening tests will become available 
almost immediately to test for those traits. Indeed, there would appear to be 
107 	Section 75AK(1)(c). 
108 	Section 75A0(2). 
109 	Travers, R.C., "A Proposal to Reform Australian Product Liability Law" (1995) 69 
Australian Law Journal 1006 also lists Division 2A of Part V of the TPA as an alternative 
option for seeking legal redress. 
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considerable pressure both from industry and from the general public to 
market test kits as rapidly as possible. There are many problems associated with 
this. These include, first, that if kits become available too early the percentages 
of false positives and false negatives will not have been properly assessed. 
Secondly, adequate mechanisms for counselling testees both before and after 
testing may not have been fully implemented. Thirdly, and perhaps most 
importantly, it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the value of genetic 
tests is questionable when there is no possibility of curing the exposed defect. 
The UK Shaw Committee Report specifically referred to the problems 
associated with testing for late onset conditions and recommended that 
extensive counselling and follow up support should be provided for adults 
coming forward for this testing. 110 The Committee found that such diagnosis 
is only justifiable if those requesting it have fully considered all its 
implications. 111 Further, the Committee expressed the belief that children 
should not have genetic diagnosis for late onset disorders, recommending that: 
"there should be no mass screening for public health reasons in childhood 
unless a treatment for the disorder exists". 112 
2.3.1 Protection of Privacy 
Unlike other forms of human genetics, some aspects of genetic 
screening and testing can be considered as mainstream medical practice and 
therefore will not be required to be subjected to the stringent regulatory 
requirements of biomedical research, except insofar as they may require clinical 
trials prior to registration and manufacture of requisite materials. Yet 
screening, perhaps more than any other aspect of human genetics, creates the 
most serious ethical problems because of the potential for interference with 
human rights through invasion of privacy and discrimination. For this 
reason, the whole gamut of national and state legislation associated with the 
protection of human rights as well as relevant international instruments may 
all have a role in the regulatory regime for genetic screening and testing. 113 
110 	Shaw Committee Report para 79. 
111 	Shaw Committee Report, para 80. 
112 	Shaw Committee Report, para 92. 
113 	For a review of Australia's position in relation to human rights see Bailey, P.H., Human 
Rights: Australia in an International Context (1990) Butterworths, Sydney. 
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Some of the more relevant provisions for the protection of privacy are listed 
below. 
• Where the information is obtained during testing or examination of an 
individual by a doctor, the traditional duty of confidentiality not to divulge 
information applies. 
• Where the information is in relation to a Commonwealth agency, the 
Commonwealth Privacy Act 1988 applies which only permits information 
to be divulged in very limited circumstances. Specific requirements in 
relation to the collection, storage and use of private data are set out in a 
number of Privacy Principles. 
• Other State and Commonwealth Statutes establish further duties of 
confidentiality. For example, the Commonwealth Epidemiological Studies 
(Confidentiality) Act makes it an offence for a person who has carried out 
an epidemiological study to divulge personal information. Similarly, State 
Public Health Legislation places responsibilities and duties on health 
employees not to disclose information. 
• Where the information is gathered in research, the current NHMRC 
Guidelines on Privacy in Research apply. These Guidelines generally 
require that researchers have regard and respect for the individual's rights 
and to take all precautions to protect the person's privacy. 
• The NHMRC has issued further guidelines for the use of genetic registers in 
medical research, 114 which require that keepers of registers follow 
guidelines set out in the NHMRC Statement on Human Experimentation 
and Supplementary Note 6, Epidemiological Research (1992). 
2.3.2 Discrimination by Third Parties 
The new genetics has the capacity for greatly increasing the information 
available about an individual's genetic makeup, which inevitably creates the 
potential for interference with human rights. Unless that information is 
protected rigorously, it is possible that some individuals will be discriminated 
against on the basis of their genetic constitution. 115 There is a real possibility of 
114 	NHMRC Guidelines for the Use of Genetic Registers in Medical Research (1991) Report to 
the NHMRC by the Medical Ethics Committee of NHMRC. AGPS, 18p. 
115 	Note that in the USA a number of states are already attempting to introduce legislation 
to prevent genetic discrimination in the health insurance arena. See Dotsey, J., 
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the creation of a genetic underclass of the uninsurable and unemployable in 
the future, even though many of these people will show no present physical 
manifestation of their condition. 
It is important to remember that employers, insurers and 
superannuation providers are already able to "discriminate" without the use 
of DNA analysis. There are many other ways of tracing the likelihood of 
predisposition to particular diseases or susceptibility to disease, for example 
through tracing family histories. Thus the prohibition of DNA analysis will 
not of itself prevent discrimination. The current attitude of the Life 
Investment and Superannuation Association of Australia is to require the 
disclosure of genetic test results consistent with the general "utmost good 
faith" requirement of disclosure in insurance contracts. However, the 
Association does not compel individuals to undertake genetic tests. 116 
In the area of employment the terms of the Disability Discrimination 
Act 1992 (Cth) are likely to prevent an employer from selectively testing an 
individual employee with a susceptibility to a genetic disease. It is further 
unlikely that a susceptibility to a condition rather than having the condition 
would be a relevant consideration provided the person had the capacity to 
undertake the job. There is a body of evidence, however, that suggests that 
when it comes to filling positions, people can be discriminated against on the 
basis of genetic predisposition, even by Commonwealth agencies. 117 Moreover, 
there is further evidence that sufferers of genetic disorders and their families 
perceive that they have suffered the effects of discrimination by health 
insurers, life insurers and employers. 118 The fear of discrimination may cause 
a small but significant percentage of the relatives of sufferers of genetic disease 
"Lawmakers Crack Down on Genetic Discrimination: a Legislative Overview" (1996) 10 
Gene Watch 2. 
116 	Life, Investment and Superannuation Association of Australia, Draft Policy Regarding 
Genetic Testing (1996). 
117 	See Taylor, S., "Case Study of Genetic Discrimination in the Context of Huntington's 
Disease: Some Social Implications of the 'New Genetics' Technologies" (unpublished 
manuscript). 
118 	Lapham, E.V., C. Kozma and J.O. Weiss, "Genetic Discrimination: Perspectives of 
Consumers" (1996) 274 Science 621. 
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to refuse to be tested. 119 Such refusals may ultimately have serious 
reproductive or psychological consequences. 
The United Kingdom Nuffield Council Report of 1993 on Genetic 
Screening: Ethical Issues recommended that the potential use of genetic 
screening by employers should be kept under review. 120 The Report further 
recommended that insurers should adhere to their current policy of not 
requiring any genetic tests as a prerequisite of obtaining insurance, and that 
pending the outcome of discussions concerning the future use of genetic 
information, insurance companies should accept a temporary moratorium on 
requiring the disclosure of genetic data. 121 
2.3.3 Familial Considerations 
The nature of genetic information requires that some additional 
considerations are taken into account, principally because of the family 
implications of genetic screening and testing. The 1993 Nuffield Council 
Report recommended that the accepted standards of confidentiality with 
respect to medical information should be followed as far as possible. However, 
when information is revealed that may have serious implications for relatives 
of those who have been screened, it was recommended that health 
professionals should seek to persuade individuals, where necessary, to allow 
the disclosure of relevant genetic information to other family members. 122 
Subsequently, the Shaw Committee Report recommended that if an 
individual cannot be persuaded to share this information, their right to 
119 	Ibid., 9% refusal rates were reported in that study. 
120 	Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Genetic Screening: Ethical Issues (1993), Chapter 6, 
recommendation 6.27 at p 64. 
121 	Ibid., recommendations 7.37, 7.38 at p 73. Note, however, the two exceptions to that 
moratorium: 
(i) the moratorium should not apply to individuals with a known family history that can 
be established by conventional questions; 
(ii) the moratorium should only apply to moderately sized policies. 
There is considerable ambit in these exceptions which must bring into question the 
effectiveness of any such moratorium, were it to be introduced. 
122 	Chapter 5, recommendations 5.40 and 5.41 at p53. 
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privacy must be respected. 123 Note, however, that the Australian Medical 
Association's Code of Ethics, as amended in 1996, refers to the need to: 
"[k]eep in confidence information derived from your patient, or from a colleague 
regarding your patient, and divulge it only with the patient's permission. Exceptions 
may arise where the health of others is at risk or you are required by order of a court 
to breach patient confidentiality. -124 
The first exception may well allow a doctor to divulge confidential 
genetic information to family members at risk, which may be contrary to the 
recommendations made by the British committees. The conflict between a 
doctor's duty to respect the confidentiality of a patient and the duty to inform 
others of serious risks to life or health is not easily reconciled. Doctors need to 
be advised of the parameters within which they should make decisions 
whether to disclose such information. 
2.3.4 Recent Australian Analysis 
In Australia, the most recent discussion of relevant privacy law has been 
conducted by the Privacy Commissioner: The Privacy Implications of Genetic 
Testing. 125 The Commissioner analysed privacy concerns in respect of genetic 
testing and implications of the collection of personal information in the 
context of employment, insurance, law enforcement and scientific research. 
Matters listed for further consideration included: the need to conduct a survey 
to establish the extent of genetic testing; the need for formalising standards as 
to disclosure of personal genetic information; the lack of desirability of 
population DNA databases; and the development of standards in insurance, 
superannuation and employment for use of personal information. 
• The Cancer Genetics Ethics Committee (CGEC) of the Victorian Anti-
Cancer Council has produced comprehensive guidelines on the establishment 
and use of registers of genetic diseases which are to be referred to the national 
Australian Health Ethics Committee for public consultation. The CGEC sees 
that cancer genetic registers differ in a number of ways from the types of 
registers anticipated in the NHMRC guidelines. It pays particular attention to 
community concerns regarding the protection of confidentiality and privacy, 
123 	Shaw Committee Report, para 228. 
124 	Australian Medical Association, AMA Code of Ethics (1996). 
125 	Information Paper Number 5 (1996). 
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consent to identification in a register, possible misuse of information and 
broader social implications, and admits that it is unlikely that all adverse 
effects can be completely eliminated. 
Work of the kind undertaken by the Privacy Commissioner and the 
Anti-Cancer Council are valuable starting points both in determining the 
issues that are likely to arise as genetic tests become more prevalent, and in 
modifying and expanding the regulatory framework to deal with these issues. 
2.3.5 Public Lack of Interest in Population Screening 
It is becoming apparent that one of the ways that the public has chosen 
to deal with the negative aspects of screening for genetic disease is simply to 
refuse to be tested. In the USA clinicians have been surprised by the lack of 
interest of the public in undergoing screening for hereditary gene defects such 
as cystic fibrosis. 126 A cystic fibrosis consortium, which was established to assess 
the social impact of genetic testing and screening, has found that pregnant 
couples were the only group in which there was significant uptake of freely 
available tests, and then only if the tests were incorporated into a broader 
testing program. 127 One of the groups in the consortium concluded that: "[Wile 
believe that clinicians should not routinely offer carrier screening to 
nonpregnant individuals who do not have a family history of CF." 128 
2.3.6 Comment 
The primary justification for patenting of human genetic research is to 
encourage investment in that research, and the primary justification for 
funding and conducting human genetic research is that it will ultimately lead 
to better diagnosis and treatment of genetic diseases and other diseases with 
genetic components. The manufacture of therapeutic proteins using genetic 
engineering has made an important contribution to the treatment of disease. 
The same cannot be said for gene therapy at present. The initial promise of this 
technique has not yet been fulfilled and it may be many more years before any 
126 	See, for example, Coghlan, A., "Public Gives Thumbs Down to Gene Screening" (1996) New 
Scientist 13 April, 8. 
127 	Marshall, E., "ELSI's Cystic Fibrosis Experiment" (1996) 274 Science 489. 
128 	Ibid. 
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form of gene therapy is part of routine medical practice. On the other hand, 
developments in the diagnosis of genetic disease are proceeding apace. The 
difficulties in this area are not so much to do with implementation of the 
technology as with ensuring that it is implemented in an ethically appropriate 
fashion. The wide ranging considerations that must be taken into account 
outside the safety and ethics of the technique itself suggest that great care will 
have to be taken in the implementation of any genetic testing or screening 
technology into clinical practice. Moreover, if the public rejection of 
population-based genetic screening is more widespread then continued public 
finding of research in this area may need to be reevaluated. 
2.4 Regulation of Use of Human Tissue 
The Human Genome Diversity Project (HGDP) is a research project and 
therefore falls under the same regulatory regime as for all biomedical research, 
as discussed in Part 1. Although similar ethical issues are raised by both the 
Human Genome project and the HGDP, the HGDP has elicited a more vocal 
response, particularly from indigenous groups. Unless a great deal of effort is 
made in the near future to alleviate those concerns, it will be difficult for the 
project to gain public support. That support is essential because the entire 
project is premised on the willingness of individuals to voluntarily donate 
samples. If genetic research involving non-western cultures is to progress in 
any meaningful way, then it is essential that one of the fundamental norms of 
conduct of that research be that differing cultural perspectives are taken into 
account. More generally, the HGDP has also served to highlight the important 
legal issues associated with the collection and use of human tissue. 
2.4.1 Informed Consent to the Collection of Tissue Samples and Ownership 
of Samples 
The law has always denied a property right to the donor of bodily 
tissues, principally to prevent commercialisation in the use of those tissues. 
The decision of the Californian Supreme Court in Moore v Regents of the 
University of California 129 makes it clear that, in California at least, there can 
be no action for conversion of human cells because the donor can have no 
proprietary interest in those cells. The case arose because John Moore, a 
129 	(1990) 51 Cal. 3d 120. 
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sufferer of hairy cell leukemia, had his spleen removed as part of his 
treatment. Before that time, his physician, Dr. Golde knew of the research and 
economic value of Moore's cells but failed to inform him. The Mo cell line, 
derived from Moore's spleen cells, was subsequently patented and proved to be 
a commercial success. Moore sued for conversion and for breach of fiduciary 
duty or lack of informed consent. The majority of the Supreme Court refused 
to accept the conversion argument, but accepted that there had been a breach of 
fiduciary duty or lack of informed consent. Go1de should have informed 
Moore of his personal interest, because this may have affected his medical 
judgment. The outcome was that Moore settled out of court for a small 
amount but failed to get a share of the profits derived from the patent on the 
Mo cell line. 
In the past the trend has been to presume that human tissues that had 
been removed for therapeutic or research purposes had been abandoned by the 
donor once they had given valid informed consent to the proposed removal. 
There is now growing support for the additional requirement of informed 
consent to subsequent use. The European Bioethics Convention, for example, 
requires that separate consent be given to subsequent use of research 
s a mp les. 130 The Nuffield Council on Bioethics in the United Kingdom 
addressed this issue in its 1995 report Human Tissue: Ethical and Legal Issues. 
The need to clarify and strengthen the ethical and legal framework associated 
with clinical and research use of human tissue was recognised as urgent. There 
was general agreement that human tissue "legally cannot and ethically should 
not be treated as a commodity." 131 The Report recommended that consent to 
treatment "should be taken to include consent to subsequent disposal or 
storage of tissues and further acceptable use provided that it is regulated by 
appropriate ethical, legal and professional standards." 132 This requirement will 
generally be satisfied provided that the range of intended uses is explained to 
the donor. These recommendations largely follow the judgment of the 
Californian Supreme Court in Moore: that the legal use of removed tissue is a 
130 	Council of Europe Draft Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of 
Human Beings with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Bioethics 
Convention (1994) Article 13. 
131 	Nuffield Council Report (1995) Chapter 13, para 13,9. 
132 	Nuffield Council Report (1995) Chapter 13, para 13.12. 
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matter of informed consent, and should not come with in the domains of 
property law or commercial law. 
In Australia, this issue is in the process of being clarified with respect to 
the use of human tissue for research purposes, following a 1993 discussion 
paper by the Australian Health Ethics Committee on "Use of Routine Blood 
and Tissue Samples for Research". That discussion paper was circulated to 
interested parties and comments elicited. In addition a number of workshops 
were held in 1993, in which the use of patient tissue was a major topic. 
Subsequently a notice of intent to issue guidelines was published and 
information packages were released. The most recent step is a compilation of 
submissions in response to the information packages. 
The need for guidelines on the use of human tissue for research 
purposes was generally supported in the submissions, although many 
expressed an opinion that some flexibility should be retained. In relation to 
informed consent, the general view was that there should be a flexible 
approach, as determined by institutional ethics committees on a case by case 
basis. It would seem that there was some consensus that consent to future use 
may not always be necessary. However, there was support for the view that 
consent should always be required for research using foetal tissues and 
placenta and genetic material or cell lines. A number of submissions 
commented on the uncertainty in Australian law with respect to ownership 
and commercial exploitation of human tissue. 
As with other aspects of the research/therapy dichotomy, requirements 
are less stringent for matters falling into the category of therapy. There is no 
requirement for institutional ethics committee oversight of consent 
procedures for therapeutic interventions, or the need to follow guidelines 
drafted by the Australian Health Ethics Committee. Its jurisdiction is purely in 
relation to biomedical research funded by its governing body, the NHMRC. 
Even so, common law informed consent requirements apply equally to both 
categories. The need for separate consent to subsequent use remains to be 
determined in Australia. 
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2.4.2 Informed Consent With Respect to Indigenous Peoples 
Different considerations apply when tissue is obtained from indigenous 
groups. It can be argued that valid informed consent can only be obtained if 
information is supplied in a culturally appropriate form. In some instances 
this may require consent from the social group as well as the individual, both 
because of the dangers of genetic stigmatisation and racism attaching to the 
whole group, and because of differing beliefs about ownership and rights to 
consent. 
There is some recognition of the unique health needs of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples in Australia. It is generally acknowledged that 
research and clinical practice involving these peoples raises particular 
concerns. 133 The NHMRC has provided some guidance as to how to conduct 
research involving indigenous peoples, 134 but no special considerations are 
explicitly required with regard to clinical practice. NHMRC guidelines are 
required to be applied by institutional ethics committees in assessing any 
research proposal involving Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. They 
address several areas of particular concern, namely consultation and 
community involvement, consent and ownership and publication of data. 
Patenting of research material is not expressly prohibited, but separate consents 
are required for any use of information or blood or tissue samples gathered in 
the course of research. 135 Abrogation of these guidelines would presumably 
lead to application of the normal sanctions that are available for breach of 
research guidelines, including withdrawal of funding and publication of 
default. This would most probably be sufficient to deter researchers from 
applying for a patent without obtaining the requisite consent. Nevertheless, it 
would not affect the validity of any patent granted. Nor do the guidelines apply 
to non-NHMRC funded research. 
133 	See the Council Session of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Standing 
Committee of NHMRC in June 1995 on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health. 
134 
	
	NHMRC, Interim Guidelines on Ethical Matters in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Health Research (1991). 
135 	Guideline 9. 
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The Human Genome Organisation has also recently issued guidelines 
on the conduct of genetic research. 136 These exemplify the need for 
communication in a culturally and socially appropriate form, consultation 
preceding recruitment, informed consent at the appropriate level, and respect 
for choices made as to use of materials. The guidelines also endorse technology 
transfer and sharing of profits with the indigenous peoples from whom 
samples were taken. Those seeking to collect material under the auspices of the 
HGDP research effort are required to follow the guidelines. It is of vital 
importance to the success of any research in this area that such guidelines are 
both respected and seen to be respected by the relevant communities. 
2.4.3 Comment 
If Moore's case is good law in Australia, and a person can have no 
proprietary interest in their own body parts once they have been removed, 
informed consent remains as the only existing means of protecting the 
interests of all the parties involved. 137 The adequacy of informed consent 
provisions is far from certain. I suggest that this aspect of regulation of human 
genetic research and its clinical application, perhaps than any other, needs 
greater attention by lawyers and policy makers. 138 Indeed, the problems 
associated with use of human tissue loom large on any ethical agenda for 
human genetic research. It may be that legislation is the only means by which 
the interests of the donor of tissue can be protected. The supply of tissue from 
willing donors is vital to the continuance of human genetic research. Donors 
will be loathe to do so if they see researchers benefiting financially from the 
use of their tissue. It does seem inequitable that the only person who is 
prohibited from making a profit out of the use of human tissue is the donor of 
that tissue. On the other hand, the implications that may arise out of making 
human tissue a subject of commerce are generally recognised as so profound 
136 	HUGO Ethical, Legal and Social Issues Committee, Report to Council, Statement on the 
Principled Conduct of Genetics Research (1996) available on the Internet at 
http://hugo.gdb.org/conduct.htm  
137 	Note that the decision of the majority in Moore has been widely criticised. A number of 
commentators have suggested that a person should have a property right in their own 
removed tissues. See, for example, Ducor, P., "The Legal Status of Human Materials" 
(1996) 44 Drake Law Review 195. 
138 	Save perhaps for the issues associated with use of genetic information. 
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that commercial transactions between the donor and user of that tissue should 
be avoided, if at all possible. 
In most instances where human tissue is donated for genetic research it 
will be "generic", in that the identity of the tissue and of the donor are 
irrelevant. In such cases I would support the view that it is inappropriate for 
the donor to receive a share of profits arising out of patents for inventions 
which use the tissue, because it is not the tissue itself that has generated the 
profit, but the invention. I will recommend that where the donor's tissue is in 
some way unique, either to that particular individual, or the individual's 
ethnic group, there is much better justification for allowing them a share in 
patent profits, particularly if the patented invention could not have been 
created without the use of that unique tissue. 
Conclusion 
This analysis has demonstrated that Australia and other countries have 
a long history of formulating and testing the appropriate regulatory 
mechanisms to deal with biomedical research, and these apply to human 
genetic research as much as any other research involving human subjects. 
This is not to deny that there are some gaps in the regulatory mechanism, 
particularly with respect to issues of access to genetic information and access to 
genetic material. It is difficult to see how a ban on patenting might fill the gaps 
in the regulatory regime in these areas. 
The patent system has in the past been used as a device for discouraging 
immoral inventions, including prohibitions on the patenting of 
contraceptives and gambling devices. 139 Ethical considerations have also been 
used • to justify the exclusion from patenting of certain items in some 
jurisdictions, particularly , foodstuffs and medicines, on the basis that private 
property rights should not interfere with the supply of vital goods. 140 For the 
139 	A number of examples are listed by Wells, A.J., "Patenting New Life Forms: An 
Ecological Perspective" [1994] European Intellectual Property Review 111. 
140 	See, for example, Moufang, R., "Patenting of Human Genes, Cells and Parts of the Body? - 
The Ethical Dimensions of Patent Law" (1994) 25 IIC 487, 501. Section 51(1)(b) of the 
Patents Act 1990 (Cth) allows the Commissioner to refuse to accept a patent request for a 
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most part, however, it is outside the competence of patent officers and judges 
to decide whether genetic research in itself is ethically acceptable. 141 If 
objections to patenting of human genetic material are to be given the attention 
they deserve they must be separated out from objections to the research. 142 I 
suggest that if a particular piece of research has been vetted and approved by a 
body which has been given the mandate to consider such issues, and if the 
research has been carried out in accordance with requisite guidelines, it is 
entirely inappropriate for patent officials to revisit the question of acceptability 
of that research. 
Human genetic research and its clinical application are monitored and 
controlled by a wide array of oversight mechanisms. These range from 
pronouncements of respected international organisations, through research 
guidelines to legislative requirements and prohibitions. There is little doubt 
that the existing system has imperfections, although the full extent of those 
imperfections may only become apparent as the science and medicine progress. 
The legal, ethical and soci al issues associated with human genetic research and 
its clinical applications will require monitoring for the foreseeable future. 
In Australia, oversight of the research phase is stringent. It rests on the 
ability of individual institutional ethics committees (IECs) to perform their 
duties, which for some committees may be quite onerous. The role of bodies 
such as the Gene Therapy Committee in providing expert advice to IECs is 
substance which is capable of being used as a food or medicine and is a mere mixture of 
known ingredients, or for a process producing such a substance by mere admixture. 
141 
	
	The extent to which they have the competence to address the ethics of patenting such 
work is less certain, see Chapter 6. 
142 	The distinction between the two issues may well have been further confused by the 
decision of the Technical Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office in Plant 
Cells/Plant Genetic Systems. (1995) OJEPO 545. In its consideration of the public 
order/morality provision in Article 53(a) of the European Patent Convention, the Board 
looked to the appropriateness of the technology employed in the invention itself, and not 
just to the exploitation of the invention. This would appear to be outside the competence 
of the Board in its consideration of Article 53(a) exclusions, and, as suggested by Straus, 
may present an additional requirement of patentability. Straus, J., "Patenting Human 
Genes in Europe - Past Developments and Prospects for the Future" (1995) 26 IIC 920, at 
933. 
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vital to their effectiveness. It also relieves the IECs from having to assess the 
technical merits of particular protocols so that they can concentrate on their 
true role of identifying and assessing the risks to the individual patient. At the 
same time it is unfortunate that the Gene Therapy Committee does not have a 
wider mandate to provide the public with a forum both for information and 
for input. 
The most important and contentious legal, ethical and social issues 
related to human genetic research and its applications are those associated with 
access, either in the form of access to genetic information or access to genetic 
material, and the role of the principle of informed consent. The concerns 
associated with these issues are too complex and too far removed from the 
patenting issue to be discussed further in this thesis. A number of bodies are 
turning their attention to these topics. These include the Victorian Anti-
Cancer Council, the Privacy Commissioner and the Australian Health Ethics 
Committee, which plans to examine this area for the next three years. This 
thesis also forms part of a larger project funded by the Australian Research 
Council which in part will assess these issues. For the remainder of this thesis, 
the focus is on the extent to which patenting is appropriate in the area of 
human genetic research and its applications, and not on the appropriateness of 
that research per se. 
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CHAPTER 5: COMMERCIALISATION OF GENETIC 
RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the patent system should not be 
the forum for regulating human genetic research because a number of more 
appropriate regulatory regimes exist outside the patent system. Once research 
becomes the domain of the company rather than the public institute, however, 
the question is again raised whether the patent system has a role in regulating 
that research, and, if it does, whether it discharges that role adequately. Two of 
the premises underlying objections to patenting of human genetic material are 
that patenting is the only means by which companies are regulated and that if 
we accept patenting of human genetic material, then wholesale 
commercialisation of all aspects of research and practice is acceptable. 
In this chapter I attempt to rebut these premises. First, there are a 
number of means by which companies are regulated outside the patent system. 
I will review some of these modes of regulation to demonstrate that 
companies, just as much as public institutions, are governed by a wide range of 
codes of practice, research guidelines and legislation. Thus it is appropriate that 
the patent system retains its dominant role of providing an incentive for 
innovation rather than regulating that innovation. Secondly, there may be 
aspects of human genetic research and clinical practice that should be shielded 
from commercialisation. 1 
The sequence of activities involved in the transition from the pure 
research phase to the practice phase has been metaphorically described by John 
Sulston as a flowing stream, with DNA sequencing at the upstream end, 
flowing downstream to the marketing of diagnostic tools and therapeutics.2 
The sequence of the flow is shown below: 
1 	Means could be provided from within the patent system for discouraging those particular 
aspects of commercialisation. A number of recommendations to this effect are made in 
Chapter 7. 
2 	John Sulston is one of the scientists most actively involved in sequencing the human genome. 
He used this term at the recent Genome Summit held by the Human Genome Organisation 
(HUGO) in Canberra. 
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• anonymous sequences; 
• fragments of genes; 
• whole genes of unknown function; 
• gene sequences of known function; 
• deleterious mutations; 
• diagnostic assays; and 
• therapies. 3 
In my discussion of the effect of commercialisation I will use Sulston's flow 
analogy to assess the differing issues associated with upstream research and 
downstream practice. It must be recognised that commercialisation plays an 
influential role at both ends of the stream, and that the development of genetic 
products occurs within a competitive commercial environment. It is neither 
possible nor desirable to remove all commercial influences from this area. I 
submit that the more realistic goal that should be pursued is to ensure that 
there are mechanisms in place to moderate the excesses that might occur in a 
purely market-driven system. 
The influence of commercialisation in human genetic research and its 
clinical applications cannot be ignored. The pharmaceutical industry has 
always been very much a commercial venture, and pharmaceutical companies 
have always conducted their own applied research. The change that genetics 
has brought is that these companies are also becoming interested in the earlier 
basic research phase, perhaps because of the perceived need to stake their 
claims to particular DNA sequences at the outset. The other change that the 
new genetics has brought is that many of the scientists who are involved in 
basic research and for whom academic kudos has in the past been sufficient 
reward are now claiming their share of the profits to be gained through this 
technology. In the USA in particular a number of geneticists have either joined 
pharmaceutical or biotechnology companies or have formed their own private 
companies. The input of the private sector into basic human genetic research is 
substantial. An estimated $85 million was spent privately in this area in the 
USA in 1993.4 Human genetic research conducted in the commercial domain 
has been along two main lines. First, some companies have become specialised 
in hunting for specific disease-related genes, locating them within the human 
3 	The underlying science from which this flow analogy is derived has been described fully in 
Chapter 3. 
4 	Anderson, C. "Genome Project Goes Commercial" (1993) 259 Science 300. 
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genome, isolating them and sequencing their codes and developing diagnostic 
tests. For a very limited range of genetic diseases therapeutic treatment regimes 
have also been established. Secondly, other companies have focused on 
automated sequencing of large numbers of DNA fragments, including 
expressed sequence tags (ESTs). 5 
A number of government and private studies - in the USA have assessed 
the economics of the biotechnology industry. 6 It is clear from these studies that 
the cost of developing biotechnology products is high and a large portion of 
company revenue is spent on research and development. 7 Burk reported on a 
survey in 1990 which found that of 500 biotechnology companies sampled, only 
25% showed a net profit. 8 Other evidence shows that the average cost of 
producing a new drug in 1990 was around $US 230 million, and it took 12 years 
to develop.9 These estimates are likely to be even higher where biotechnology 
is used)- 0 Quite clearly, investors in biotechnology must have some security for 
their investment, and the patent system would appear to provide an 
appropriate source for that protection. 
The Mandeville survey of 1981 made the suggestion that, in areas of 
high technology like biotechnology, developments are so rapid that the patent 
system is bypassed. 11 Quite clearly, this is not the case today. The number of 
patent applications for biotechnological inventions has risen dramatically. The 
European Patent Office estimated that patent applications in the area of genetic 
engineering increased by 600% between 1981 and 1985. 12 More specifically, 1,175 
5 	ESTs are cDNA copies of mRNAs extracted from human cells. 
6 	Reported in Burk, D.L., "Biotechnology and Patent Law: Fitting Innovation to the 
Procrustean Bed" (1990) 17 Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal 1. 
7 	40%, on average: Ibid., at 17-18. 
8 	Ibid., 18. 
9 	From a study carried out in the United States, cited in Power, P.A., "Interaction Between 
Biotechnology and the Patent System" (1992) 3 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 
214, at 220. 
10 	Ibid. 
11 	Mandeville, T.D., D.M. Lamberton and E.J. Bishop, Economic Effects of the Australian 
Patent System (1982) AGPS. 
12 Cited in Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Directive on the 
Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions (1988) at 9. 
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upstream patents were issued world wide for human DNA sequences between 
1981 and 1995. 13 The extent of patenting is also substantial from the 
downstream perspective. A new patenting category was created in Australia in 
1988, covering medical preparations with genetic material and gene therapy. 14 
By September, 1994 there had been 160 patent applications in this category. 
Currently, then, it would appear that patents are actively being sought by 
biotechnology companies for inventions associated with genetic research and 
development. From this it can be inferred that patents are also playing a major 
role in encouraging innovation in biotechnology, perhaps more than in any 
other industry. 
The existing system for commercialisation of recombinant DNA 
technology has been remarkably successful. Evidence has been presented that 
1993 world net sales of human proteins produced by recombinant DNA 
technology were $US 7.7 billion. 15 On this basis, a sound rationale has to be 
presented to justify any modification to the existing system. 
Part 1: 	Regulation of Commercialisation  
There is a perception in the community that because companies are 
profit-based they will somehow be more likely to abuse the trust of research 
subjects and patients in the quest for profit. There are a number of reasons why 
this may not necessarily be the case. 
1.1 Application of Existing Regulatory Principles 
Companies, just as much as universities and other government-run 
research institutes, are subject to many of the regulatory regimes outlined in 
Chapter 4. The two regimes of legal liability and professional responsibility of 
the medical profession apply to medical researchers employed by companies 
where they have direct contact with research subjects. There may be some gaps 
in these duties when researchers acquire samples from medical intermediaries. 
The Nuffield Council Report of 1995 recommended that where tissue is of 
13 Thomas, S.M., et al, "Ownership of the Human Genome" (1996) 380 Nature 387. 
14 Ref A61K 48/00. 
15 Straus, J., "Patenting Human Genes in Europe - Past Developments and Prospects for the 
Future" (1995) 26 IIC 920, at 921. 
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special interest for research or for commercial development, the proposal 
should be referred to a research ethics committee. 16 
The more stringent form of ethical review that has been developed for 
biomedical research in Australia is restricted to research that is: 
• funded by the NHMRC (although the Australian Research Council also 
requires institutional ethics committee review and compliance with 
NHMRC guidelines); 
• conducted by an institution that received NHMRC funding; or 
• approved under the CTN or CTX schemes. 
Thus companies may be able to escape the NHMRC institutional ethics 
committee system of ethical review. In the USA, however, the trend has been 
for companies to submit their proposals for ethical approval on a voluntary 
basis. There is no reason to suppose that Australian companies will be any less 
willing to subject themselves to the same sort of review process. In addition, 
the broad definition of therapeutic goods in Australia means that any of the 
products used in genetic technology will be required to go through the clinical 
trial process before they can be registered and licensed for manufacture or 
importation, and thus institutional ethics committees will be guaranteed input 
at this stage. 
In any case, many of the developments arising out of human genetic 
research already bypass the institutional ethics committee system because they 
are classified as medical practice rather than research. This is particularly 
salient in the areas of genetic screening and testing. As has been pointed out in 
Chapter 4, in many respects this work creates the most troublesome ethical 
issues, because of its potential effects on fundamental human rights. The 
exemption from institutional ethics committee review in this area applies 
equally to government-sponsored and privately-sponsored work. Those with 
commercial interests in screening technology must take as much account as 
public institutions of the system currently in place to protect human rights. 
16 	Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Human Tissue Ethical and Legal Issues (1995) Chapter 13, 
para 13.38. 
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1.2 Regulation of Companies 
In many ways companies are subjected to more rigorous monitoring 
than government-sponsored research institutes. A large body of regulation is 
in place covering consumer protection, restrictive trade practices and product 
safety. In Australia the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and complementary state 
legislation provides the bench mark for acceptable standards of practice, part IV 
covering restrictive trade practices, part WA covering unconscionable conduct 
and part V consumer protection, including unfair practices and product 
liability. In addition, the Corporations Law provides the framework around 
which uniform codes of business ethics are being developed across Australia. 
Parts WA and V of the TPA provide the critical focus on the individual 
consumer. The product liability provisions have already been discussed in 
Chapter 4 in relation to product development. It may also be possible to bring 
the unconscionable conduct and misleading and deceptive conduct 
provisions 17 to bear on corporations providing genetic services without full 
evaluation of the risks to the individual consumer. In this respect the 
provisions of the TPA arguably provide greater protection to the consumer, 
because they carry legislative force, whereas the institutional ethics committee 
system only provides guidance. Crucial considerations are: 
• whether a company, in engaging in the supply of genetic services is 
"engaging in trade or commerce"; 
• whether a patient is a consumer within the definition in section 4(3) of the 
legislation; 18 and 
• the extent to which "unethical" conduct constitutes "misleading and 
deceptive" or "unconscionable" conduct. 
1.3 Research Involving Indigenous Peoples 
Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of the commercialisation of 
human genetics is that it is unclear how it can be ensured that consideration is 
given to the views of indigenous groups in relation to commercialisation of 
17 Respectively, sections 51AA and 51AB, and section 52 of the TPA. 
18 A person will be a consumer if they acquire goods or services for private use or consumption. 
There seems to be no good reason why a person who participates in a clinical trial cannot be 
acquiring goods or services for their personal use. 
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research of the type being conducted under the auspices of the Human Genome 
Diversity Project. 19 Ethical review could be avoided if the research is not 
NHMRC funded, and the doctrine of informed consent could be bypassed if 
companies acquire human tissue second- or third-hand. Companies thereby 
may be free to patent and commercialise products of or methods using cell 
lines taken from indigenous peoples, without even requiring their consent. 
Moreover, there would be no obligation for companies to share the profits 
from their work with the indigenous groups from whom the cell lines arose. 
1.4 Effect of the Biodiversity Convention 
Provisions of the Biodiversity Convention may be applicable to human 
genetic material. The Biodiversity Convention" was signed at the Rio 
Conference on Environment and Development in 1992. The objectives, stated 
in Article 3, include the conservation of biological diversity, equitable sharing 
of the benefits from use of genetic resources, including access to and transfer of 
technology. The provisions relating to rights over genetic material include 
Articles 15, 16 and 19. Article 15 requires that the provider country of genetic 
material determines access to that material, but that restrictions on access 
should not run counter to the Convention. This Article also requires that 
financial mechanisms should be established with the aim of providing for fair 
and equitable sharing of research and development and the benefits of 
commercialisation. Article 16 requires the transfer of technology to developing 
countries on fair and favourable terms. It further provides that intellectual 
property rights should be supportive of and not run counter to the objectives of 
the Convention. Article 19 encourages the participation of provider countries 
of genetic materials in their subsequent development. 21 
Although the Convention requires that the host country is consulted 
with respect to acquisition of genetic material and shares in the profits of 
patenting, the extent to which it could impact on the commercialisation of 
19 The concerns of indigenous groups were discussed in Chapter 1 in section 3.3. 
20 	Reproduced in: (1992) 31 International Legal Materials 818. 
21 These Articles are discussed in more detail in Powers, M.A., "The United Nations 
Framework Convention on Biological Diversity: Will Biodiversity Preservation Be 
Enhanced Through Its Provisions Concerning Biotechnology Intellectual Property Rights?" 
(1994) 12 Wisconsin International Law Journal 103. 
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human genetic research is uncertain from the terms of the Convention itself. 
Human biodiversity was not an issue that was considered at the Rio 
Conference, and even if the Convention does apply to human genetic material, 
regard should be had to the fact that the USA has refused to become a signatory 
because of its objection to these and other provisions. 22 I suggest that since US 
biotechnology companies are the main players in commercial human genetic 
research using samples derived from indigenous peoples, the impact of the 
Biodiversity Convention is likely to be minimal. 
It would be erroneous to paint the picture that all companies seek to 
exploit indigenous peoples and rob them of their genetic resources. There is a 
growing willingness on the part of some companies to engage in royalty 
sharing agreements with countries and communities from whom genetic 
resources were acquired. 23 Such agreements appear to be consonant with the 
spirit of the Biodiversity Convention. They should be encouraged, on the 
condition that any inequality of bargaining power is not exploited. 
Part 2: 	Commercialisation of Upstream Research 
Patenting of human genetic research does not stand alone as being a 
unique problem in academic science. It is part of a wider trend favouring 
science which has commercial applicability. It would be generally accepted by 
most of the people involved in academic research, whether they be the funders 
or the researchers, that the emphasis of that research has changed vastly over 
the last decade. The academy is no longer the ivory tower that it once was. Like 
every other institution it must justify itself in the language of economic 
rationalism. As part of this, research that has commercial implications will be 
favoured by funding agencies over pure science. In the long run, this change 
may be detrimental in that it will lead to cessation of the basic science from 
22 United States, Declaration Made at the United Nations Environment Programme 
Conference for the Adoption of the Agreed Text of the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
Reproduced in: (1992) 31 International Legal Materials 848. 
23 	For example, The Crucible Group, People Plants and Patents: the Impact of Intellectual 
Property on Biodiversity, Conservation, Trade and Rural Society (1994) International 
Development Research Centre, Ottawa, at 11. 
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which much applied science flows. 24 Nevertheless, it is a fact of academic life 
that projects must now be justified in terms of their benefit to the nation, and 
economic benefits will receive favoured consideration. 
2.1 Change in Focus of Publicly Funded Research. 
As recently as 1981 it was pointed out that although government and 
higher education sectors carry out the majority of Australia's total research and 
development effort, these sources only ever provided a small percentage of 
total domestic patent applications. 25 The patent incentive has in the past largely 
been avoided by the public sector because of the perceived fear that pursuit of 
commercial advantage would somehow corrupt pure research. 26 Given the 
cost of patenting, the nature of academic research and the small role of patents 
in innovation the Mandeville report concluded that "it is questionable 
whether it would be economically desirable for universities to emphasise 
patenting more than they currently do."27 Since that time, I would argue that 
the shift in focus in government expectations of the goals of publicly funded 
research and development in a number of countries has led to a much greater 
emphasis being placed on patenting and transfer of technology from the public 
to the private sector in order that it might be commercially exploited. 
2.1.1 Patent Policy in US Public Institutions 
In the USA collaboration between the private and public sectors has been 
encouraged much more than elsewhere. 28 In the 1930s a number of 
universities already had formal patent policies, and in 1974 Stanford 
University applied for a patent for recombinant DNA technology, invented by 
24 Australia's newest Nobel Prize winner for Physiology or Medicine, Professor Peter Doherty 
said as much in his opening address at the Scicomm96 Conference (1996) University of 
Melbourne. 
25 Less than 3% in 1978: Mandeville survey, at 71. 
26 The history of academic attitudes towards patenting is described in Weiner, C., 
"Universities, Professors and Patents: A Continuing Controversy" [1986] Technology Review 
33. 
27 Mandeville survey, at 95. 
28 Other countries are now catching up. See for example, the United Kingdom's Office of 
Science and Technology White Paper Realising Our Potential (1993). 
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Cohen and Boyer.29 Since then, a series of legislative enactments have been put 
in place in the USA to ensure the transfer of technology from government 
institutes and universities to the private sector. 30 This legislation primarily 
requires patenting of appropriate research outputs conducted in the public 
sector, and transfer of this technology to private industry by technology 
licensing agreements and cooperative research and development agreements. 
A recent background paper by the US Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 
analysed the efficacy of transfer of technology, which it defined as the 
conversion of scientific knowledge into commercially useful products, with 
respect to human genetic research. 31 According to the OTA background paper, 
"the success of the biotechnology sector [in the USA, when compared with 
other countries] owes much to federal technology transfer and intellectual 
property policies." 32 The OTA suggested that such policies will prove equally 
as important in the commercialisation of human genetic research. 
2.1.2 Patent Policy in Australian Public Institutions 
In Australia, some consideration has also been given to the desirability 
of patenting inventions developed through publicly funded research, and 
licensing them to industry. 33 In particular, a report by a working group of the 
Prime Minister's Science and Engineering Council pointed out that it is 
generally recognised that Australia fails to exploit adequately publicly funded 
research and development. 34 A piecemeal approach appears to be favoured in 
Australia with regard to policy on patenting and subsequent use of inventions 
derived from publicly funded research, it being left very much to the 
29 	Weiner, at 39. 
30 These include the Bayh-Dole Act 1980 (US); Stevenson-Wydler Act 1980 (US); Federal 
Technology Transfer Act 1986 (US). 
31 US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Federal Technology Transfer and the 
Human Genome Project (1995) Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, Foreword, 
at iii. 
32 	Ibid., at 1. 
33 Similar considerations have also been raised in Britain. See, for example, Cornish, W.R., 
"Rights in University Innovations: The Herschel Smith Lecture for 1991" (1992) 1 European 
Intellectual Property Review 13. 
34 Working Group of the Prime Minister's Science and Engineering Council, The Role of 
Intellectual Property in Innovation. Strategic Overview, Volume 1 (1993) AGPS, at 10. 
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individual and the institution. 35 Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the 
culture has changed, with funding agencies now looking very favourably on 
collaboration with industry and strategic research programs.36 Patents are now 
one of the means by which success in research is measured. 37 
2.1.3 Effect of Patenting on the Culture of Academic Research 
This growing commercialisation is radically altering the culture of 
research, based as it is on what have been referred to as the norms and rewards 
of science, namely: universalism, communism, disinterestedness and 
organised scepticism. 38 The tradition of rapid publication of results in wide-
circulation journals is not only the primary reward for academic scientists, but 
is also the dominant measure of academic excellence. However, there may be 
valid commercial reasons, including the possibility of patenting, why the early 
disclosure of results is not always appropriate. As Sherman has pointed out, 
patents change both the forum and form in which research results are first 
disclosed.39 Even so, other evidence indicates that commercialisation per se 
need not ultimately cause a decrease in publication rate. On the contrary, that 
evidence shows that researchers from those government institutes in the USA 
35 	Australian Vice Chancellor's Committee, Ownership of Intellectual Property in 
Universities. A Discussion Paper (1993). This is also the case in Britain. See Office of 
Science and Technology, Intellectual Property in the Public Sector Research Base (1992) 
HMSO. 
36 Two good examples in Australia are Co-operative Research Centres and Australian 
Research Council Collaborative Research Grants, both of which are funded jointly by 
government and industry. 
37 Concerns have been expressed in some quarters, however, as to the appropriateness of 
taking the acquisition of intellectual property as an independent measure of academic 
achievement. See the National Academies Policy Advisory Group, Intellectual Property 
and the Academic Community (1995) Royal Society, London. 
38 By Merton, R.K., The Sociology of Science (1973) Chicago, University of Chicago Press. See 
also Drahos, P., "Intellectual Property Law and Basic Science: Extinguishing Prometheus?" 
(1992) 10(2) Law in Context 56. 
39 Sherman, B., "Governing Science: Patents and Public Sector Research" (1994) 7 Science in 
Context 515, at 526. 
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that have formal partnerships with industry tend to have higher publication 
rates than those from non-industry aligned institutes.40 
The other option for protection of research data is secrecy. Although the 
norms and rewards of science may have some congruency with the patent 
system, they would appear to have nothing in common with secrecy. 41 One of 
the primary requirements of both publication and patenting is disclosure of 
information, allowing its subsequent use by others. The main difference is that 
use follows on immediately after publication, whereas for patenting, disclosure 
occurs at the start of the patenting period but use is not permitted until the end. 
Secrecy is premised on the fact that there is no disclosure requirement. Indeed, 
disclosure puts an end to the protection afforded by secrecy. For this reason the 
use of secrecy as a means of retaining control over information could create a 
"destructive, anti-intellectual climate" 42  Although the patenting option also 
restricts the release of information, its effects are likely to be much less 
profound. 
2.1.4 Patenting in the Post-Academic Era of Science 
This new closed research culture poses problems different from those 
normally associated with research conducted in the public sector. One of the 
concerns that has been identified in this new "post-academic" era of science is 
that objectivity will be lost. 43 Objectivity is incorporated into the academic 
system through the norm of disinterestedness which requires impartiality in 
the reporting of research results. Whilst it is clear that some form of security 
for investment in scientific research beyond mere publication rights must be 
guaranteed to encourage commercial investment to continue, it is vital to the 
credibility of that science that it continues to be seen as objective. It may be that 
in some circumstances patents actually play a role in supporting the objectivity 
of the science on which they are based: a high level of scrutiny is required both 
of the claims made in the patent and of the prior art to ensure that the 
40 US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Federal Technology Transfer and the 
Human Genome Project (1995), at 35. 
41 	Eisenberg, R., "Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research" 
(1987) 97 Yale Law Journal 177. 
42 	Poste, G., "The Case for Genomic Patenting" (1995) 378 Nature 534, at 535. 
43 	Ziman, J., "Is Science Losing Its Objectivity" (1996) 382 Nature 751, at 754. 
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invention claimed is an advance over the prior art. Nevertheless, the issue 
remains whether patents are appropriate in the area of human genetic 
research, where the welfare of the individual research subject should override 
all other considerations. 
2.2 Effect of Patenting on Human Genetic Research and Its 
Applications 
It is clearly in Australia's interests to support human genetic research 
and its clinical application from a number of perspectives: 
• direct improvements to health care; 
• financial gains in obtaining a share in this huge commercial venture; 
• the kudos to be gained internationally from making a contribution to the 
research; and 
• the expertise to make informed choices as to appropriate technology. 
That research effort is both costly and risky, and therefore private funding of 
the research itself, as well as its application into clinical practice, must be seen 
as having some desirable features. It is another matter to determine whether 
the option of patenting is an appropriate incentive. 
2.2.1 The National Institutes of Health's Upstream Patent Claims 
The Human Genome Project has been described as the biggest patenting 
issue in the USA at present," primarily because in 1991 the US National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) applied for upstream patents for a large number of 
expressed sequence tags (ESTs), as well as the complete cDNA sequences that 
incorporate the ESTs. 45 The EST claims ultimately were rejected for failure to 
demonstrate the three crucial requirements of novelty, usefulness and non-
obviousness,46 and were subsequently withdrawn. Given that the US Patent 
Office routinely rejects a large number of applications, however, its rejection in 
44 Maher, L., "The Patent Environment: Domestic and European Community Frameworks for 
Biotechnology" (1992) 33 Jurimetrics Journal 67 at 128. 
45 See, for example, Eisenberg, R., "Genes, Patents and Product Development" (1992) 257 
Science 903. 
46 See, for example, "Ethics, Legality of Gene Patenting are Weighed in Senate Subcommittee 
Hearing" (1992) BNA Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law Daily 1 October 1992. 
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this case should not be seen as fata1. 47 A change in policy means that NIH are 
no longer pursuing the patent claims. Even so, it seems certain that 
commercial enterprises have made similar patent claims, and they are likely to 
appeal against rejection by the Patent Office. The stated aim of the NIH in 
applying for the EST patents was to encourage product development.48 Those 
who oppose EST patents argue that they would have the opposite effect because 
they may prevent later downstream patent claims which may otherwise have 
been valid for genes, proteins and diagnostic tools subsequently developed 
even though the EST information may not have been used in their 
development. If nothing else, the NIH claims have demonstrated the need for 
detailed public discussion and clear official guidelines in the general area of 
patenting of human genes. 49 
The basis of the Human Genome Project as a cooperative international 
venture may well have been undermined by patent applications for ESTs. 
Much of the work involved in the Human Genome Project can still be 
considered to be basic research, a central feature of which should be the free 
flow of information. At the very least, application for patents could have 
impeded scientific progress by the inevitable delays resulting from processing 
of patent claims. Normal delays have been exacerbated of late by the great 
increase in the number of claims for biotechnology patents. In the USA it has 
been estimated that by 1988 there was a backlog in processing of patent claims 
by the Patent and Trademark Office of around two and a half years, and up to a 
further two years before the final ruling was made.50 Eisenberg has suggested 
that greater certainty in the outcome of applications and streamlining 
. 47 	Agence France Presse in its September 24, 1992 issue cites the number of rejected claims as 
90%. 
48 For example, Healy, B., "Special Report on Gene Patenting" (1992) 327 New England 
Journal of Medicine 664. 
49 Such public discussions are already underway. In 1992 a public meeting was called by the 
Genome Patenting Working Group, Committee on Life Sciences and Health, Federal 
Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering and Technology (US), Federally Funded 
Genome Research Science and Technology Transfer Issues. Proceedings of a Public Meeting, 
May 21, 1992 and the Patent and Trademark Office has recently given notice of public 
hearings and request for comments on patent protection for biotechnological inventions. 
50 Crawford, "Patent Claims Buildup Haunts Biotechnology" (1988) 238 Science 723. 
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procedures will outweigh problems associated with interim secrecy required 
whilst patent claims are being processed.51 
The effect of the refusal of the Patent Office to accept the EST claims 
initially appeared to be quite serious. 52 Craig Venter, the geneticist who coded 
the NIH ESTs, became employed by The Institute for Genomic Research 
(TIGR), a non-profit partner of Human Genome Sciences Inc (HGS), in which 
SmithKline Beecham has a major equity share. Venter isolated 150,000 ESTs, 
which were contained in a computer database. TIGR and HGS claimed that 
they would only grant access to academic institutions to this database on the 
condition that an "option agreement" was signed, under which HGS would 
have exclusive option to any patents arising from research using those 
sequences. A number of academic institutes around the world have since 
agreed to sign the agreement. 
Other groups, including Merck Pharmaceutical Co., contributed EST 
information to a central public data base known as GenBank at the National 
Center for Biotechnology Information in the USA to counter TIGR's move. 
Merck strongly refuted the suggestion that this indicates an anti-patenting 
stance for biotechnology inventions. Rather, it argued that it demonstrated 
Merck's commitment to maintain the crucial distinction between patentability 
of inventions and accessibility of research tools for research purposes. 53 TIGR 
has since released a large number of its ESTs to add to the database, although 
some will remain secret. 54 
2.2.2 Ownership of Sequence Information 
Now that the main focus of research effort in the Human Genome 
Project is sequencing the human genome, issues associated with ownership 
and release of sequence information have become a source of concern for the 
scientists and funding agencies associated with the project. Gene sequence 
51 Eisenberg, R., "Patenting the Human Genome" (1990) 39 Emory Law Journal 721. 
52 Dickson, D., "HGS Seeks Exclusive Option on all Patents Using its cDNA Sequences" (1994) 
371 Nature 463. 
53 Caskey, C.T. and A.R. Williamson, "Merck, SmithKline and Patents" (1996) 381 Nature 
360. 
54 Coghlan, A., "Minor Genome Secrets Open To All" (1995) New Scientist 7 October, 5. 
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information clearly is of immense value, both in commercial terms and in 
terms of basic research. 
A number of scientists are strongly of the belief that where sequences of 
nucleotides have not been ascribed function, and are therefore located at the 
farthest upstream end of Sulston's flow, they are "pre-competitive" and should 
be made freely available, even when they are likely to contain a gene with high 
commercial value. One such example is the sequence of nucleotides which is 
believed to contain BRCA2, the second gene to be identified as having a link to 
inherited breast cancer. The sequence has been put on the Internet by the 
Sanger Centre in the United Kingdom and Washington University in the USA 
in the hope that this will aid in the localisation of the gene. 55 A major trade 
association in the USA has also endorsed the release of sequence information 
into the public domain, so that industry may reap the benefit of the "more 
meaningful and costly scientific work" in ascribing function to the sequence. 56 
2.2.3 The Bermuda Declaration 
These views were supported in a recent strategy meeting of Human 
Genome Project participants in Bermuda, sponsored by the UK Wellcome 
Trust.57 A number of principles were endorsed at the Bermuda meeting, 
including the requirements that primary genomic sequences should remain in 
the public domain and that they should be rapidly released. As sequences 
become available, they are now released onto the Internet, and the HUGO 
website provides the central indexing of all sequence information. By putting 
this _information in the public domain, the patenting option is effectively 
55 Dickson, D., "Open Access To Sequence Data Will Boost Hunt for Breast Cancer Gene" 
(1995) 378 Nature 425. 
56 	Industrial Biotechnology Association, Position Paper: Recommended Federal Policy 
Concerning Human Genetic Sequences Discovered by Federal Researchers, Contractors and 
Grantees (1992). Referred to in Eisenberg, R., "Genes, Patents and Product Development" 
(1992), at 907. 
57 "International Strategy Meeting Agrees Principles of Early Data Release for Human 
Genome Sequencing" (1996), press release by the Wellcome Trust, London, 17 April. 
Participating countries included the UK, the USA, France, Germany and Japan. See also 
Bentley, D.R., "Genomic Sequence Information Should Be Released Immediately and 
Freely in the Public Domain" (1996) 274 Science 533. 
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excluded until some additional step is taken, for example ascribing function to 
a particular gene sequence. 
Some caution may need to be exercised with regard to the rapid release 
of sequence information, because there is no opportunity for peer review. 58 
Nor is there much opportunity for quality control. One example that has been 
cited is the entry into GenBank of EST sequences supposedly of human origin, 
which later were found to include yeast and bacterial sequences. It has been 
claimed that those sequences are still listed in GenBank as being of human 
origin. 59 Sequence information that is available in public access databases will 
clearly need continual updating and checking for errors. It may be appropriate 
for a body such as the Human Genome Organisation to be given the 
responsibility to undertake this task. 
2.2.4 Patent Law and Upstream Patenting 
Even without the release of gene sequence information into the public 
domain, there now appears to be some unanimity of opinion that where a gene 
sequence has not been assigned a particular function it is not patentable under 
current patent law, because it does not have industrial applicability but is 
merely a research too1. 60 This clearly appears to be the case under current 
Australian patent law (see Chapter 6). But that same body of opinion supports 
patenting of bona fide inventions arising out of human genetic research. 61 
Such patents may create less of a problem to scientists than patenting of ESTs 
and other sequences of unknown function, provided that function has been 
ascribed, because research effort is less likely to be wasted. 
58 In this regard, see the comments of Adams, M.D. and J.C. Venter, "Should Non-Peer-
Reviewed Raw DNA Sequence Data Release Be Forced on the Scientific Community?" 
(1996) 274 Science 534. 
59 	Ibid. 
60 Some of the more notable viewpoints include those of the international Human Genome 
Organisation in Caskey, C.T., R.S. Eisenberg, E.S. Lander and J. Straus, "HUGO Statement 
on Patenting of DNA Sequences" (1995) Genome Digest 6; the British National Academies 
Policy Advisory Group, Intellectual Property and the Academic Community (1995); the 
House of Commons Science and Technology Committee (the Shaw Committee), Human 
Genetics: The Science and Its Consequences (1995) HMSO, London. 
61 	Ibid. 
155 
2.2.5 Deleterious Effect of Broad Patents 
Another concern of both scientists and industry is related to the breadth 
of patent protection being claimed in a number of areas of biotechnology, 
particularly because both the European and US Patent Offices are apparently 
prepared to accept patent claims having extensive coverage. Examples of 
patents that could impinge on human genetic research include a patent 
covering all ex-vivo gene therapy 62 ; a patent on the enzyme Taq polymerase, 
which is required for all polymerase chain reaction work; 63 a patent on one of 
the genes believed to be linked to inherited breast cancer (BRCA1); 64 a patent 
on a gene that may play a role in obesity. 65 Such patents may have 
extraordinary value. The so-called obesity gene patent, for example, has been 
licensed to the pharmaceutical company Amgen for $20 million, as well as 
milestone payments and undisclosed future royalty payments. The scientists 
who sequenced the gene will get a one third share of the $20 million 
payment.66 
If patents are too broad it is feared that research will be inhibited, either 
because it will inevitably lead to patent infringement or it will be unpatentable 
because it is obvious. The British Court of Appeal and House of Lords decisions 
in Biogen v Medeva suggest that these Courts, at least, may not support broad 
patent claims. 67 One of the concerns raised by the Shaw Committee in its 
Report to the House of Commons was that patenting criteria are being applied 
too loosely by patent examiners, and that such problems are exacerbated by the 
62 Coghlart, A., "Sweeping Patent Shocks Gene Therapists" (1995) New Scientist 1 April, 4; 
Nowak, R., "Patent Award Stirs Controversy" (1995) 267 Science 1899; Gavaghan, H., 
"NIH Wins Patent on Basic technique Covering all Ex vivo Gene Therapy" (1995) 374 
Nature 393. 
63 Aldhous, P., "PCR Enzyme Patent Challenged" (1993) 260 Science 486. 
64 Butler, D., and D. Gershon, "Breast Cancer Discovery Sparks New Debate on Patenting 
Human Genes" (1994) 371 Nature 271. 
65 	Stone, R., "Rockefeller Strikes Fat Deal with Amgen" (1995) 268 Science 631. 
66 	Ibid. 
67 Biogen Inc v Medeva Plc [1995] FSR 4 (Court of Appeal). The House of Lords judgment was 
handed down on 31st October 1996, an abridges version of which appeared in The Times, 1 
November 1996. 
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fact that the width of patent claims cannot be challenged through the European 
Patent Convention. 68 Section 40 of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) allows for 
challenges to be made in Australia on the ground of lack of fair basis. In 
contrast, the problem in Australia is a lack of parties willing to make such 
challenges. One of the most likely reasons for this is the small size of 
Australia's biotechnology industry and the lack of competition for the 
Australian market. 
Part 3: 	Commercialisation of Downstream Practice 
There can be no doubt that the growing commercialisation of genetic 
research will have serious effects on the distribution of health care resources. 
To be viable commercially, companies will have to set product prices at the 
appropriate level both to recoup research costs and to achieve an acceptable 
profit margin. Patents provide one means by which some of these research 
costs can be recouped. 
3.1 Patenting of Drugs 
The impact on health care of commercialisation and patenting of 
inventions that have clinical application is not a new phenomenon. Patenting 
did not start with genes, although some of the literature seems to suggest as 
much. It has been recognised for some time that the ability to patent drugs is 
crucial to the survival of the Australian pharmaceutical industry. At the same 
time, pharmaceuticals are obviously key components of the health care system. 
The total expenditure on pharmaceuticals including prescription payments and 
over the counter drugs is around 10% of all health expenditure in Australia.69 
The cost of prescription drugs to Australia is substantial. In 1994-95 a total of 
around $2.33 billion was spent on prescriptions, over $1.88 billion of which was 
supplied by the federal government. 70 This figure is just over 0.4% of the 
68 House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Human Genetics: The Science and Its 
Consequences (1995) HMSO, London, paras 208 and 209. 
69 Commonwealth Department of Human Services and Health, Annual Report 1994-95 (1995) 
AGPS, at 79. 
70 	See Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Australia's Health 1996 (1996) AGPS, at 
181. 
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GDP. 71 The federal government subsidises the cost of pharMaceuticals through 
the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS). 72 Drugs are listed on the PBS by the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee. 
The critical issue for policy makers in the area is how to ensure that, on 
the one hand, as wide a range of drugs are offered to consumers at as 
reasonable a price as possible, whilst on the other, quality is assured and 
product development continues. The stated objective of the PBS scheme is: 
"Rio enable access to necessary therapeutic substances at the lowest cost to 
Government and consumers consistent with reliable supply." 73 
Exact details of the extent to which patenting of drugs affects pricing 
policy is difficult to find. Whatever the precise relationship may be, it would 
appear to be generally accepted that it is in the public interest for the company 
that has developed and marketed the drug to be able to price it appropriately in 
order to recoup the high cost of research and development. It can do so because 
it has a monopoly during the life of the patent, and is therefore not restricted in 
its pricing policy by market forces. Since the time taken between invention and 
marketing of a new drug is usually prolonged because of the requirement for 
clinical trials, the extent to which patents actually have an effect on the cost of 
drugs may be less than would otherwise be supposed. If, as reported above in 
the introduction to this chapter, the time taken to develop a drug is 12 years, 
exploitation of the patent through product pricing will only produce valuable 
returns during the last eight years of its life. In the first eight years of the 
patent's life, costs can only be recovered through licensing arrangements and 
royalty payments 
It is not in the public interest for a patented drug to be overly favoured 
in the market once the patent has expired. In the past the trend has been for 
drug prescribers and beneficiaries to favour name brand drugs rather than 
cheaper generics. Recent changes to the listing system for drugs in Australia 
may reverse this trend. Since 1987 the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory 
71 	Annual Report, at 78. 
72 	Australia's Health 1996, at 180. The history of Australia's medicinal drug policy is 
described by Harvey, K. and M. Murray, "Medicinal Drug Policy" (1995) In: H. Gardner 
(ed) The Politics of Health, Churchill Livingstone, Melbourne, second edition, chapter 9. 
73 	Annual Report, at 77. 
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Committee has been required to consider comparative cost-effectiveness before 
listing drugs on the PBS. That requirement became mandatory for listing of all 
new pharmaceuticals in 1993.74 Prescribers and beneficiaries are deterred from 
requesting particular brands through the minimum pricing policy, whereby the 
beneficiary pays any additional cost when the particular brand of prescribed 
drug costs more than the listed basic price. The rationale for introducing 
economic considerations in drug listing has been stated to be "the potential to 
encourage more rational diffusion of new technologies in health".75 There are 
some problems in using economic values, the most obvious being in the 
consideration of new drugs to treat new diseases like AIDS. Harris has pointed 
out that the decision whether to fund expensive treatments costing in excess of 
$100,000 per life year saved must ultimately be a political one, and that 
economic evaluation as yet fails to provide an agreed methodology for such 
difficult decisions. 76 This issue will become more acute as the supply of 
diagnostic and therapeutic products of genetic engineering increases. There is 
little doubt that such products will be expensive because of the costs involved 
in their development. 
3.2 Patenting of Drugs and Genetic Products Compared 
There is no clear reason why commercialisation and patenting of 
human genetic research and its clinical applications should have a different 
effect on the health care system than patenting of drugs. 77 There is a danger in 
both cases that the need for commercial enterprises to be profit-based may 
require them to set prices at such a level that it becomes impossible to deliver 
some products through the national health system. This runs counter to the 
fundamental ethical principle of distributive justice. 
Genetic products, just as much as any type of drug, need to be made 
available through the health care system as rapidly as possible after their 
efficacy and safety have been assured in order to alleviate suffering. Since the 
74 Discussed in Harris, A.H., "Economic Appraisal in the Regulation of Pharmaceuticals in 
Australia: Its Rationale and Potential Impact" (1994) The Australian Economic Review 99. 
75 	Ibid., at 101. 
76 	Ibid., at 103. 
77 Note, however, that the extent of that effect may be greater as the products developed 
through gene technology become more readily available. 
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research and development phase is long and expensive for both types of 
products, however, it is not inappropriate to provide the same form of 
incentive to encourage that research to continue. It is likely to take at least as 
long to market the products of human genetic research as for new drugs, and so 
in this regard the advantages that a patent offers in terms of product pricing 
will be equally limited. In order to ensure that effects of patents for genetic 
products are not felt beyond their lifetime a mechanism must be put in place to 
level the playing field. Economic cost effectiveness may be an appropriate 
method of achieving this end, as would appear to be the case for drug-related 
products. Using this means, previously patented products do not receive 
favourable treatment over generic products produced by competitors. The aim 
should be that as soon as the patent period comes to an end the market is freed. 
3.3 Case Studies on the Effect of Commercialisation 
Potential effects of commercialisation on the delivery of products 
through the health care system can perhaps best be demonstrated by analysing 
the sequence of events involved in the delivery of two important products 
which were both produced using recombinant DNA technology. 
3.3.1 The Factor VIII Case Study 
Haemophilia A is a disease of the blood in which certain of the vital 
factors for clotting the blood are absent. In its most severe form, death can 
result from haemorrhaging. In 1990 there were 1134 sufferers of haemophilia A 
in Australia, 452 of which manifested the severe form of the disease. 78 Factor 
VIII is the currently accepted blood clotting treatment for haemophilia A. If it 
can be delivered in pure form, that is free from viral contaminants such as HIV 
and Hepatitis C, it has the effect of increasing the life expectancy of sufferers of 
haemophilia A to an age close to that of the general population." Access to 
Factor VIII is also vital during childhood to prevent later onset of joint 
damage, requiring corrective surgery. In 1993 inadequate amounts of Factor 
78 McNeill, J., and M. Sinclair, "Epidemiology of Haemophilia A in Australia and Projection 
of Factor VIII Requirements" (1993) Australasian Society of Blood Transfusion Inc 
Conference Factor VIII: Supply and Demand in the 1990s, 3, at 4. 
79 	Ibid., at 3. 
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VIII were being produced to supply its demand. 80 Consequently a number of 
haemophiliacs were still suffering from debilitating joint disorders. In 
addition, as long as Factor VIII is derived from blood products its purity cannot 
be guaranteed. As a startling example of this, the incidence of HIV infection in 
Australia is close to 30% of the haemophiliac population and practically all 
cases arose out of the supply of contaminated blood products. 81 
Factor VIII now exists in two recombinant forms, known as Kogenate 
and Recombinate. 82 Their production was a feat of genetic engineering. Factor 
VIII was then and still is the largest human protein produced by recombinant 
DNA technology. Both products have undergone extensive clinical trials and 
both have been approved by the Food and Drugs Administration in the USA. 
They have been available in Australia for the last two years. Both are reported 
as being extremely effective, highly purified products, 83 although there are still 
some problems associated with their production and delivery which will need 
to be rectified. There are therefore forceful reasons why these recombinant 
forms of Factor VIII should be made available to haemophiliacs as rapidly as 
possible. The difficulty faced by health service providers is the cost of the 
recombinant products. Each unit may be up to double the cost of the plasma-
derived alternative. It has been estimated that free access to the recombinant 
products is likely to increase the health budget by some $70 million. 
This is a clear example of the tension between an individual's right to 
the best available treatment, a health care system that is increasingly limited by 
economic constraints and a commercial enterprise that is required by its 
80 	Ekert, H., "Factor VIII: Supply and Demand - the Paediatric Picture" (1993) Australasian 
Society of Blood Transfusion Inc Conference Factor VIII: Supply and Demand in the 1990s, 5. 
81 Rickard, K., "Towards Optimal Therapy for People with Haemophilia: A Physician 
Examines the FVIII Situation in Australia" (1993) Australasian Society of Blood 
Transfusion Inc Conference Factor VIII: Supply and Demand in the 1990s, 6. 
82 	Ibid. 
83 	Ibid., at 9. See also Bray, G., "Clinical Studies of Recombinant Factor VIII (Recombinate) 
in Previously Untreated Patients with Severe Haemophilia A" (1993) Australasian 
Society of Blood Transfusion Inc Conference Factor VIII: Supply and Demand in the 1990s, 
14; Cochran, M.A., "Recombinant FVIII (Kogenate): Production, Safety and Efficacy" 
(1993) Australasian Society of Blood Transfusion Inc Conference Factor VIII: Supply and 
Demand in the 1990s, 16. 
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shareholders to make acceptable profits. In the current economic climate 
rationing of health care resources is inevitable and the way in which they are 
rationed is an area of increasing debate. I suggest that it surely would be 
inappropriate if a patent system, the ultimate aim of which is to provide an 
economic benefit for the Australian population in general, has the actual effect 
of causing an adverse economic impact on the provision of health care to that 
same population. 
3.3.2 The Hepatitis C Case Study 
Hepatitis is a disease of the liver which has a number of symptoms. 
Many people who have had hepatitis never fully recover from it and in some 
it may lead to cirrhosis or liver cancer, both of which can be fatal. In the 1970s it 
was discovered that one form of hepatitis was caused by the Hepatitis A virus 
and another form was caused by Hepatitis B. However, there were still more 
forms of hepatitis, which were termed non-A non-B hepatitis (NANBH). At 
that stage, it was not known if NANBH was a virus or some other agent, or if it 
had more than one cause. 
From a public health point of view it was important that the cause of 
NANBH was found as soon as possible. In addition to the obvious costs of 
treating afflicted individuals, it was known that NANBH could be carried in 
the blood, and therefore all recipients of donated blood were potentially at risk 
of receiving the contamination. There were also important commercial 
reasons for finding the cause of NANBH. Once a diagnostic test for NANBH 
was available, all blood samples would be required to be tested. Thus the 
manufacture of a reliable diagnostic test would be a highly lucrative venture. 
The development of a vaccine would be equally as profitable. 
In the early 1980s, a number of biotechnology companies embarked on 
the task of identifying the cause of NANBH. All of them had expertise in 
recombinant DNA technology and all had the most up-to-date equipment and 
teams of highly skilled researchers. Even so, many years of research and dollars 
were invested in the quest. Chiron Corporation won the race. It identified a 
third virus, known as Hepatitis C (HCV), and developed a diagnostic test for 
the presence of the virus in human blood. HCV has been found to cause 90% of 
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cases of NANBH. 84 In Australia alone at least 100,000 people carry HCV, 85 
although many of them will be unaware that they are carriers. Consequently, 
all donated blood is now routinely tested for the presence of HCV. Chiron's 
work was therefore a critical breakthrough in combating the spread of hepatitis. 
A number of companies subsequently tried to market their own 
diagnostic kits, but this turned out to be of little value to them, because Chiron 
had taken out a patent which protected the information that it disclosed about 
the virus. Chiron could have given licences to its competitors which would 
allow them to use its invention in return for licence fees, but it chose instead to 
licence only one company. Using this strategy Chiron controlled the market for 
HCV diagnostic kits. Companies attempting to market competing kits in 
Britain were sued by Chiron for infringement of its patent. They counter-
claimed that Chiron couldn't enforce its patent, that it was invalid because it 
covered things that Chiron had not invented. 
The claims made by Chiron in its patent were indeed very broad. 
Chiron's research had given it a detailed knowledge of part of the gene 
sequence of the virus that it had isolated, yet the patent was wide enough to 
cover the whole of the virus and every strain of the virus. Chiron's 
competitors said that it had gone too far. The role of the patent system is 
supposedly only to exclude others from exploiting an invention. The 
competitors argued that Chiron's claims were more than mere exclusion from 
use of the invention; in reality they amounted to ownership of the virus itself. 
The English courts did not agree, holding that the patent was valid. 86 
The other companies thus lost out on a lucrative market because they 
could not sell their kits. The public also may have lost out. First, Chiron was 
not restricted by market forces in its pricing of the kits because it had no 
competitors to force the prices down. Secondly, because Chiron only had 
84 Data from the National Health and Medical Research Council, Draft Report on a Strategy 
for Detection and Management of Hepatitis C in Australia (1996). 
85 	Ibid. 
86 Of a series of cases between Chiron and its competitors, the most relevant are Chiron 
Corporation v Organon Teknika Ltd (No. 3) [1994] FSR 202 before Aldous J in the Patents 
Court and Chiron Corp v Murex Diagnostics Ltd(No. 12) [1996] FSR 153, before Leggatt, 
Morritt and Schiemann LJJ in the Court of Appeal. 
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detailed knowledge of one strain of HCV, its kits worked best on that strain and 
competing kits worked better on other strains. There was a danger that a 
particular test kit might not show up the presence of a strain to which it was 
not particularly sensitive. For this reason, the National Health and Medical 
Research Council in Australia has recommended that every sample that tests 
positive should be tested again using an alternative kit. 87 But Chiron's patent 
would be infringed if any kit other than those marketed by Chiron and its 
licensee were used. It would seem to be contrary to health care policy to restrict 
the market for diagnostic kits in this way. Thirdly, no one had yet marketed a 
vaccine for HCV. It makes sense to assume that the more people that are 
researching in the area, the better the chance that a vaccine will be developed. If 
some people are excluded from working in that area, the time taken to develop 
a vaccine will increase. 
Some of the companies were not satisfied with the decisions of the 
English Courts. One of them, Murex Diagnostics Ltd, decided to challenge the 
validity of the patent under Australian law. The Murex v Chiron case was 
heard by Burchett j  in the Federal Court in Sydney. 88 After 40 days of hearings 
the case was settled out of court. 89 The settlement included the provision of a 
licence to Murex which enabled it to market its diagnostic kit, and so from its 
point of view further challenge was unnecessary. Further, we can fairly safely 
make the assumption that Chiron must have concluded that its patent would 
be declared invalid if the case had reached the stage of final judgment. On this 
basis, from a commercial point of view it was better for Chiron to grant Murex 
a licence than to continue with the case. 
Business interests clearly were more important to the parties in the 
Murex v Chiron case than the effect on public health. This is not to say that the 
out of court settlement necessarily will be detrimental to public health. 
Competing kits can now be marketed, which will improve the reliability of 
diagnostic tests and may cause the prices of the test kits to fall. In this case, 
therefore, the end result was probably favourable in public health terms. But 
87 National Health and Medical Research Council, Draft Report on a Strategy for Detection 
and Management of Hepatitis C in Australia (1996). 
88 Murex Diagnostics Australia Pty Ltd v Chiron Corporation No. G106 of 1994. 
89 In Chapter 6 I will discuss the implications that the Murex v Chiron case might have had 
on Australian patent law, had Burchett J been able to hand down his judgment. 
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there is no guarantee that this will happen in every case. I argue that if patents 
are cast in too broad terms they could exclude non-licensed researchers from 
developing diagnostic or therapeutic tools. Unless licensed researchers are 
committed to developing those tools in a timely fashion the health care system 
will suffer. 
Conclusion 
Where research into or application of genetic technology is institution-
based it is subject to a high level of ethical scrutiny, the cornerstone of which is 
the protection of the individual, which is achieved by an assessment of the risk 
to that particular individual. As soon as such work moves outside the 
institution or outside the definition of research it may be beyond the reach of 
the ethical review system. Arguably existing human rights and consumer 
protection legislation provides adequate protection of the public, even in the 
commercial arena. Difficulties will always arise, however, where commercial 
interests and the welfare of the individual patient or the indigenous group are 
in conflict. The patent system, designed as it is to encourage innovation, 
favours commercial interests. In some circumstances the effect of human 
genetic research on the individual patient or the social group may be so 
profound that commercial interests should be subsumed to considerations of 
their needs. If this is the case then the role of the patent system in human 
genetic research must be limited appropriately (see Chapter 7). 
The need for commercial funding of human genetic research and its 
introduction into clinical practice is beyond question. Commercial funding will 
inevitably lead to commercialisation of the research or practice itself, and 
included in this is the need for economic viability. Any debate about the 
desirability or otherwise of commercialisation of human genetics must 
acknowledge the reality of the situation. From the upstream perspective, 
institution-based research that is linked to private industry will be favoured by 
funding agencies over purely academic research. At the downstream end, 
provision of health care is required to fit prescribed economic parameters. 
Products are generally supplied to the health care service by private enterprises. 
This linkage between the private and public sectors at both the upstream and 
downstream ends of the flow inevitably leads to the introduction of 
commercial considerations into academic research and health care, including 
the need to provide the patent incentive. 
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Companies may well be willing to invest in research and development 
without the patent incentive, if by undertaking research they get a sufficient 
headstart over their competitors to be the first to market the products of that 
research. There will be little or no advantage over the patent system in terms of 
public interest, however, if lack of patent protection requires that research 
results are kept secret until marketable products are available, since this will 
inevitably lead to prolonged duplication of research effort. In the last year there 
has been a remarkable change of direction by some of the larger pharmaceutical 
and biotechnology companies, which are now taking a farsighted approach to 
investment in research and protection of their research interests. The 
willingness of a number of companies to invest in a pathogen sequencing 
consortium90 is but one example of a realisation of the benefits of collaborative 
research and release of research results into the public domain so that they can 
be shared by all. Even so, this willingness is perhaps still premised on the 
availability of later downstream patents. Companies will always argue that they 
wouldn't do the research without the patenting option, and there is no way to 
refute this other than by doing the experiment. It seems hardly likely that a 
government would be willing to take this risk, because the cost to the nation of 
companies taking their research elsewhere will be high and it will be difficult 
to entice them to return. 
From both a law and a policy perspective, patents cannot and should not 
be claimed for DNA sequences of unknown function. The same cannot be said 
for more downstream inventions, where neither the law nor the policy can be 
stated with nearly as much certainty. The restrictions that patent law imposes 
on downstream inventions will be analysed in Chapter 6. There are a number 
of mitigating provisions, outside the normal patenting criteria, that may 
ameliorate detrimental effects of upstream and downstream patents. These 
include, at the upstream end, exclusion from infringement for experimental 
work and freedom to publish once a provisional application has been lodged, 
and, at the downstream end, provision of compulsory licences and revocation 
90 The pathogen sequencing consortium is a consortium of scientists and 
biotechnology/pharmaceutical companies which plans to sequence the fifty most 
prevalent pathogens. Dr. Michael Morgan of the Wellcome Trust discussed this proposal in 
his talk "Human Pathogen Sequence Data given at the HUGO Genome Summit in 
Canberra in October, 1996. 
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of patents which are not in the public interest. The extent to which these 
provisions should be made use of is discussed in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 6: PATENTABILITY OF HUMAN GENETIC 
MATERIAL 
Introduction 
The final premise on which many of the objections to patenting human 
genetic material are based is that if some genetic material is patentable then it 
necessarily follows that all genetic material is patentable. This is not the case. In 
Chapter 2 I examined the legislation and case law in Australia that provides 
certain defined limits on the patentability of inventions. It is not enough for there 
to be a bona fide invention; that invention must demonstrably have commercial 
application, be new, and involve an inventive step and must be fully, disclosed. In 
this chapter I will analyse how patent law relates to inventions derived from 
human genetic research with respect to the requirements of manner of 
manufacture, novelty, inventive step and disclosure. 
Given the commercial nature of human genetic research, and the clear 
economic implications to the nation of alleviating genetic disease, it is unlikely, 
without express exclusion, that the isolation and subsequent synthetic 
manufacture of human genes could be considered to be improper subject matter 
for the letters patent, as expressed in NRDC. 1 It clearly belongs to the useful rather 
than the fine arts. Taken on face value, therefore, the manner of manufacture test 
will be satisfied for most inventions arising out of human genetic research. The 
same cannot be said, however, when all that is being claimed is the DNA sequence 
with no knowledge of its function. Unless information is included as to how to 
produce that specific sequence or how the sequence may be used, it offers nothing 
in the way of commercial applicability. In this respect, therefore, concerns about 
the patenting of DNA sequences of unknown function, including ESTs, are 
unfounded. 
What is of real and particular concern is the extent to which exclusive rights 
can be claimed over DNA sequences of known function and their applications. 
Generally the aim of the patentee will be to extend the ambit of the patent as far as 
possible. This is particularly important in the area of human genetic research for 
two reasons. First, the unique degeneracy of the genetic code must be taken into 
account. To recapitulate on the information that was provided in Chapter 3: 
1 	National Research and Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252. 
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• proteins are made by a two step process: messenger RNAs are transcribed from 
DNA genes and the chains of amino acids that constitute proteins are 
translated from the messenger RNAs; 
• there is a one to one copy of DNA bases to messenger RNA bases; 
• each amino acid is translated from a set of three messenger RNA bases, known 
as a codon; 
• there are 64 different codons, based on the various combinations of the four 
messenger RNA bases; 
• there are only 20 amino acids; 
• more than one codon can code for a particular amino acid; 2 and 
• consequently there can be more than one DNA sequence for a particular 
protein. This is known as degeneracy of the code. 
The effect of degeneracy of the code in terms of patenting is that unless all of the 
DNA sequences that code for a particular protein are claimed, competitors are not 
excluded from using a code different from that claimed in the patent to make the 
same protein. As such, narrow downstream claims often also include broad 
upstream claims. 
Secondly, for many of the claims to human genetic material, the only 
inventiveness is in the method chosen to produce the sequences. Once the 
sequence has been produced, the value of the invention is in the disclosed 
sequence and the method itself becomes redundant. If only the method could be 
patented it would have little value. Consequently, patent claims often include any 
method of using or producing those sequences. Here, therefore, patents for narrow 
upstream inventions include broad downstream claims. 
Patent examiners and the courts must ensure that the patents claiming the 
use of DNA sequences are not impermissibly wide, but at the same time that they 
have some real value. The focus of this chapter is to assess the extent to which the 
limitations on patenting presently existing within the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) 
provide appropriate limitations on patenting of human genes and their 
applications. 
There is scant case law on this matter in Australia. The case of Murex v 
Chiron which has recently been settled out of court after 40 days of hearings before 
2 	Note that some of the codons are known as start or stop codons, because they signal the start 
and stop of the translation process. These codons do not code for amino acids. 
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Burchett J in the Federal Court3 had the potential to provide the benchmark in 
interpreting the issues. Realisation of that potential now must await another 
challenge to a biotechnology patent. For the present, some guidance can be 
obtained by looking to other jurisdictions. Although there are some differences in 
the legislation in Australia and Europe, the decisions of the European Patent Office 
and the English courts provide assistance.4 The landmark English cases of 
Genentech,5 Genentech (Growth Hormone),6 Asahi,7 Biogen8 and Chiron9 as well as the 
decisions of the European Patent Office in Onco-mouse 10 and Relaxin 11 all require 
detailed consideration. Although none of these cases apart from Relaxin relates to 
human genetic research per se, the information that they provide about the general 
area of patentability of biotechnology inventions gives valuable guidance as to 
how similar issues associated with the particular area of human genetic research 
may be interpreted by the courts. Finally in this chapter, the specification 
requirements will be analysed with respect to human genetic research. Again 
settlement of the Murex case means that the standard for future biotechnology 
3 	Murex Diagnostics Australia Pty Ltd v Chiron Corporation No. G106 of 1994. 
4 	Note that the divergence between Australian and US patent law is somewhat greater. For 
this reason, only the most seminal US cases have been called on to provide assistance. 
5 
	
	Genentech Inc's Patent [1987] RPC 553, before Whitford J in the Patents Court; [1989] RPC 
147, before Purchas, Dillon and Muslin LJJ in the Court of Appeal. 
6 	Genentech Inc's (Human Growth Hormone) Patent [1989] RPC 613, before Falconer J in the 
Patents Court. 
7 	Asahi Kasei Kogyo KK's Application [1991] RPC 485, before Falconer J in the Patents Court; 
Dillon, Ralph Gibson and Stuart-Smith LJJ in the Court of Appeal; Lord Keith of Kinkel, 
Lord Brandon of Oakbrook, Lord Acicner, Lord Oliver of Aylmerton and Lord Jauncey of 
Tullychettle in the House of Lords. 
8 	Biogen Inc v Medeva Plc (1995] RPC 25, before Aldous J in the Patents Court; [1995] FSR 4, 
before Nourse, Peter Gibson and Hobhouse LJJ in the Court of Appeal; the House of Lords 
handed down its opinions on 31st October 1996. The Law Lords sitting were Lord Goff of 
Chievely, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Mustill, Lord Slynn of Hadley and Lord 
Hoffmann. Lord Hoffmann gave the leading judgment. An abridged version of the 
judgment was reported in The Times on 1 November 1996. 
9 	Chiron Corporation v Organon Teknika Ltd (No. 3) [1994] FSR 202 before Aldous J in the 
Patents Court; Chiron Corp v Murex Diagnostics Ltd(No. 12) [1996] FSR 153, before Leggatt, 
Morritt and Schiemann LJJ in the Court of Appeal. 
10 	See particularly the decision of the Technical Board of Appeal, Re Harvard College (President 
and Fellows) (Decision T 19/90) [1990] OJEPO 476. 
11 	[1995] OJEPO 388. 
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patent cases in Australia has not yet been set. Assistance can be obtained from the 
English decisions in Biogen and Chiron. 
It will become apparent that neither the law nor the science in this area is 
easy. Both are new, and the parameters have not been fully explored for either. In 
Genentech Mustill LJ commented that the problem is exacerbated by the fact that 
novel patents in this area are frequently drafted in a way that is difficult to 
comprehend. His Lordship referred to the Genentech claims as being "laconic", 
and preceded by writings which were "long and diffuse and cast in a most unusual 
form". 12 The aim of Genentech was for the patent to cover the maximum amount 
of territory in the general area of the invention. If only the true extent of the 
invention were claimed, the patent would have little value because it would be 'too 
easy for others to invent around it. To achieve this end, the claims in Genentech 
were cast in what Mustill LJ referred to as 
"concentric zones of generality, no doubt in the hope that if one or more claims failed, 
others would still survive in a form sufficient to give Genentech the commercial 
advantage which the application was intended to secure." 13 
One of the critical policy issues that the courts are required to determine is 
how far patent protection should be allowed to extend outside the invention. In 
Genentech the court was in agreement that the claims made were far too wide, yet 
in other cases, such as Chiron v Murex, similar very broad claims were upheld. 
These cases serve to emphasise the fact that decisions as to the validity of patent 
claims will often turn on the way the application is drafted and the credibility of 
the expert witnesses on each side. 
Part 1: Manner of Manufacture and Human Genetic Research 
Most of the inventions derived from human genetic research and its 
applications will have the requisite commercial applicability to satisfy the manner 
of manufacture test. It does not necessarily follow that all will be patentable. The 
1984 Report of the Industrial Property Advisory Committee, 14 in recommending 
that the manner of manufacture test should be retained in the new legislation, 
rationalised this decision by stating that the application of the test was facilitated 
by the extensive body of case law. That case law has developed a range of 
12 	Genentech Inc's Patent [1989] RPC 147, at 252. 
13 	Ibid. 
14 	Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia (1984) AGPS. 
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exceptions for material which is considered to be unpatentable because it is not a 
manner of manufacture. Human genes and their applications potentially may be 
included within some of the exceptions, which are described below. 
1.1 Case Law Exclusions from Patentability 
1.1.1. Mere Discoveries: General Considerations 
Traditionally, mere discoveries have not been patentable because of the 
requirement that knowledge and ingenuity are used to produce a new and useful 
thing. 15 Discoveries are neither new nor useful, first, they are already in existence, 
and secondly, they do not have the requisite applicability. In NRDC the difficulty 
in distinguishing between discoveries and inventions was pointed out. 16 The High 
Court insisted that the whole process must be looked at and it was enough to 
show that there was one inventive step from the prior art. 
Even though discoveries are not patentable, patents can be claimed for 
, methods embracing discoveries, or for products of discoveries, provided that they 
fulfil the other patenting requirements. As such, even if the identification of a 
naturally occurring gene or gene sequence is classified as a discovery, the 
utilisation of that knowledge to make a synthetic gene and gene products may be 
characterised as patentable inventions. 17 The law in Australia at present is unclear 
as to whether: 
• an isolated gene sequence of known function is a patentable invention or a 
mere discovery; and 
15 	See, for example, Lane-Fox v Kensington & Knightsbridge Electric Lighting Co Ltd [1892] RPC 
413. 
16 	National Research and Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252, 
at 264. 
17 	The Patent Office, in its Manual of Practice and Procedure, affirms this view with respect to the 
patenting of microorganisms and other life forms, stating at 8.1.15.2 c), with reference to the 
decision in Rank Hovis, below, that naturally occurring micro-organisms per se are not 
patentable as they represent a discovery and not an invention, but a claim to a pure culture 
in the presence of some specified ingredients would satisfy the requirement of a technical 
intervention, and at 8.1.15.3 that isolation and cultivation of naturally occurring micro-
organisms which have some new use satisfy the requirement of technical intervention. 
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• the novelty and inventive step requirements for a patentable invention can be 
satisfied through the sequencing of the gene in question, irrespective of 
whether this is considered to be a discovery or an invention. 18 
These considerations are particularly important in patenting genes because 
many of the methods employing gene sequence information and the products 
derived from its use are already known. If gene sequences are classified as 
inventions or if they are allowed to be used to fulfil the requirements of novelty 
and inventive step, the extent to which patents can impinge on both applied and 
basic genetic research may be considerable. Broad patent claims could be 
encouraged, potentially covering all future use of the gene sequence in issue. This 
is precisely the issue that was being argued in the Murex v Chiron case before 
Burchett J. The Chiron patent claims the Hepatitis C genome. Murex argued inter 
alia that the genome was a discovery and was therefore not patentable. If Burchett 
J had been given the opportunity to accept this argument then patentability would 
have had to be found in the narrower claims to methods employing the genome, 
or products derived from its use, both of which may have been obvious. 
1.1.2. Living Organisms and Products of Nature as Discoveries: Specific Considerations 
Both processes involving naturally occurring living organisms and living 
organisms themselves, provided that they are not naturally occurring, are now 
considered to be patentable. 19 For many years products of nature were considered 
to be unpatentable subject matter because they were classified as inherently being 
discoveries rather than inventions. The watershed for patenting in this area was 
the US case of Diamond v Chakrabarty, 20 which allowed a patent for a genetically 
modified bacterium that could break down hydrocarbons. The patent was 
originally refused by the examiner because the bacteria were products of nature 
18 	The statutory exclusion of discoveries in the Patents Act 1977 (UK) has been interpreted as 
allowing the discovery to fulfil the novelty and inventive step requirements (see below at 
1.3.1). 
19 	In Rank Hovis McDougall Ltd's Application (1976) 46 AOJP 3915 the Assistant Commissioner 
of Patents granted a patent for a new strain of micro-organism that could be used in a 
process for the production of an edible protein. The process itself was also patentable but a 
patent was refused for the original microorganism, because it was naturally occurring. This 
decision was confirmed by an official notice from the Patent Office in 1980. Public concerns 
associated with patenting of living organisms were discussed in Chapter 1, in part 1. 
20 	447 US 303 (1980). 
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and were living organisms, taking them outside the scope of patentable subject 
matter. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the relevant legislative history 
supported a broad construction. Burger CJ emphasised that the claim was to a 
non-naturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter, and that 
Chakrabarty's work was "not nature's handiwork but his own; accordingly it is 
patentable subject matter .••" 21 The critical requirement that must be satisfied is 
that they are made by man, "anything under the sun that is made by man" 22 being 
inherently patentable. 
Since Chakrabarty a wide range of biotechnological inventions have received 
patent protection in the US. The only requirement to bring material that has been 
isolated or purified under the umbrella of patentable subject matter would seem to 
be that it offers some material advantage in utility over the naturally occurring 
materia1.23 In effect, there is little difference between this requirement and the 
Australian manner of manufacture test. Neither the US test, requiring practical 
utility, nor the Australian test, requiring a manner of manufacture would now 
appear to create a major barrier to patenting products or processes involving living 
organisms that have been modified in some way. Patents for genetically 
engineered bacteria, pigs, mice, and so on, are unlikely to fail on this basis. The 
same can also be said for DNA sequences which are produced in recombinant 
form from cDNA copies of messenger RNA, because the sequences lack the introns 
present in naturally occurring DNA and therefore can be said to be sufficiently 
different from the natural form to be products of man rather, than products of 
nature. 
The situation is different for living organisms that have not been genetically 
modified. In the Chiron patent for Hepatitis C, one of the claims that Chiron made 
was to the unmodified virus. Murex may have had a good case for arguing that an 
unmodified living organism, albeit one which was very difficult to isolate and 
characterise, was nonetheless nature's handiwork and not man's. It is open to 
question whether isolation of the virus from nature is sufficient for it to be claimed 
as an invention.24 The product of nature argument can also be raised against 
21 	Ibid., at 310. 
22 	Ibid. 
23 	There is an extensive body of case law in this area. See, for example, Merck & Co v Olin 
Mathieson Chemical Co 253 F.2d 156 (1958); In Re Bergstrom 427 F.2d 1394 (1970). 
24 	Note that such arguments will not prevent the process leading to the isolation of a product 
from nature from being patented, provided that it fulfils the other patenting criteria. 
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patenting of DNA sequences where the claims are to isolated gene sequences as 
they exist in nature. 
In the USA, patents are allowed for pure cultures of naturally occurring 
micro-organisms.25 The position is somewhat less clear in Australia, because the 
decision of the assistant commissioner in Rank Hovis indicates that mere isolation 
and purification may not be sufficient. 26 The Federal Court is not bound by this 
decision and may choose not to follow the reasoning therein, should it be given the 
opportunity to do so. Patent Office practice would now seem to be more closely 
aligned with the US position. With regard to gene sequences, for example, a Patent 
Office note on patenting of biotechnology inventions listed as patentable 
inventions, inter alia, the DNA coding sequence for a gene claimed in either 
isolated or recombinant state.27 It would appear, therefore, that mere isolation is 
regarded as sufficient inventiveness by the Patent Office for the grant of a patent. 
The law on this matter awaits definitive judicial pronouncement. From an 
international perspective, the US position has some similarities with that in 
Europe, although there is some indication of a different stance in England. 28 
1.1.3. Methods of Treating the Human Body 
Methods of treating the human body have been described as unpatentable 
in a number of cases, including NRDC.29 A range of developments in human 
genetic research could be denied patents should this exclusion prevail. If read 
widely, it could not only cover surgery, but other forms of therapy and even 
diagnostic testing. The notion that the method of treatment of humans is not 
patentable is entirely a product of case law in Australia, yet until recently the cases 
have been vague in defining both the ambit of the exception and the rationale for 
25 	For example, In Re Bergstrom 427 F.2d 1394 (1970); In Re Bergy 596 F.2d 952 (1979). 
26 	Note that the decision in Rank Hovis was made by the assistant commissioner of patents and 
therefore does not create a binding precedent for the Federal Court. 
27 	Australian Industrial Property Organisation, Australian Patents for Genetically Manipulated 
Organisms (1994). 
28 	Discussed in section 1.3.1, below. 
29 	Objections to the patenting of methods of medical treatment were discussed in part 2 of 
Chapter 1. 
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its existence. The recent decisions of Gummow J and the Full Federal Court in the 
Rescare case30 have considerably clarified the issue. 
The exclusion was first pronounced by Lord Buckmaster in C & W's 
Application,31 where his Lordship stated that the refusal of the Patent Office to 
patent an invention for the removal of lead from human bodies because it related 
simply to human bodies was sound. The justification for this conclusion was that 
such treatment had no reference to any form of manufacture or trade and therefore 
was not a manner of manufacture. A series of three cases in the 1970s in England 
confirmed that a method of treating a human ailment with a known substance was 
not an invention. In summary, the English position would appear to have been 
that, even though the rationale for the exclusion in C & W's Application was no 
longer tenable after NRDC, it could be justified on the basis of ethics, and because 
the exclusion was well established in the case law, any change should come from 
the legislature. 32 However, the exclusion was read strictly so that only the medical 
treatment of ailments was excluded, and not, for example, contraception. 33 
In Australia, the patentability of a new method of conducting an operation 
on part of the human body was first considered in Maeder v Busch. 34 Whilst none of 
the High Court judges was willing to decide the issue, Latham CJ, Dixon and 
McTiernan JJ all expressed doubt as to whether such subject matter could be 
regarded as a "manner of manufacture". 35 That view would seem to have been 
endorsed in NRDC, where it was suggested that methods of surgery and other 
processes for treating humans "Must apparently be put aside". 36 
Barwick CJ further considered the matter in Joos v Commissioner of Patents. 37 
His Honour rejected the general argument that methods of medical treatment were 
not forms of manufacture or trade which was presented in C & W's Application, 
30 	Rescare Ltd v Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd (1992) 111 ALR 205; Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v 
Rescare Ltd (1994) 28 IPR 383. 
31 	(1914) 31 RPC 235. 
32 	Schering Aktiengesellschaft 's Application [1971] RPC 337; Eli Lilley & Co's Application [1975] 
RPC 438; Upjohn Company (Robert's) Application [1977] RPC 94. 
33 	Schering's Application [1971] RPC 337. 
(1938) 59 CLR 684. 
35 	Evatt J seemed to be inclined to the opposite view. 
36 	NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, at 270. 
37 	(1972) 126 CLR 611. 
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and narrowed the exception to the treatment of diseases, correction of a 
malfunction or removal or amelioration of an incapacity, if, indeed, it was to be 
accepted at all. Barwick CJ went on to explain that if the exclusion did exist, then 
its justification must be based on public policy, using the Statute of Monopolies 
language of being "generally inconvenient". 38 As a consequence of Barwick CJ's 
judgment in loos, the Patent Office discontinued its prior practice of refusing 
patents for the medical treatment of humans. 39 The rationale of this decision was 
that loos cast doubt on the past practice, and it was the duty of the commissioner 
only to refuse patent applications when they were clearly inappropriate subject 
matter for patenting. 
The validity of the human treatment exception was questioned in the Israeli 
Wellcome Foundation case, where it was proposed that the exception had no basis in 
law or logic and the subject matter was clearly within the realm of economic 
endeavour.40 Subsequently Davison CJ in the New Zealand Wellcome Foundation 
case gave a detailed analysis and critique of the exclusion. 41 His Honour came to 
the conclusion that there was no satisfactory basis for excluding medical treatment 
from patenting, and that there was no warrant in law for granting an exclusion 
based on ethics. Furthermore, it was unrealistic to distinguish between cosmetic 
and medical treatment. Therefore, using the NRDC test, it was possible to patent a 
process using known compounds for a new purpose in the treatment of meningeal 
leukemia in the brain. Davison CJ's decision was reversed by the New Zealand , 
Court of Appeal, however, where all three judges rejected the assertion that a 
method of treatment of human illness or disease was patentable. 42 Somers J 
commented on the special character of treatment of human ailments and adopted 
Barwick CJ's view that patent applications in this area should be rejected as being 
generally inconvenient. McMullin J, whilst realising that there was much to be said 
for developing the law to allow patents in this area, felt that any major thrust 
should be left to Parliament. Cooke J commented that there remained a deep-
seated sense that the art of the physician or surgeon in alleviating human suffering 
does not belong to the area of economic endeavour. 
38 	Section 6, Statute of Monopolies. 
39 	This decision is explained in Upjohn's Application (1979) 49 AOJP 382. 
40 	Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Plantex Ltd [1974] RPC 514. 
41 	Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [1979] 2 NZLR 591. 
42 	(1983) 2 IPR 156. 
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In the most recent case to address the issue in Australia, 43 Gummow J 
found that the decision of Davison CJ in Wellcome Foundation was more 
appropriate to the Australian position than the decisions of the Appeal Court 
judges. His Honour pointed out that it was the practice of the Commissioner of 
Patents to accept such patents, and this had produced no deleterious 
consequences. On appeal," all three judges agreed that, unlike England, there was 
no binding authority in Australia and therefore they were free to decide the 
matter for themselves. They decided the matter by a majority of 2:1 in favour of 
patenting, Lockhart J stating that: "I see no reason in principle why a method of 
treatment of the human body is any less a manner of manufacture than a method 
of ridding crops of weeds..." 45 
Both Lockhart and Wilcox jj commented that Parliament had been given the 
opportunity to create a statutory exception when it enacted the 1990 Act, but failed 
to do so. This shows a contrary line of reasoning to the English cases, where it was 
argued that the method of medical treatment exclusion was well established and it 
was for the legislature to change. I suggest that if the exclusion were as well 
established in the case law in Australia, then it would be questionable whether it 
would be appropriate to use the argument that since the exclusion does not appear 
expressly in the Act it can be ignored. The rationale for keeping the manner of 
manufacture test in the new legislation was that it should be interpreted using the 
case law. In the three High Court cases of Maeder, NRDC and loos, however, the 
judges were seemingly very careful to avoid any definitive pronouncement on the 
issue. Given the lack of justification in law for the exclusion, and the anomalies 
between cosmetic treatment and medical treatment, and products and processes of 
medical treatment, the majority decision in Rescare would appear appropriate. 
Nonetheless, the matter is not yet concluded. Sheppard J ., in dissent, found that 
where the treatment and relief of human suffering had direct bearing on the well-
being of the nation and involved a life threatening disease patent claims should be 
rejected on the basis that they are generally inconvenient. 
Despite Sheppard J's reticence in the Rescare appeal, the authorities indicate 
that there is now little or no place for the method of medical treatment exclusion to 
the manner of manufacture test. The Patent Office sees the decision in the Rescare 
appeal as affirming its long established practice following Joos not to object to 
43 	Rescare Ltd v Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd (1992) 111 ALR 205. 
44 	Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 28 IPR 383. 
45 	Ibid., at 400. 
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methods of treatment of humans.46 Furthermore, the Office also sees Rescare as 
establishing that arguments based on ethics or social policy are not relevant in 
determining whether particular subject matter is patentable. 47 
1.2 Statutory Exclusions 
1.2.1 Patents Act 1990 
Section 18(2) of the Patents Act provides the only express exclusion to 
patentability, that human beings, and the biological processes for their generation, 
are not patentable:15 This provision was introduced into the Patents Bill 1989 by 
Senator Harradine, and agreed to by both houses. 49 Senator Harradine stated his 
belief that the second half of this amendment would prevent patenting of 
techniques developed for cloning human embryos at the four cell stage, although 
Senator Coulter seemed to doubt that it would cover anything more than normal 
sexual reproduction.50 Reference to the possible patenting of humans in the first 
part of the amendment is generally considered to be so contrary to fundamental 
norms that it goes without saying. This amendment therefore probably has 
negligible effect. 
The Patent Office's note on biotechnology stated that the only limitation that 
this exclusion would create in the area of genetic research would be that DNA or 
genes in the human body would not be patentable as such.51 On the other hand, 
once a gene sequence has been separated from the human body and manufactured 
synthetically for reintroduction into the body for therapeutic purposes it would be 
patentable. The Patent Office went on to list the range of potentially patentable 
46 	Australian Industrial Property Organisation, Patent Office Manual of Practice and Procedure, 
Volume 2, section 8.1.14.4. 
47 	Ibid. 
48 	Note also that in section 51(1) the commissioner has discretion to refuse to accept an 
application (a) for an invention the use of which would be contrary to law or (b) for a 
substance which is capable of being used as a food or medicine, but only where the food or 
medicine is a mere mixture of known ingredients. 
49 	House of Representatives, Hansard Parliamentary Debates 16 October 1990, 2947, at 2955. 
50 	Senate, Hansard Parliamentary Debates 20 September 1990, 2653, at 2653-2655. 
51 	Australian Industrial Property Organisation, Australian Patents for Genetically Manipulated 
Organisms (1994). 
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inventions in this area.52 Although applications in any of these areas are open to 
challenge in opposition or revocation proceedings, the clear signal from the Patent 
Office is that there is very little restriction in what it sees as patentable subject 
matter in this area of research. 
1.2.2 Statute of Monopolies 
Section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies excludes manners of new manufacture 
which are contrary to law or mischievous to the state by raising prices, hurting 
trade or being generally inconvenient. It would appear to be accepted by the 
judiciary that both the 1952 and 1990 Patents Act import the whole of this section. 53 
In Joos, for instance, Barwick CJ referred to the method of medical treatment 
exclusion being based on public policy using the Statute of Monopolies language of 
being generally inconvenient, and Gummow J confirmed that the question should 
be framed in this way in Rescare. In the Rescare appeal Lockhart J would not accede 
to the appellant's argument that the ground of generally inconvenient was not 
available. As such, any of these Statute of Monopolies arguments could provide an 
avenue for the judiciary to introduce public policy or ethical considerations in its 
determination of whether human genes are patentable. 
The general inconvenience exclusion has been used a number of times in 
Australia to deny patent claims for subject matter to which the public expect that 
they have free access, including purchased computers, lunch boxes and picture 
frames. 54 Patent claims may also be denied on this basis where there are life 
threatening consequences, including for methods of medical treatment. In Rescare, 
however, both Gummow J at trial and Lockhart J on appeal rejected the possibility 
that this exclusion could prevent patenting of methods of medical treatment. 
Wilcox J went further and stated that the courts should not get involved in matters 
of ethics or social policy, for which they have no particular expertise. On the other 
hand, Sheppard J rejected the patent claim on the basis of general inconvenience. 
As such, it is presently unclear exactly how willing the judiciary will be to use the 
52 	Ibid. 
53 	Section 18(1)(a) Patents Act 1990 refers to manner of manufacture within the meaning of 
section 6, Statute of Monopolies and the dictionary of terms in Schedule 1 again refers to this 
section in its definition of 'invention'. 
54 	See, for example, Telefon A/B LM Ericssons Application [1975] FSR 49; Clayton Furniture Ltd's 
Application [1965] AOJP 2303; Boccari's Application [1967] A0J13 1380. 
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general inconvenience argument to exclude from patenting matters which have 
ethical and social implications. 
In Murex v Chiron, Burchett J would have been required to consider whether 
the Chiron invention failed to fulfil the manner of manufacture requirement on the 
grounds that to grant such a patent would be generally inconvenient or would be 
mischievous to the state by raising prices. Aside from any ethical arguments 
against patenting of genes and living organisms, some of which were discussed in 
Chapter 1, there are strong arguments based on public interest why it may not 
have been desirable for Chiron to monopolise Hepatitis C testing in Australia. 
• A number of strains of Hepatitis C exist throughout the world, and the 
dominant strains in Australia may not be the same as those in the northern 
hemisphere. If only one diagnostic test is performed there is a danger of a false 
negative result if that test is not sensitive to a particular strain. For this reason, 
the NHMRC has recommended that more than one diagnostic test should be 
used. A number of test kits are available, but blood banks may not be willing to 
use them because of the risk of infringement action by Chiron. If a blood bank 
fails to use more than one test and gives a recipient contaminated blood, then 
arguably the infected recipient may have a negligence claim against it. 
• The Chiron test kits are expensive. The availability of other kits would be likely 
to have encouraged lower pricing. 
Although these arguments are not without foundation, I suggest that it was 
unlikely that Burchett J would have accepted them, given the clear reticence on the 
part of judges both in Australia and elsewhere to get involved in public policy and 
ethical considerations in relation to patenting. 55 From a jurisprudential point of 
view, one of the main purposes of the law is to set and apply acceptable standards 
based on these self same issues, particularly in the interpretation of a public 
interest statute. For the judiciary to claim that it does not have the expertise to 
consider such difficult questions, even when the legislature has given it the 
mandate to do so, could be seen as abrogating its legal responsibility. The general 
inconvenience exclusion provides an important means for the judiciary to consider 
the policy of patenting. I propose that it is more appropriate to consider such 
matters here rather than through the other patenting requirements. However, the 
trend has been in the other direction. The policy of granting or denying broad 
patent claims tends to have been decided on a case by case basis by either liberal or 
55 	See for example the judgments of Lockhart and Wilcox JJ in Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v 
Rescare Ltd (1994) 28 IPR 383. 
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strict reading of the novelty and inventive step requirements, as discussed below 
in Parts 2 and 3. A more overt discussion of these policy issues by the courts may 
be both more appropriate and more in line with current High Court practice. 
1.2.3 Proposed Amendment to Section 18 Patents Act 
Two attempts have been made by the Australian Democrats to introduce 
amendments to section 18 Patents Act 1990. In 1990 during the parliamentary 
debate of the Patents Bill Senator Coulter sought to add the following amendment 
to section 18: 
"(2) A patentable invention shall not include the following: 
(a) a gene or genes, whether derived from cells or chemically synthesised; 
(b) a genome either complete or one which has genetic material added or 
deleted; 
(c) the altered organism (human, plant, animal or microorganism) produced by 
having its genome manipulated, and 
(d) the progeny of the genetically engineered organism which also carry the 
altered genome. 
(3) 	Sub-section (2) does not limit the patenting of technologies, techniques and 
processes involved in the carrying out of genetic engineering." 56 
That amendment was rejected by the Senate Standing Committee on 
Industry, Science and Technology and by the Opposition. 57 In the second reading 
speech of the Patents Bill Mr. Prosser noted that the amendment was too restrictive 
because it would prevent patenting of vaccines and antibiotics and would create a 
flow on effect of hindering research and development of new technology in the 
medical and pharmaceutical fields. 58 
In June 1996 Senator Stott-Despoja of the Australian Democrats introduced 
an amendment to section 18 as a private member's bill. It states that: 
,.(3) 	The following are not to be regarded as possessing the quality of novelty or 
inventiveness for the purposes of this section: 
56 	Senate Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology Report on the Consideration of 
the Patents Bill (1990). 
57 	Senate, Hansard Parliamentary Debates 20 September 1990, 2653; House of Representatives, 
Hansard Parliamentary Debates 16 October 1990, 2947. 
58 	House of Representatives, Hansard Parliamentary Debates 16 October 1990,2947, at 2948. 
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(a) naturally occurring genes; or 
(b) naturally occurring gene sequences; or 
(c) descriptions of the base sequence of a naturally occurring gene or a naturally 
occurring gene sequence." • 
In the second reading speech on 27th June 1996 Senator Stott-Despoja 
commented on the need for urgent action, both in terms of public policy and also 
for fundamental philosophical and moral reasons. 59 Although most of the 
concerns outlined by Senator Stott-Despoja relate to patenting of human genes, the 
amendment covers genes from all species. She justified this on the basis that there 
is no biological difference between human and other genes, and therefore if the 
Senate believed that naturally occurring human genes should not be patentable 
then logically all naturally occurring genes and gene sequences should be 
excluded. 
Given the lack of equivalent provisions in patenting legislation in most 
other countries,60 and the perceived need to encourage biotechnology in this 
country, it is doubtful that Parliament will pass this amendment. It its current 
form, the amendment is much narrower than the Coulter amendment, including 
within its ambit only naturally occurring genes and gene sequences and the 
descriptions of their base sequences. In restricting the amendment in this way, it 
may well be that if passed it will have as little actual effect on patenting of 
inventions in this area as Senator Harradine's amendment. For this reason I 
suggest that there is little justification for the amendment being incorporated into 
patent law, and to do so would be more likely to cause confusion than benefit. 
L3 Manner of Manufacture v Enumerated Exclusions 
The present state of Australian law is such that the manner of manufacture 
test as interpreted in NRDC61 and subsequent cases is unlikely to create a barrier to 
59 	Senate, Hansard Parliamentary Debates 27 June 1996, 2332. Note that debate on the Bill was 
adjourned on the motion of Senator Chee, and that debate has not yet taken place. 
60 Note, however, that in 1994 France amended its Intellectual Property Code to declare the 
human body, its parts and products and the knowledge of the entire or partial structure of the 
human gene to be inventions, the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to 
"ordre publique" or morality, making them unpatentable. Reported in Straus, J., "Patenting 
Human Genes in Europe - Past Developments and Prospects for the Future" (1995) 26 /IC 920, 
at 922. 
61 	National Research and Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252. 
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patenting isolated human gene sequences of known function and other 
applications derived from those sequences. Furthermore, although some matters 
could fall within the scope of exclusions to the manner of manufacture test created 
by the case law, recent interpretation of these exclusions by the judiciary indicates 
that this may be unlikely. The courts appear reluctant to read the exclusions 
broadly, or even accept them at all unless they have a firm basis in law. The recent 
cases of Rescare62 and CCOM63 strongly affirm the interpretation of the manner of 
manufacture test in NRDC: that provided an invention had economically 
important consequences and there is no justification in law or logic for excluding 
it, it will satisfy the test. In the area of human genetic research, the test will easily 
be passed in this form. The courts potentially have the option of introducing 
ethical and social policy considerations through the "generally inconvenient" and 
other exclusions derived from the Statute of Monopolies. From the comments made 
in the Rescare cases, however, it is clear that counsel would be required to present 
compelling justification as to why the court and not Parliament should decide such 
issues. For the present, it is unlikely that Parliament will amend the Patents Act to 
expressly exclude genes and gene sequences from the ambit of section 18. 
A different stance has been taken in Europe to the issue of what should be 
excluded from the reach of the patent system. 64 The manner of manufacture test 
was the touchstone of patentability in the UK, as in Australia, up to 1977. In 1973 
the UK signed the European Patent Convention (EPC). Patenting legislation of 
member states was required to be based on the EPC. A new Patents Act was 
62 	Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 28 IPR 383. 
63 	CCOM Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd (1994) 28 IPR 481. 
64 	The European patent system has a number of layers of review. Applications can be made for 
patents in one of two ways. 
• Applications can be made through the European Patent Office (EPO), located in Munich. 
The EPO is able to grant a number of national patents in common form. Opposition 
proceedings go to the Opposition Division and appeal proceedings are heard by the Technical 
Board of Appeal. Complex issues of law are passed on to the Enlarged Board of Appeal. 
Revocation and infringement proceedings are, however, matters of state jurisdiction. In 
England first instance cases are heard in the Patents Court and applications for leave to appeal 
may be made to the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. 
• Applications may also be made within individual member states. All decisions and appeals 
are a matter of state jurisdiction. 
See Cornish, W.R., Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights (1989) 
London, Sweet & Maxwell, second edition, at 65. 
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enacted in 1977, through which manner of manufacture test was replaced by a 
definition of invention in sl(1) (Article 52 EPC), requiring that it is new, involves 
an inventive step and is capable of industrial application, and a list of exclusions in 
s1(2) and (3) (Article 52 and 53 EPC). 65 The requirement of industrial applicability 
is much the same as the manner of manufacture test, as interpreted in Australian 
case law. In general inventions associated with human genetic research will satisfy 
this requirement, the claims for ESTs and other sequences of unknown function 
being one notable exception. It should be noted, however, that subsection 4(2) 
(Article 52(4) EPC) provides that a method of treatment of the human or animal 
body by surgery or therapy or of diagnosis practised on the human or animal body 
is not patentable because it is not capable of industrial application, although a 
product used in such treatment can be patented, s4(3). As such, the UK Patents Act 
gives statutory recognition of the medical treatment exception outlined above. 66 
Despite the detailed nature of the definition of patentability in the UK and 
European legislation, it is unclear how much this will actually restrict patenting in 
the area of human genetics. The matter remains one of statutory interpretation by 
the judiciary. 
1.3.1 Discoveries As Such: Subsection 1(2) Patents Act; Article 52(2) EPC 
There has been some debate as to the interpretation of the wording of 
subsection 1(2) of the Patents Act 1977 (UK), although the law now appears settled. 
Clearly, the exclusions themselves will be excluded from patenting, but the words 
"only to the extent that" and "relates to the thing as such" indicate that the 
excluded material can, nevertheless, be used as the substratum of a patentable 
claim, for example, to a method embracing the excluded material. The critical issue 
65 	These exclusions include, in 1(2): (a) a discovery, scientific theory or mathematical method; 
(b) a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work or any other aesthetic creation whatsoever; 
(c) a scheme, rule or method for performing a mental act, playing a game or doing business, 
or a program for a computer; (d) the presentation of information, but only to the extent that 
the patent relates to the thing as such; and in 1(3): (a) an invention the publication or 
exploitation of which would be generally expected to encourage offensive, immoral or 
antisocial behaviour; (b) any variety of animal or plant or any essentially biological process 
for the production of animals or plants, not being a micro-biological process or the product 
of such a process. 
66 	Also see White, A.W., "Patentability of Medical Treatment Wellcome Foundation's (Hitching's) 
Application " (1980) EIPR 364. 
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is whether the method is patentable even if the other patenting requirements, 
principally inventive step and novelty, are only fulfilled by the excluded material 
itself. Falconer J indicated that patenting should be refused in such cases. 67 His 
Honour's view was not supported by the majority in Genentech68 and in 
subsequent cases.69 Nor would it appear to be the favoured interpretation of the 
equivalent provision in the EPC. 70 
The interpretation of s1(2) would now appear to be settled that provided 
there is a new technical result using the excluded matter, and the result itself is not 
excluded, then that result will be patentable. 71 Furthermore, matter excluded from 
patentability through si(2) can contribute to the inventive step required to make 
the invention patentable. Using this interpretation, things such as gene sequences 
may be excluded from patenting if they are classified as being discoveries. But if 
some sort of practical application, which need not of itself be novel or non-
obvious, is included, this will be patentable. In Genentech, for example, the Court 
agreed the incorporation of a DNA sequence into an expression vector would have 
been patentable if the production of the sequence itself was not obvious. The Court 
was divided, however, on the issue of obviousness. 
• For Purchas LJ the data on both the DNA and amino acid sequences for 
human tissue plasminogen activator protein (t-PA) discovered by Genentech were 
not obvious. Focusing on the total work done, it was outside the capacity of the 
hypothetical skilled worker. Even so, from Purchas U's viewpoint the majority of 
the claims failed because they related to the discovery as such rather than the 
method embracing the discovery. Claims to the method embracing a discovery 
will only succeed where the method is clearly identified and defined, with no 
speculative element. Genentech attempted to include in their claims methods 
which had not yet been invented, and as such it was held to be claiming the 
discovery itself. 
67 	In Merrill Lynch Inc's Application [1988] RPC 1. 
68 	Genentech Inc's Patent [1989] RPC 147. 
69 	These include: Genentech Inc's (Human Growth Hormone) Patent [1989] RPC 613; Gale's 
Application [1991] RPC 305; Lux Traffic Controls Ltd v Pike Signals Ltd [1993] RPC 107; Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc v N.H. Norton & Co Ltd [1994] RPC 1. 
70 	See, for example, Vicom 's Application (Decision T208/84) [1987] OJEPO 119, which was used 
as authority for the interpretation given to sl(2) in Genentech. 
71 	Note that in Merrill Lynch's Application and Gale's Application both the invention itself and its 
application were excluded. 
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Dillon LJ agreed that the nucleotide and amino acid sequences were 
discoveries not inventions,72 and also that a patentable invention could be found in 
the application of a discovery. His Lordship accepted that the inventive step and 
novelty requirements could reside in the discovery alone. But on the facts of this 
case it was obvious to the person skilled in the art to set out to produce human t-
PA by recombinant DNA technology, and whether the person skilled in the art 
actually had the ability to perform the task was irrelevant. Consequently there was 
nothing by way of inventive step to support the claims in the patent. 
Mustill LJ also concluded that most of the claims failed. Indeed, for him 
some failed at the first hurdle because, quite apart from the exclusions in s1(2) they 
were not inventions, as required in s1(1). His Lordship agreed in part with the 
judgements of both of the other Lord Justices. Although Mustill LJ preferred the 
view of Falconer J in Merrill Lynch he acceded to the view that a discovery could be 
the foundation of a patent provided that what was claimed was the embodiment 
of the discovery. Here Mustill U agreed with Purchas U that there was no 
embodiment because the claims included things not yet invented. But he also 
agreed with Dillon LJ that the discovery of the sequence data did not include an 
inventive step. Skill and persistence would have been enough. 
The one aspect of this case on which all three Lord Justices agreed, with 
little discussion, was that the sequence data was a discovery and not an 
invention. 73 In subsequent cases the parties have been willing to concede this 
point. In the English Chiron case, for example, the parties had agreed that included 
in the discovery in that case was the determination of the genetic sequence of an 
isolate of the Hepatitis C virus. 74 Arguably parties have little to lose in conceding 
this issue. Generally patent applicants in this area claim more than just the DNA 
sequence (the claims for ESTs and other sequences of unknown function providing 
one exception), and since inventive step and novelty can lie in the discovery of the 
sequence, there will be negligible effect on the value of the patent in not claiming 
the sequence as part of the invention. The only danger arises when the claims to 
methods or products arising out of the discovery are so broad as to be tantamount 
to claiming the discovery itself. 
72 	Genentech Inc's Patent [1989] RPC 147, at 237. 
73 	Ibid., Purchas p at 204, Dillon p at 237 and Mustill 14 at 256. 
74 	Chiron Corp v Murex Diagnostics Ltd [1996] FSR 153, at 175. 
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The European Patent Office (EPO) has given a similar interpretation to the 
equivalent provision in Article 52(2) EPC. According to the Opposition Division in 
the Relaxin case, the long-standing practice of the EPO, as set out in its Guidelines, 
is to find invention both in the process of isolating a substance found in nature and 
in the substance itself provided that it can be properly characterised by its 
structure and that it had no previously recognised existence. 75 Using this 
interpretation, the new H2-relaxin protein claimed in the patent was classified as 
an invention and not a discovery. What was required was an industrially 
applicable technical solution to a technical problem. There was no express 
reference in this case to the characterisation of DNA sequences isolated from 
nature as being either discoveries or inventions. The claims in the patent were to 
DNA fragments encoding for H2-relaxin and its precursors. The sequences of the 
fragments was not revealed in the claims. What was disclosed was the amino acid 
sequence of the H2-relaxin molecule and precursors. Claims of this type offer 
broad protection, covering not only the DNA sequence as it exists in nature, but 
any DNA sequence which could code for that amino acid sequence. As such, the 
claims avoid objections based on discovery and lack of novelty. The claims may 
well lack a fair basis but this is not an opposition ground in Article 100 EPC. 
In the earlier European case of Vicom, decided before Genentech, the EPO 
also made it clear that the novelty and inventive step requirements can reside in 
the discovery itself. Similarly, although Purchas U in particular referred to the 
DNA sequences in the Genentech patent as being discoveries, it would appear to 
be taken for granted in most cases heard by the Technical Board of Appeal of the 
EPO that genes are patentable subject matter. 76 
The outcome from these cases, that inventive step and novelty can be 
satisfied by the unpatentable discovery, could be seen as being out of line with the 
whole notion of patentable inventions. It arises out of a straight exercise in 
statutory interpretation, the effect of which is to reduce the scope of the exclusion. 
In Australia, where the exclusions are creations of case law rather than statute, no 
such formulation has yet been placed on the discovery exclusion. In addition, the 
conclusion that gene sequences are discoveries cannot be stated with an equal 
degree of certainty. 
75 	Relaxin [1995] OJEPO 388. 
76 	Some twenty decisions to this effect are referred to by Straus, J., "Patenting Human Genes in 
Europe - Past Developments and Prospects for the Future" (1995) 26 IIC 920, at 925. 
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1.3.2 Exclusion Based on Method of Medical Treatment: Subsection 4(2) Patents Act, 
Article 52(4) EPC 
The exclusion in subsection 4(2) has been considered in three cases in 
England.77 In each of these, the principal examiner gave a wide meaning to the 
word therapy, to include preventative as well as curative treatment. As a 
consequence, some of the claims in each case failed because they were held to fall 
within the exclusion in subsection 4(2). 78 This broad interpretation of the exclusion 
could also exclude patent claims for genetic diagnosis and therapy. There is some 
indication that similar legislation may be interpreted differently elsewhere in 
Europe. In Germany, for example, a narrow interpretation of therapy has been 
adopted, thereby allowing claims which were similar to those rejected by the 
English Court.79 
Careful drafting of patent claims can avoid altogether the exclusion in s4(2). 
Subsection 4(3) provides that a product can be treated as being capable of 
industrial application even though it is invented for use in a s4(2) method. Further, 
s2(6) allows for novelty to reside in the use. This allows for patenting of purpose-
limited product claims to known substances for both first and second (or 
subsequent) pharmaceutical uses. 80 Just as patents can be claimed for methods 
embodying excluded discoveries, even when inventive step and novelty reside 
only in the discovery, so too can patents be claimed for products used in excluded 
methods of medical treatment, even when novelty resides only in the method of 
treatment. 
In Australia, the decision in Rescare means that there is now nothing 
intrinsically unpatentable about methods of medical treatment. This makes such 
tortuous leaps of logic as seen in the British legislation and cases unnecessary. The 
stated purpose of the exclusion in s4(2) Patents Act 1977 (UK) is to: 
These are: Unilever Ltd (Davis's) Application [1983] RPC 219; Bayer AG (Meyer's) Application 
[1984] RPC 11; John Wyeth & Brother Ltd's Application [1985] RPC 546. 
78 	This interpretation was approved on appeal by Falconer J in Unilever, [1983] RPC 219 and 
Falconer and Whitsard H  in John Wyeth. [1985] RPC 546. 
79 	Hydropyridine [1984] OJEPO 26, cited in John Wyeth [1985] RPC 546. 
80 	John Wyeth [1985] RPC 546 at 567. 
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"ensure that the use in practice by practitioners of such methods of medical treatment in 
treating patients should not be subjected to possible restraint or restriction by reason of 
any patent monopoly."81 
By allowing patents for known products used in a new method of treatment 
(which would be excluded in Australia after Phi/ips,82 unless a new result is 
created), the effect on practitioners may be felt equally, if not to a greater extent 
than patenting of the methods of medical treatment themselves. 
1.3.3 Exclusion Based on Public Order / Morality: Paragraph 1(3)(a) Patents Act, 
Article 53(a) EPC 
Article 53(a) EPC provides that patents will not be granted where their 
publication or exploitation would be contrary to "ordre publique" or morality. In 
its interpretation of this provision, the European Patent Office Board of Appeal has 
reached a number of favourable decisions for biotechnology patent applicants. 83 
The first case to discuss this provision in some detail in relation to biotechnology 
patents was the application for the Harvard onco-mouse. 84 The application was 
initially refused by the Examining Division of the EP0.85 The President and 
Fellows of Harvard College appealed to the Technical Board of Appea1. 86 The 
Board considered the grounds of sufficiency of disclosure (Article 83 EPC) and 
exceptions to patentability under Article 53(a) and 53(b) (discussed below) and 
concluded that the decision of the Examining Division should be set aside and the 
case be remitted to that Division for reconsideration. The Board emphasised that 
any exceptions to the general rule of patentability in Article 52(1) should be 
narrowly construed. 
In its consideration of Article 53(a) the Board recognised the problems 
associated with genetic manipulation of mammals, particularly in relation to 
81 	Ibid., at 565. 
82 	NV Philips Gloeilampenfabrielcen v Mirabella International Pty Ltd (1995) 32 IPR 449. 
83 	The European Patent Office Board of Appeal's willingness to accept a broad claim in 
Polypeptide Expression/Genentech (Decision T127/85) [1989] OJEPO 275 should be contrasted 
with the English Genentech cases. 
84 	The application was to patent an entire mouse, which had been genetically altered so that it 
had a predisposition to cancer. 
85 	(1989) OJEPO 451. 
86 	Re Harvard College (President and Fellows) (Decision T 19/90) [1990] OJEPO 476. 
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animal suffering and damage to the environment. The Board concluded that this 
exception required a careful balancing exercise between benefit to mankind in 
curing diseases on the one hand and environmental damage and cruelty to 
animals on the other, and that this balancing exercise was the task of the 
Examining Division. In the circumstances of the case the Examining Division 
concluded that the balance swung in favour of benefit to mankind. 87 Opposition 
hearings are presently being heard by the Opposition Division. Arguments being 
raised include: 
• that higher onco-mammals could suffer considerably; 
• that there is considerable risk to the environment; and 
• that the balancing act is misconceived it being inherently immoral to subject 
animals to painful disease. 88 
In Relaxin 89 it was pointed out that the provision was likely to be invoked 
only in rare and extreme cases. Its function was to ensure that patents would not 
be granted for inventions universally regarded as outrageous, the sort of 
inventions that, according to EPO Guidelines, were so abhorrent that the grant of 
patent rights would be inconceivable. One patent application which triggered this 
exclusion was for a transgenic mouse, the purpose of which was as a research tool 
in the study of wool growth and human hair production. 90 
The Relaxin case makes it clear that for the EPO there is nothing inherently 
immoral or contrary to public order in the patenting of human genes. The narrow 
reading of the public order/morality exclusion, and the stated unwillingness of the 
EPO Divisions to get involved in ethical issues makes it unlikely that this 
provision will provide an obstacle in the patenting of most biotechnology 
inventions. 
87 	Grant of European patent no. 0 169 672 (Onco-mouse/Harvard) [1992] OJEPO 588. 
88 	As reported by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Human Tissue Ethical and Legal Issues 
(1995) at 90. 
89 	[1995] OJEPO 388. 
90 	See Nuffield Council, op cit, at 90. 
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1.3.4 Exclusion Based on Biological Processes or Animal or Plant Varieties: Paragraph 
1(3)(b) Patents Act, Article 53(b) EPC 
This provision provides that plant or animal varieties or essentially 
biological processes for the production of plants or animals are not patentable. 
Microbiological processes, or the product of such a process escape this exclusion. 
• Animal or plant varieties: 
Although this exclusion is not directly relevant to the patenting of human 
genetic material, the cases in which it has been argued demonstrate the 
difficulties that can arise in interpreting statutory provisions of this nature. 
In the Onco-mouse case, the Board of Appeal considered that the animal 
varieties exclusion was not intended to cover animals as such. It remitted the 
task of deciding whether the application was for animal varieties to the 
Examining Division. The Examining Division considered that, since the only 
aspect of the patent directed to animals was to non-human mammals or to 
rodents, and since animal variety is a sub-unit of species, Article 53(b) did not 
apply in this respect. The case is currently before the Opposition Division. 
In the interim, the Opposition Division and Board of Appeal has given a 
different interpretation to the provision with respect to plant varieties, 
including in the exclusion plants themselves, as well as plant varieties. 91 In a 
later case, the Opposition Division gave a similar interpretation to this 
provision.92 The precise ambit of this new interpretation remains uncertain. It 
has been suggested that, according to the Technical Board, the plants in 
question had become a variety because they had been genetically modified to 
be herbicide resistant and this trait was distinctive and stable in future 
generations.93 The patent was not bad because the plants claimed "embraced" 
varieties, but because they had become a variety. In Onco-mouse the Board of 
Appeal was careful to point out that plant varieties have another form of 
protection available to them, whereas animal varieties do not. This may be 
91 	Plant Cells/Plant Genetics Systems (Decision T356/93) and (Decision G3/95) [1995] OJEPO 
540. See 374 Nature 8. 
92 	Lubrizol, as reported by Abbott A., "Withdrawal of Patent Claim Leaves Position of Plants 
Unclarified" (1996) 381 Nature 178. 
93 	Roberts, T., "Plant Patent Quagmire" (1996) 381 Nature 642. 
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sufficient to justify a narrower reading of the variety exclusion for animals than 
for plants.94 Since it appears that the main justification for this exclusion is the 
fact that a different form of protection is available for plant varieties, I suggest 
that it is entirely appropriate that claims involving animals should be 
interpreted in a different way from claims involving plants. 
• Essentially biological processes, not microbiological processes and the products 
thereof: 
This provision has been given a very narrow interpretation by the Board of 
Appeal. Technical processes and processes involving microinjection have been 
held to be non-biological or microbiological processes, thereby avoiding the 
exclusion. The types of processes that might be included in the exclusion are 
traditional selective breeding practices.95 Through this narrow interpretation, a 
provision that could have had a profound effect on patenting of genetic 
material in higher organisms will be of minor concern to patentees. 
1.4 The European Biotechnology Directive 
Differences in the interpretation of legislation derived from the EPC 
between member countries and difficulties in the interpretation of the exclusion 
provisions indicate that there is still a great deal of uncertainty and lack of 
uniformity in the issue of patenting of biotechnological inventions across Europe. 96 
In 1988 the European Commission proposed a Directive to establish clear 
standards for the legal protection of biotechnological inventions. 97 The 
Commission believed that the proposed Directive was necessary to provide 
authoritative guidance for the problems presented in national patent law arising 
with respect to biotechnological inventions and which are not directly addressed 
by such laws. 
94 	Plant varieties are also protected through the UPOV Convention. Note that Australia is a 
signatory to the Paris Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 1961, and enacted 
the Plant Variety Rights Act in 1987 to satisfy its obligations under that Convention. 
95 	Nuffield Council, at 93. 
96 	Some of the implications of this uncertainty and lack of uniformity are discussed by Maher, 
L. "The Patent Environment: Domestic and European Community Frameworks for 
Biotechnology" (1992) 33 Jurimetrics Journal 67-132. 
97 	Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal 
Protection of Biotechnological Inventions (1988). 
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The main goal of the Directive was harmonisation of standards for 
protecting biotechnological inventions, but such harmonisation has proved 
difficult, if not illusory. The issue was complicated by the fact that at the same time 
as the European Parliament was considering the proposed directive, the EPO was 
hearing the application for the Harvard onco-mouse as well as a number of other 
contentious patent claims. The decision of the Board of Appeal in the Onco-mouse 
case provoked outrage in the European Parliament and considerably delayed 
agreement on the Directive. A common position was reached by the European 
Commission in February, 1994.98 Since then a number of reviews of the Directive 
were made and major changes were proposed, including an absolute ban on 
patenting human genes and gene therapies on which much current 
medical/pharmaceutical research is based. Although the biotechnology industry 
agreed to a number of conditions, it was unwilling to allow terms which would 
prevent isolated human genes from being patented. Environmental representatives 
on the European Parliament, in contrast, would not allow the Directive to pass 
without such provisions. At that stage, a number of commentators expressed 
doubt that there would ever be a Biotechnology Directive and whether it would be 
worth having in this form. 99 Their fears were confirmed in 1995, when the 
European Parliament voted 240 to 180 to abandon the Directive altogether. 100 
Attempts have since been made to resurrect the Directive. The European 
Commission published an amended version in late 1995. This must be approved 
by both the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The modified 
Directive still considers isolated genes and living organisms to be patentable. 101 It 
appears that the process of isolation will be enough to confer the necessary 
inventiveness, even though the isolated material may be identical to that existing 
98 	European Commission, Common Position of the Council of 7 February 1994 on the Proposal for a 
Council and European Parliament Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, 
Statement of the Council's Reasons (1994). 
99 	Nott, R., "The Proposed EC Directive for Biotechnological Inventions" (1994) 5 European 
Intellectual Property Review 191-194; Dickson, D., "European Patent Directive in Critical Test 
over Genes" (1994) 372 Nature 310; Butler, D., "Patents Stalemate on Biotechnology" (1994) 
372 Nature 393. 
100 	Coghlan, A., "Europe Kills of Patents on Life" (1995) New Scientist 11 March, 7. 
101 	Abbott, A., "European Proposal Reopens Debate over Patenting of Human Genes" (1995) 
378 Nature 756. 
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in nature. 102 If the Directive is adopted, European law will be parallel with that in 
the USA, both allowing for patenting of isolated but unmodified natural materials. 
It is uncertain at present if Australia will take the same position. Given the strong 
anti-patenting lobby within the European Parliament, it must be seen as unlikely 
that there will be endorsement of the Directive in its existing form. 
The initial rejection of the Directive by the European Parliament was seen 
by a number of commentators as a rejection of patenting of genes. However, this is 
not the effect: there is nothing in European Patent Convention that explicitly 
prevents patenting of genes and the interpretation of Article 53(a) in Relaxin 
indicates that nor is there any implicit exclusion. The aim of the Directive is to 
provide much needed clarification as to the extent to which genes are patentable. It 
would be unfortunate if this aim could not be achieved. 
1.5 The Need for Exclusions in the Australian Legislation 
The lack of a unified policy on patenting across the European Community 
and difficulties in the interpretation of the exclusion provisions makes an analysis 
of the value of express exclusions difficult. Perhaps the main lesson from the 
European experience is that if exclusions are to be included in the legislation they 
must be framed very carefully to avoid ambiguities in their interpretation. The 
effectiveness of the Australian manner of manufacture test and case law exclusions 
in dealing with biotechnology patents will only become clear once a number of 
cases have been decided in the area. There are obvious parallels in the Australian 
case law and European statutory exclusions. Both offer the possibility of excluding 
a range of matters associated with human genetic research. In practice, there 
would appear to be little difference in the interpretation of either form of 
exclusion, the tendency being to give both a narrow reading. In addition, both the 
Australian and European legislation include provision for public policy 
considerations. There is a marked reluctance of the courts and Patent Offices to 
enter into such debates. As such, current patent law provides little in the way of 
express impediments to patenting of human genetic information and its 
applications. However, the other patenting criteria may provide obstacles to 
patenting that are particularly difficult to overcome in this field. 
102 	Grace, M., "A Matter of Life and Death" (1996) New Scientist 27 July, 60. 
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Part 2: 	Novelty and Human Genetic Research 
Similar arguments to those raised against the manner of manufacture 
provision could also be used in relation to lack of novelty: gene sequences form 
part of the prior art base because they already exist. Generally, this argument has 
not been held to be sufficient to deny novelty for two main reasons, which are best 
exemplified by reference to the Relaxin case103. First, the Opposition Division of the 
EPO held that, since the DNA fragments claimed in the patent were all cDNAs, 
they fulfilled the novelty requirement because they were different from the 
naturally occurring DNA sequences coding for the same polypeptides. Secondly, 
even if the claim included genomic DNA fragments it was held that the requisite 
novelty may still be present. Article 54(1) EPC provides that an invention is 
considered to be new if it does not form part of the state of the art, and Article 
45(2) defines the state of the art as comprising everything made available to the 
public. The parties agreed that even though the form of relaxin claimed in the 
patent existed in nature it was unknown prior to the invention and therefore had 
not been made available to the public. Further, it was established patent practice 
for a natural substance that had been isolated for the first time and was previously 
unknown to fulfil the novelty requirement. 
In many instances, the value of recombinant DNA technology is in 
producing useable quantities of previously known products. Tissue plasminogen 
activator, claimed in Genentech is but one example. 104 In such situations both the 
product and the process used to produce it are known. How, then, can the claims 
be novel? The courts have recognised this difficulty, which particularly pertains to 
biotechnology patents, and have modified the novelty requirement accordingly. It 
has been said that to distort the novelty requirement in this way "is arguably to 
trivialise the concept to the point where it hardly constitutes a credible criterion for 
103 	[1995] OJEPO 388. 
104 	Other notable examples are Factor VIII:C and erythropoietin. The US patents that were 
claimed for both of these recombinant products have been the subject of extensive litigation 
because patents already existed for the naturally produced products. The recombinant 
products were held to infringe the patents on the naturally produced products in Scripps Clinic 
and Research Foundation v Genentech 666 F.Supp. 1379 (1987) and Amgen Inc v Chugai 
Pharmaceutical Co 706 F.Supp.94 (1989), although both of these decisions were subsequently 
reversed on other grounds. 
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the grant of patent protection." 105 Ultimately, of course, the judiciary is making a 
policy decision by weighing the need to encourage investment in this area of 
research against the need to make that research available to the public. In 
Genentech, mustill U explicitly recognised this tension in patent law, but cautioned 
the courts against embarking on major judicial legislation. 106 For his Lordship the 
task was to understand and apply the Act, leaving it to the legislature to repair 
flaws in the regime. In general, patent legislation appears to have been interpreted 
to ensure that the balance swings in favour of encouraging investment, unless the 
monopoly claimed is obviously out of line with the merit of the invention. This 
was held to be the case in Genentech, and in such circumstances the courts have 
found ways of interpreting the patenting requirements to restrict or deny 
monopoly rights. 
As with the other patenting requirements, it is necessary to look to other 
jurisdictions to assess how the Australian provisions might apply to biotechnology 
patents. Again, a number of decisions in the English courts and EPO provide some 
instructions. The analysis will be framed in the form of two questions: where and 
how much disclosure? 
2.1 Where Should Novelty Reside? 
Inroads have been made into the novelty criterion in at least three 
identifiable areas in Europe, by varying the site of the novelty inquiry. These are: 
in the discovery or the invention; in the product or the method of medical 
treatment; and in the product, the process or the purpose. 
2.1.1 In the Discovery or the Invention? 
Genentech and subsequent cases make it clear that, even though discoveries 
are not patentable, novelty can reside in the discovery provided that it is the 
method or product embodying the discovery that is being claimed (see above, at 
1.3.1). 
105 	Thomson, J.A., Biopatenting the Splice of Life: A Consideration of the Interface between 
Biotechnological Inventions and Patent Law (1994) Ph.D. Thesis, University of Western 
Australia, at 146. 
106 	[1989] RPC 147, at 259. 
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2.1.2 In the Product or the Method of Medical Treatment? 
Subsection 2(6) Patents Act (UK) expressly provides that even if the 
invention of a substance or composition for use in a method of treatment excluded 
through s4(2) is part of the state of the art, the invention can still be patented if 
novelty can be shown to reside in the use (see above at 1.3.2). John Wyeth followed 
the European authority of Eisai, 107 in its consideration of the novelty requirement 
for Swiss-type use claims. These types of claims are framed in such a way to allow 
for patenting of inventions directed to second or subsequent medical uses of 
known products. 108  In Eisai it was held that the requisite novelty could be found in 
the new use for product claims to a known substance or composition both when a 
first therapeutic use is claimed and also when second or subsequent uses are 
claimed. 
2.1.3 In the Product, the Process or the Purpose? 
In the European case of Mobil 109 it was held to be sufficient for novelty to 
reside in the purpose to which a compound had been put when both the product 
and the process were already known. According to Lord Hoffmann in Merrell Dow, 
purpose novelty as applied in Mobil requires that the new purpose for which an 
old compound is used in an old way is interpreted as being a "functional technical 
feature" of the invention. He went on to question whether this part of the decision 
in Mobil applied in the UK. 
These three aspects of the "where" question considerably reduce the potency 
of the novelty criterion, by allowing for novelty to reside in areas of the invention 
other than the patent claims. In some respects this may have a detrimental effect 
on research and development, particularly where methods embodying discoveries 
are framed very broadly, as was attempted in Genentech. On the other hand the 
change in focus of the novelty requirement for inventions embodying second or 
subsequent therapeutic uses and new purposes arguably may encourage further 
research because it prevents single patents from dominating entire fields. But this 
will only be beneficial in terms of encouraging competition if the holder of the 
product patent is willing to licence its use widely. If the patentee refuses to licence, 
107 	Re Eisai Co Ltd (Decision G05/83) [1985] OJEPO 64, cited in John Wyeth [1985] RPC 546. 
108 	See John Wyeth [1985] RPC 546, at 565. 
109 	Mobil/Friction reducing additive (Decision G02/88) [1990] EPOR 73 referred to in Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals Inc v NH Norton & Co Ltd (1996) 33 rPR 1, at 13. 
198 
and continues to carry on research exclusively it will eventually gain patent 
coverage over the field. This would have been a most effective strategy in the 
Merrell Dow case, discussed below. If Merrell Dow had succeeded in enforcing its 
patent on the acid metabolite of an antihistamine drug, it would have effectively 
increased the life of its expired patent on the drug itself, because others using the 
drug would inevitably have infringed the patent on the metabolite. 
It is doubtful whether any of these interpretations would be followed in 
Australia for a number of reasons: 
• the first and second considerations rely very much on statutory interpretation 
of the specific discovery and medical use provisions in the EPC and Patents Act 
(UK), which have no equivalents in the Australian legislation; 
• the decision in Rewire110 indicates that methods of medical treatment are 
patentable, thereby negating any requirement for Swiss-type claims; and 
• it is doubtful whether either the second or third considerations can apply in 
Australia after the Philips case. 111 The High Court made it clear that if, on the 
face of the specification, the claim is for a new use of an old product, the 
application will not even pass the first hurdle of being an invention. 
Until new interpretations become available, it should be assumed that 
novelty must reside in the thing being claimed, whether that be a new product or 
new process. Australian courts may well eventually come up with their own 
idiosyncratic interpretations of the novelty criterion, based on policy decisions as 
to the extent to which patenting should be allowed in the area of biotechnology. 
2.2 How Much Prior Disclosure Is Required? 
The second issue that must be assessed is the extent of prior disclosure that 
is required to prove want of novelty. Australian law requires that all of the 
essential integers of the invention are disclosed. 112 According to the decision of the 
House of Lords in Asahi , 113 however, for the prior art to anticipate an invention as 
required in the Patents Act 1977 (UK), a mere disclosure is not enough. The 
disclosure must be enabling. To understand the holding in Asahi it is necessary to 
explain some of the facts. Asahi claimed a patent for human tissue necrosis factor 
110 	Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 28 IPR 383. 
111 	NV Philips Gloeilampenfabrielcen v Mirabella International Pty Ltd (1995) 32 IPR 449. 
112 	See Chapter 2, section 4.2. 
113 	Asahi Kasei Kogyo KK's Application [1991] RPC 485. 
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produced by recombinant DNA technology. It first filed an application in the USA 
on 6/4/84 and filed in the UK on 4/4/85. It claimed priority from the US 
application. A competitor had filed an application in Japan on 6/3/84 and a 
European application on 26/2/85. A number of assumptions were made in the 
appeal: 
• that claims 2 and 3 of the 26/2/85 application disclosed methods of preparing 
the products claimed by Asahi; 
• that the products disclosed in those claims were also disclosed in the 6/3/84 
application but the methods for preparing them were not; and 
• that the UK application was entitled to the US priority date of 6/4/84. 
The court had to decide whether, on the basis of these assumptions, the 
subject matter disclosed in the claims was part of the state of the art at the US 
priority date. The relevant prior art base was the 6/3/84 patent, which did not 
disclose the method for producing the products. Thus the ultimate question was 
whether, to form part of the state of the art, a disclosure has to include the method 
of working the invention. If the question was answered affirmatively then the 
patent would not be bad for want of novelty. Lord Oliver held that the invention 
was the combination of the formula for the compounds claimed and the means for 
making them. The 26/2/85 application could not claim the 6/3/84 priority for the 
totality of the invention claimed, but only for the formula. Lord Oliver made it 
clear that disclosure of a formula is not enough for a matter to be made available to 
the public unless the method of working it is so self evident as to require no 
explanation. Consequently, where the prior art is solely in the form of published 
information, an enabling disclosure is required. 
This decision followed the reasoning of Falconer J in Genentech Inc's (Human 
Growth Hormone) Patent. 114 Falconer J applied the judgments of Lord Westbury in 
Hills v Evans 115 and Lord Reid in Van der Lely N.V. v Bamfords Ltd 116 and other 
recent cases to posit the requirement for an enabling disclosure. Other authorities 
also supported the contention that the same enabling disclosure requirement 
applies to claims to new chemical compounds, and hence to proteins and DNA 
sequences. This decision signifies that for prior disclosure by publication it is not 
enough that the product is identified, the method of producing it must also be 
described. 
114 	[1989] RPC 613. 
115 	(1862) 31 LJCh 457. 
116 	[1963] RPC 61. 
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A more recent House of Lords decision throws further light on the novelty 
criterion with respect to anticipation both by publication and by use. In Merrell 
Dow v Norton 117 the patent in issue was for an acid metabolite of an antihistamine 
drug which was inevitably formed in the patient's liver after taking the drug. 
Merrell Dow owned the patent on the metabolite and had owned the patent on the 
drug, but this had expired. It claimed that other companies which had started to 
manufacture the drug were infringing the patent on the metabolite. At trial Aldous 
J held that the patent was invalid and this decision was affirmed by both the Court 
of Appeal and the House of Lords. Counsel opposing the patent argued that the 
metabolite was anticipated because volunteers in the trial for the drug had taken 
the drug and therefore made the metabolite inside their own bodies, even though 
this use did not instruct on the nature of the product or the process for making it. 
Lord Hoffmann, with whom the other Lords agreed, held that the fact that 
something had been done before was insufficient to have made the invention 
available to the public. On the other hand, with respect to disclosure by 
publication, it was held that the disclosure in the patent for the drug was sufficient 
to anticipate the claim to the metabolite. This was so even though the chemical 
structure of the metabolite had not been disclosed. What is required is a 
description sufficient to work the invention. Where "the recipe which inevitably 
produces the substance is part of the state of the art, so is the substance as made by 
that recipe." 118 
Thus, in England, the disclosure must show the method that will inevitably 
produce the product claimed, but it need not identify the chemical structure of the 
product. It is not sufficient to identify the chemical structure, without the means 
for producing it. Merrell Dow further denies anticipation by use for the 
manufacture of a product in the human body without instructions on the method 
of production. If the Court had decided otherwise a major impediment to 
biotechnology patents could have been created, in that a patent could not be 
claimed for a protein or gene isolated from the human body, because it would 
always have been made before. Merrell Dow can therefore be seen as indirectly 
affirming the proposition that a product of nature isolated for the first time is 
patentable, because, even though the product existed before, no instructions were 
available on how to produce it. But it also says that even if the chemical structure 
of a product is identified for the first time there will be no novelty if the recipe for 
117 	Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc v NH Norton & Co Ltd (1996) IPR 1. 
118 	Ibid., at 11. 
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producing it is already known. This suggests that identification of the DNA or 
amino acid sequence required to produce a particular protein will not be 
patentable if the method of production is already known. At issue is how much of 
the recipe must be known for it to "inevitably produce" the product. Although 
standard recombinant DNA techniques are known to those skilled in the art, the 
particular recipe for producing that specific DNA or amino acid sequence may not 
be. Slight modifications in the recipe may be enough to create novelty. 
In Australia, the language of enabling disclosure rarely appears in decisions 
addressing the novelty criterion. Even so, Hills v Evans and Van der Lely appear to 
have been accepted as good law in Australia, suggesting that the disclosure must 
not only identify the product but must teach how to produce it.119 Lockhart J in 
Nicaro Holdings stated that: 
"The prior art must enable the notional skilled addressee at once to perceive and 
understand and be able practically to apply the discovery without the necessity of 
making further experiments." 120 
Thus, unlike the "where" question, there is no reason to suppose that the question 
of how much disclosure is required should be answered differently in Australia 
than in England. 
In summary, on its face, the novelty requirement has the capability of 
restricting patenting of inventions associated with human genetic research, either 
because the inventions are products of nature that are already in existence, or 
because recombinant DNA processes are now standard and well known by those 
skilled in the field, or because the end products are often already known. On 
interpretation of the novelty requirement, however, the English and European 
cases indicate that: 
• the requirement for an enabling disclosure means that products of nature, 
although already in existence, will not destroy the novelty of an invention; 
• for a prior publication to destroy novelty it must disclose the method of 
producing the invention, since disclosure of the formula or sequence of itself is 
not sufficient either to destroy or to create novelty; 
• if novelty is allowed to reside in aspects of the invention other than in the 
claims themselves, inventions including known products or using known 
processes can still be novel. 
119 	For example, in Nicaro Holdings Pty Ltd v Martin Engineering Co (1990) 16 IPR 545. 
120 	Ibid., at 549. 
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It is presently unclear whether the novelty criterion will be interpreted in 
the same way in Australia as in Europe. With respect to the last point, the 
judgment of the High Court in PhilipS121 would suggest that a more restrictive 
interpretation may be imposed, requiring that the things claimed must themselves 
possess the requisite novelty. 
Part 3: 	Inventive Step and Human Genetic Research 
Of all of the patenting criteria, it is most difficult to come to any definitive 
conclusions as to the patentability of inventions arising out of human genetic 
research with respect to the inventive step requirement. This is because inventive 
step is always a question of fact, to be determined with reference to the available 
evidence. Hunting out genes using recombinant DNA technology will often 
require a high level of skill and years of dedicated research. At the same time, 
however, that technology is now the standard method for locating, identifying and 
synthetically manufacturing genes. It is difficult to say with any degree of certainty 
what will be required to change a skilful piece of work into an inventive one. Some 
guidance can be obtained from the judgment of the House of Lords in Biogen v 
Medeva. 122 Lord Hoffmann identified three categories of inventive step which 
would arise out of the addition of an inventive idea to the existing stock of 
knowledge: 
• using established techniques to do something no one had previously thought of 
doing, the inventive idea being the doing of the new thing; 
• finding a new way of doing something that people had wanted to do but didn't 
know how, the inventive idea being the way of achieving the goal; or 
• solving a particular problem that stood in the way of achieving a known goal 
by means that were generally known, the inventive idea being in solving the 
problem. 123 
3.1 Formulation of the Test 
There is little uniformity in the cases as to what will constitute an inventive 
step. Just because an invention is held to be obvious in one case, it does not follow 
that a similar type of invention will be obvious in subsequent cases. There is 
121 	NV Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken v Mirabella International Pty Ltd (1995) 32 IPR 449. 
122 	Biogen Inc v Medeva Plc (1996) Unreported Judgment of the House of Lords 31 October 1996. 
123 	Ibid., at 4-5. 
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considerable reluctance on the part of the judiciary to lay down a set of fixed 
criteria with which to assess the inventiveness of a particular claim. Lord Diplock 
in Johns-Manville Corp's Patent, 124 for example, commented on the lack of 
desirability in formulating a precise definition by which to measure obviousness. 
There is some justification for this; obviousness is and will always be a jury-type 
question dependent on the unique facts of the case at hand. Even so, the lack of 
criteria decreases the certainty of the patent system. Challenges to the validity of 
patents are expensive. The lack of certainty in the obviousness criteria increases 
the expense of the process for two reasons. First, this ground is unlikely to be 
pleaded alone but will have a range of other grounds added to it. Secondly, even 
where there are other legitimate grounds obviousness will almost invariably be 
tacked on. The final outcome may be that patentees and competitors come to 
reasonable licence agreements rather than risking infringement or revocation 
proceedings. But this does nothing to clarify the law and may allow invalid 
patents to be enforced. 
Various formulations exist to aid the courts in their analysis of the question 
of obviousness. In England the test was broken down into four factual steps in 
Windsurfing International Inc v Tabur Marine (GB) Ltd: 
1.Identify the inventive concept in the patent. 
2. Determine the common general knowledge of the normally skilled but 
unimaginative addressee. 
3. Identify what, if any, differences exist between the matter cited as being known 
or used and the alleged invention. 
4. Determine whether, without any knowledge of the alleged invention, the 
differences constitute inventive or obvious steps to the skilled man. 125 
The Windsurfing formulation is still good law in England. 126 The EPO 
focuses on a slightly different formulation: 
1.Identify the closest prior art. 
2. Formulate the technical problem which the invention sets out to solve, using 
objectively established facts derived from the available prior art. 
124 	[1967] RPC 479, at 493-494. 
125 	[1985] RPC 59, at 73-74. 
126 	See, for example, Aldous J's judgment in Chiron Corporation v Organon Teknika Ltd (No 3) 
[1994] FSR 202. 
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3. Determine the obviousness or otherwise of the invention. 127 
Whatever formulation is chosen, the last step, although easy to state, is the most 
difficult for the courts to evaluate. 
3.2 Is a New Product Enough? 
As with novelty, a patent will not be declared invalid solely because the 
chemical formula of the product claimed is obvious. It must also be obvious how 
to produce or obtain the product. 128 At issue is whether non-obviousness of the 
formula itself will be enough to count as an inventive step. For Lord Diplock in 
American Cyanamid 129 the grant of a temporary monopoly by these means is 
justified when a new and useful product is made. The outcome may be different 
when the final product is known to those skilled in the art. This was the situation 
in Genentech, where, according to Purchas LJ: 
"[i]t was certainly obvious that t-PA would consist of a collection of amino acids 
associated with some kind of defined molecular structure: but it was not known at the 
material date what that structure was." 13° 
A number of decisions of the EPO suggest that novelty of the product is 
enough to found inventiveness per se. In the Relaxin case, for example, lack of 
inventive step was argued in opposition to the grant of the patent on the basis that 
the claimed DNA fragments were not novel and conventional techniques were 
used in their isolation. Since the DNA fragments were held to be novel, this was 
said to be enough to satisfy the inventive step requirement. It was enough to 
provide "to the public for the first time a product whose existence was previously 
unknown." 131 The consequence of such decisions is that if a product is found to be 
novel, it will also be held to be non-obvious. Thomson has questioned whether it 
could really have been the intention of the legislature that the satisfaction of one 
patenting criterion should automatically satisfy a second criterion which has 
127 	As set out by Leonard, A., 'The European Approach to Inventive Step in Pharmaceutical 
Patents" Internet site: http: / /biotechlaw.arinet/leonard.html. 
128 	Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v Genzyme Ltd [1993] FSR 716, at 724. 
129 	American Cyanamid Co (Dann's) Patent [1971] RPC 425. 
130 	Genentech Inc's Patent [1989] RPC 147, at 214. 
131 	Relaxin [1995] OJEPO 388, para 4.6.1. 
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traditionally been more difficult to satisfy. 132 Such decisions do indeed seem to be 
relaxing the patenting criteria too far. 
It is not at all evident from English decisions that the same leniency will be 
given to the interpretation of the inventive step requirement. The mere fact that the 
product claimed in the patent is new will not be sufficient without some clear 
evidence of inventiveness. In cases like Genentech it is always going to be difficult 
to determine whether the work performed required an inventive step or mere skill 
and persistence. The requisite person skilled in the art is likely to be a team of 
highly qualified Ph.D.-level scientists with considerable intellectual capacity. What 
is inventive to such a team will be quite different from what would normally be 
inventive to the public, or indeed the judge, who must, nevertheless, place him- or 
herself in the position of that team. Purchas LJ in Genentech commented that this 
highlighted the artificiality of importing notions of obviousness into areas of high 
technology. In undertaking the task before him, his Lordship stated that prospects 
of success or commercial motivation should not be the focus of inquiry. The real 
question was whether a non-inventive skilled person would have made the 
discovery within a reasonable time frame. The fact that a number of highly skilled 
teams had spent a considerable amount of time trying to isolate the data suggested 
to Purchas LJ that it could not have been obvious. Further, he did not think it fair 
to the patentee or those in the field to deny the presence of an inventive step. 
Dillon and Must!! LJJ did not agree with this reasoning. For Dillon LJ all of 
the steps taken by Genentech were applications of known technology, none of 
which was, by itself, inventive. The particular line of research was also obvious. 
And for Mustill IJ even though the fact that competitors have not been able to 
produce the invention may strongly suggest that it was not obvious, winning the 
race was not enough. Nor was a low prospect of success. Mustill LJ considered 
that on the facts of the case, skill and persistence would have been enough, and 
skill is not the same as inventiveness. 
On the same facts Whitford J at trial and Purchas LJ on appeal held that 
there was an inventive step. Dillon and Mustill Lll held that there was not. Can 
any guidance be obtained from the cases as to how future issues of obviousness 
may be decided? In many instances the test can be formulated as whether the 
invention was "obvious to try", but this will not be appropriate in all 
132 	Thomson, J., "The Grey Penumbra of Interpretation Surrounding the Obviousness Test for 
Biotech Patents" [1996] 2 European Intellectual Property Review 90, at 91. 
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circumstances. 133 What is required for something to be "obvious to try" has itself 
become a matter for conjecture. In Genentech (Human Growth Hormone) Falconer J 
accepted the contention of counsel opposing the patent, that the invention will be 
obvious if 
"the suitable addressee would consider it worth trying from a number of possible 
alternatives ... because there is some reasonable expectation that one might get a good 
result') 
On the facts, his Honour held that on this test the necessary scintilla of invention 
was in fact present. 
Biogen adds a further layer to the inventive step requirement. For Hobhouse 
LJ a mere business assessment to pursue an identified goal by known means is not 
an inventive step. 135 There must be some element of novel insight or discovery, 
and in that particular case those elements were lacking. The House of Lords 
disagreed with the Court of Appeal on this point, stating that it is irrelevant that a 
commercial decision was made to pursue a particular experimental strategy. 136 
Accordingly, "[a]n inventor need not pursue his experiments untouched by 
thoughts of gain".137 
Ultimately the matter appears to be decided primarily on the basis of 
characterisation of the inventive concept in step 1 of the Windsurfing test.138 If the 
concept is cast in broad terms it may be easy, with the aid of expert witnesses, to 
prove that it was obvious. If the concept is too narrow, it will not justify the claims 
made in the patent. The Biogen case provides a useful example of these differing 
effects. Aldous J in the Patents Court defined the inventive concept as the idea "to 
express a polypeptide displaying antigen specificity in a suitable host". For 
Hobhouse LI' in the Court of Appeal this broad concept was obvious. Lord 
Hoffman in the House of Lords agreed that this concept was obvious, but stated 
that the more accurate concept was to "express unsequenced eukaryotic DNA in a 
prokaryotic host". This was not obvious, although it was ultimately held to be 
insufficient to support the claims made in the patent. 
133 	See Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v Genzyme Ltd [1993] FSR 716, at 723. 
134 	Genentech Inc's (Human Growth Hormone) Patent [1989] RPC 613, at 671. 
135 	Biogen Inc v Medeva Plc [1995] FSR 4. 
136 	Unreported judgment of the House of Lords, handed down on 31 October 1996, at 16. 
137 	Ibid. 
138 	[1985] RPC 59, at 73-74. 
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3.3 The Position in Australia 
In the UK Chiron case at first instance139 Aldous J appeared to place much 
greater reliance on the expert witnesses for Chiron than on those opposing the 
patent. This was enough to persuade Aldous J that the invention was not obvious. 
The matter was not raised on appeal. Given that the invention was held to be non-
obvious in England, it seems surprising that Murex raised the same obviousness 
question in Australia. The solicitor advising Murex believed that it was 
worthwhile to raise the issue again. The out of court settlement suggests that the 
patent was likely to have been held to be invalid, and, although the ground for 
invalidity is unknown, it may well be that Burchett J would have declared the 
invention to be obvious. Although the patent claims are to the same invention in 
both cases, the focus of inquiry with respect to the knowledge of the skilled man in 
the field at the time of the invention is different. The Australian case would have 
been decided on the basis of obviousness requirements in the 1952 Act. As such, 
only the common general knowledge is relevant. 140 But it is the common general 
knowledge of the skilled person in Australia,141 which may be quite different from 
the common general knowledge in England. A number of Australian scientists are 
particularly skilled in this area, and it may be that at the time of the invention their 
knowledge of the technology was superior to that of the equivalent skilled person 
in England. Much would have depended on the weight given by Burchett J to the 
expert evidence of the Chiron and Murex witnesses. On this basis, if the case had 
gone to a decision, and it had been different from the decisions in England, it 
would have been because of evidentiary matters and not because of differences in 
the law itself. 
What, then, can be said of the inventive step requirement in relation to 
human genetic research? The decisions of the EPO that have allowed the inventive 
step to be satisfied for mere novelty of product . stand in stark contrast with the 
judgment of Dillon LJ in Genentech, who refused to accept the presence of an 
inventive step where the product was known and standard recombinant DNA 
technology was used. Recombinant DNA technology is now the obvious first 
choice for the production of all biological products in industrially useful 
139 	Chiron Corporation v Organon Teknika Ltd (No. 3) [1994] FSR 202. 
140 	See Chapter 2, section 4.3. In Britain obviousness is assessed on the basis of all information 
that has been made available to the public. 
141 	W.R. Grace v Asahi Kasei Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha (1993) AIPC 190-974. 
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quantities. It would hardly be seen as a desirable result if this were to mean that 
experimental use of this technology to isolate and produce medically and 
economically important compounds was routinely denied patent protection 
because the technology of itself was obvious. On the other hand, it is equally as 
undesirable to grant broad patent protection for the discovery of gene sequences, 
because all future use of those sequences could fall within the ambit of the patent. 
Part 4: 	Specification Requirements and Human Genetic Research 
4.1 Enablement and Living Material 
The fact that many inventions involved in human genetic research include 
living matter create particular problems in relation to specification requirements. 
These have been solved to a large extent for inventions involving microorganisms 
as a result of the Budapest Treaty142 and other national provisions. These generally 
require that microorganisms are deposited in prescribed depositary institutions on 
or before the date of filing. Section 6 Patents Act 1990 sets out the Australian 
deposit requirements. Provided these are complied with, the invention will be 
taken to comply with the requirement in paragraph 40 (2) (a) that the specification 
fully describe the invention, including the best method for performing it. 143 
Uncertainties remain, however, as to how the specification requirements are to be 
fulfilled for inventions involving higher organisms. There is as yet no provision to 
deposit higher organisms, nor is it clear how they could be stored and maintained. 
4.2 Specification Requirements in European Legislation 
4.2.1 Fair basis 
Caution is required in interpreting European case law because the 
provisions in relation to specification requirements are substantially different to 
those in Australia. 144 Section 72 Patents Act 1977 (UK) provides the grounds for 
revocation of a patent. Failure to fulfil specification requirements can only be 
challenged on ground (1)(c) that "the specification of the patent does not disclose 
the invention clearly enough and completely enough for it to be performed by a 
142 	Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purpose 
of Patent Procedure 1977. 
143 	Subsection 41(1). 
144 	The Australian specification requirements were discussed in Chapter 2 at 4.2. 
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person skilled in the art." 145 The matters to be considered by the Patent Office at 
the examination stage are set out in section 14. These include the equivalent of the 
revocation ground 72(1)(c) in subsection 14(3) and also s14(5)(c), which provides 
that the claim must be supported by the description. Paragraph 14(5)(c) replaces 
the old fair basing requirement in the 1949 Act. 146 
Because the examination requirement in s14(5)(c) is not a ground for 
revocation,147 it would appear on the face of the statute that a patent cannot be 
challenged in revocation proceedings on the ground that the claims are not 
supported by the description in the specification, even if it should have been 
rejected at the examination stage on this basis. 148 There is some indication, 
however, that the courts are able to get around this omission, which could 
otherwise significantly increase the potential for widening patent protection in that 
if a broad claim survived the examination procedure there could be no further 
challenge to it on the basis that it was not supported by the description. In Biogen v 
Medeva, the English Court of Appeal referred to a number of provisions in the UK 
Act, as well as the Protocol attached to the EPC. Paragraph 72(1)(a) provides the 
ground for revocation that the invention is not a patentable invention, and s125(1) 
indicates that the invention is that which is specified in the claim as interpreted by 
the description in the specification. The Protocol requires that, in interpreting 
Article 69 (the EPC equivalent to s125 in the UK Act), the preferred construction 
should be that which "combines a fair protection for the patentee with a reasonable 
degree of certainty for third parties". Accordingly, the Court of Appeal asserted 
that: 
"These provisions of the Convention and the Act, although directly relating to the 
ascertainment of the extent of the monopoly granted by a patent, confirm the necessary 
relationship between the claimed monopoly and the description of the invention and do 
not support any intent by the draftsman that such considerations should cease to be 
relevant or that restrictive interpretations should be put on other parts of the Convention 
or the Act. ... [A]ccount must be taken of the whole of the description in the 
specification." 149 
In consequence, 
145 	Paragraph 72(1)(c): insufficiency. 
146 	In s32(1)(i). 
147 	As stated by the Court of Appeal in Genentech [1989] RPC 147 and affirmed in Biogen v 
Medeva [1995] FSR 4 and Chiron v Murex [1996] FSR 153. 
148 	See Mustill IJ in Genentech Inc's Patent [1989] RPC 147, at 260 -261. 
149 	Biogen v Medeva [1995] FSR 4, at 30. 
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"No claim can be valid unless it is a claim to an invention and the invention has to be an 
invention described in the specification." 150 
Thus, using all its skills in statutory interpretation the Court of Appeal has found a 
means to examine the extent to which the description in the specification supports 
the claims even though there is no express statutory authority to do so. The 
validity of this interpretation was not discussed in the opinion of the House of 
Lords. For Lord Hoffmann, the general principle expressed by the notion of fair 
basis could be given effect to through the sufficiency requirement in s72(1)(c). 
Therefore it cannot yet be said with certainty that the interpretation of s72 
presented by the Court of Appeal is a legitimate form of inquiry under English 
law. 
Resolution of the issue of fair basis was critical to Biogen's case, because it 
was claiming the priority date of an earlier patent (referred to as Biogen 1). 
Through its application of the above interpretation the Court was in effect making 
a determination as to whether the invention claimed in the later patent was fairly 
based on Biogen 1. The problem faced by Biogen was that it wanted to make a 
product claim to a recombinant DNA molecule displaying antigen specificity to 
the hepatitis B virus, but the virus possessed genes for two antigens (HBsAg and 
HBcAg), not one. If Biogen had been able to make a process claim, this would have 
covered any product made by the process, but it was held not to have invented a 
process. What it sought to do instead was to make the product claim as wide as 
possible by claiming any recombinant DNA molecule displaying antigen 
specificity to the hepatitis B virus. In doing so it was held to have claimed the two 
separate inventions, and one of these (for HBsAg) was not supported by the 
description in Biogen 1. 
42.2 Sufficiency 
Even if the above interpretation of the Patents Act 1977 (UK) is not accepted 
by other courts, 151 broad claims can still be challenged through the sufficiency 
requirement in s14(3). Insufficiency is also a legitimate ground for revocation 
150 	Ibid., at 32. 
151 	This issue of whether the claims were supported by the description was not raised as a 
ground for revocation in the later Court of Appeal case of Chiron Corp v Murex Diagnostics 
Ltd(No. 12) [1996] FSR 153. 
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through s72(1)(c). The focus of inquiry is whether the disclosure in the 
specification was enabling. 152 In the House of Lords decision in Biogen, Lord 
Hoffman saw that the concept of enabling disclosure was central to the law of 
patents and was crucial at three different levels: determination of priority date; 
determination of validity of the patent at examination; and as a ground for 
revocation. Although there is no express requirement for an enabling disclosure in 
section 72, for his Lordship it is incorporated because it is a matter of substance 
and not form.153 Thus the issue for the courts to decide is what constitutes an 
enabling disclosure. 
It was held in Mii/n/ycke154 that the sufficiency provision does not require 
that all possible embodiments of the invention can be made by the skilled 
addressee. In that case Morritt U claimed to be affirming the decision of the 
Technical Board of Appeal of the EPO in Polypep tide Expression/ Genentech, that an 
invention will be sufficiently disclosed if at least one way is indicated which 
enables a person skilled in the art to carry it out. 155 In Biogen, Lord Hoffmann 
expressly rejected the interpretation of Polypeptide expression/Genentech given by 
Morritt L,J, concluding that the European case was merely applying the long 
established principle that the specification must enable the invention to be 
performed across its whole width. 156 The level of disclosure required thus depends 
on the types of claims being made. Where a principle of general application is 
disclosed it is appropriate to cast the claims in general terms. But where discrete 
methods or products are being claimed, there must be an enabling disclosure for 
each of these. Thus the patentee can legitimately make broad claims either because 
it is possible to show some common principle which enables all of them to be 
made or because no other way of achieving the same effect can be envisaged. 
Biogen failed on the latter basis. A common principle was disclosed, in that both 
HBcAg and HBsAg could have been made from the disclosure in Biogen 1. But 
Biogen failed because the results claimed in Biogen 1 could also be produced by 
means different from those disclosed by Biogen. Lord Hoffmann likened such 
claims to the Wright brothers, having discovered heavier than air flight, claiming a 
monopoly on all heavier than air flying machines. 
152 	Biogen v Medeva (1996) Unreported judgment of the House of Lords, opinion handed down on 
31 October 1996, at 20. 
153 	Ibid. 
154 	Molnlycice AB v Proctor and Gamble [1994] RPC 49. 
155 	Decision T292/85 [1989] OJEPO 275, at 264. 
156 	House of Lords opinion, at 21. 
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Where Biogen failed, Chiron succeeded,157 yet it is difficult to see how its 
claims were any less broad than a claim to all heavier than air flying machines. 
Note that the decision in Chiron was handed down after the Court of Appeal 
decision in Biogen, but before the House of Lords and thus some of the findings in 
Chiron should not be used as guidance for future cases. For instance, the claim in 
question in Chiron was also to a class of products, and Murex submitted that a 
claim of this nature will only be a claim to a single invention if it specifies a novel 
common feature (the common principle in Biogen). Chiron submitted that the test 
was much more simple: whether the invention of one product is the invention of 
the others. The Court, after reviewing the authorities, accepted Chiron's 
formulation, although conceding that if this test is satisfied the Murex test is also 
likely to be satisfied. The Court did not address the issue of whether the claims 
covered other ways which could have been envisaged for achieving that result. 
According to Chiron, the claim in issue related to the discovery of the 
Hepatitis C virus (HCV) and genome sequence, the invention being a chemical 
which contained the antigenic determinants of HCV to which antibodies would 
bind. 158 Murex argued that the claim was in fact to a group of chemicals which 
were chemically and biologically different from each other. The Court held that the 
importance of the discovery of the HCV genome was that it enabled the location of 
antigenic determinants within the protein expressed by the genome. The antigenic 
determinants were identified as a sequence of at least 10 amino acids to which a 
HCV antibody would bind. There was no common formula to identify these 
sequences of amino acids. Even so, the Court held that this was a claim to a single 
invention of antigenic determinants to HCV, since the invention of one is the 
invention of all. The invention in issue looks strikingly similar to the claimed 
invention in Biogen, which was held to be more than one invention. The Court in 
Chiron distinguished the two on the basis that the claim in Biogen was to a 
polypeptide displaying "HBV antigen specificity", whereas the claim in Chiron was 
to a chemical containing antigenic determinants. Since the claim in Biogen covered 
both HBsAg and HBcAg, which had different compositions and bound to different 
antibodies, it was held to be a claim to two inventions. Although the Court held in 
Chiron that the claim was to a single invention in both substance and form, it is 
difficult to see how the difference from the Biogen claim is anything but semantic. 
Twenty two percent of the genome for that particular strain of HCV in Chiron had 
157 	Chiron v Murex [1996] FSR 153 
158 	Ibid., at 183. 
213 
yet to be sequenced, and yet the claim was broad enough to cover all antigenic 
determinants, including those for which the DNA sequence had yet to be 
determined. It was also broad enough to cover antigenic determinants from other 
strains of HCV, the genomes of which had not been sequenced at all, and could 
contain substantial differences from the strain sequenced by Chiron. By casting the 
invention in the form of a chemical which contained the antigenic determinants of 
HCV, it may be that no other methods could be envisaged for achieving the result 
claimed, without making use of the invention. If this is the case then all that can be 
said about this requirement in English law is that clever drafting of patents will 
enable broad claims to be made. 
4.3 Application of European Case Law to Australian Legislation 
There are significant differences between the Australian and European 
legislation. In Australia, patents can be challenged in revocation proceedings on all 
of the grounds of: insufficiency, lack of definition, lack of clarity and ambiguity, 
and fair basing. In Murex v Chiron all of these grounds had been raised by Murex. 
A broad summary of the statement of claim and particulars is given below. 159 
4.3.1 Sufficiency s40(2)(a): 
Not only does the invention claim all strains of HCV, it includes other 
viruses which may or may not cause non-A Non-B hepatitis (NANBH), and which 
may not yet have been identified. Yet the only disclosure is to the cDNA sequence 
of part of the genome of one strain of HCV and the polypeptide sequence encoded 
by that cDNA sequence. Accordingly, the specification does not provide sufficient 
information to enable persons skilled in the art to identify and make the invention 
for those other strains and species of virus, or indeed for that part of the genome 
and polypeptide sequence yet to be determined in the identified strain. Further, 
insufficient information is given as to how to produce epitopes or antigenic 
determinants of HCV, how to determine whether they will be useful as diagnostic 
assays, and how to produce those assays. 
159 	I would like to thank Luigi Palombi of Banlci, Palombi, Haddock and Fiora for providing 
me with this information. 
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4.3.2 Definition s40(2)(b), clarity and ambiguity s40(3): 
A wide range of the terms used in the claims and specification are alleged to 
lack clarity and succinctness and to be ambiguous and uncertain. 
4.3.3 Fair basing s40(3): 
• Of the Australian patent on earlier patents: 
Earlier US patents were claimed by Chiron to give an earlier priority date to the 
Australian patent. Murex alleges that the Australian patent application is not 
fairly based on them. 
• Of the claims on the specification: 
The claims are too wide because they include other viruses and agents which 
may or may not cause NANBH. There is no support in the specification for 
such claims, or to claims including polynucleotides or polypeptides that do not 
comprise epitopes or antigenic determinants for HCV, or to kits, assays or 
methods for detecting HCV, or to vaccines for the treatment of HCV infection. 
In essence the arguments under each of these heads are the same as those 
used in the UK Chiron case: whether the claim to a chemical containing antigenic 
determinants for HCV was a claim to more than one invention, in which case it 
was neither supported by the description in the specification, nor did the 
specification sufficiently disclose the method for making the invention across the 
whole width of the claim. The Australian cases in which the interpretation of 
section 40 has been considered give nothing but the most general guidance as to 
how Burchett J might have undertaken his task in the Murex case. If his Honour 
had used a similar interpretation to that used in the UK case it would have given a 
signal that the Federal Court might not look unfavourably on broadly drafted 
patent claims in this area. Using the rationale of the House of Lords in Biogen, 
however, the claims made by Chiron would appear to be impermissibly broad. 
Without denying the necessity of providing appropriate protection to 
patentees, the deleterious consequences of upholding broadly drafted claims must 
also be recognised. Those effects could be far reaching and oppressive to 
researchers, competitors, service providers and consumers alike. Moreover, they 
could give fuel to those lobbying against patenting on ethical grounds, because the 
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breadth of such claims is tantamount to claiming ownership of the virus and its 
genome, the very things that those in favour of patenting argue are not within the 
ambit of the patent system. 
Lord Hoffmann justified his decision in Biogen on this basis: that further 
research and healthy competition should not be stifled by allowing the first person 
who has achieved a desirable goal to monopolise every other way of doing so. The 
difficulty with this decision, however, is that patent claims drafted appropriately 
may have little value. In the case of Biogen's invention, for example, all that Biogen 
had done was to solve a particular problem that stood in the way of achieving a 
known goal by means that were generally known, the inventive idea being in 
solving the problem. As such Biogen could only claim the means by which the 
problem was solved to achieve the goal. Once the problem was solved, the goal 
was achievable with or without that particular solution, and therefore if the patent 
was restricted to that particular solution it could easily be avoided by competitors. 
Conclusion 
Thia analysis has shown that not all of the inventions associated with 
human genetic research can be patented and that the existing patent system in 
Australia has considerable scope for regulating the extent of patenting in this area. 
The manner of manufacture test and associated case law exclusions, together with 
the novelty and inventive step requirements and the specification requirements in 
s40 provide a basis for enabling the courts and the Patent Office to exclude from 
patenting claims which are cast so broadly as to be tantamount to asserting 
ownership over entire genes and all subsequent uses of those genes. The lack of 
case law in Australia and the variability in interpretation of these requirements by 
different judges in the same courts in England mean that the precise parameters 
for this regulation remain to be determined. My submission is that because these 
parameters are presently uncertain the normal patenting criteria cannot be relied 
on to provide the only limitations on patenting of human genetic material. 
Therefore it is necessary to ensure that other more clearly defined limitations are 
also available. I argue in the next chapter that those limitations can be provided 
within the patent system. 
With regard to the normal patenting criteria, the manner of manufacture 
test ensures that patents are granted only for inventions that have industrial 
applicability, and together with the discovery exclusion, it prevents patent 
protection from being claimed too far upstream. DNA sequences of unknown 
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function lack the requisite applicability and naturally occurring sequences are 
discoveries par excellence. There is every justification for excluding these from the 
patent system. Although the statutory exclusion in s18(2) has little application, and 
the amendment to s18 proposed by the Australian Democrats is unlikely to be 
adopted by Parliament, the exclusions incorporated through s6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies present a real opportunity to exclude patents for inventions contrary to 
the public interest, and these provisions should be used accordingly. It can hardly 
be in the public interest for a single person to be able to exclude all others from all 
research involving a particular gene sequence. The difficulty will be in 
determining how far outside the true invention the patent should extend: too 
narrow and the patent will have little value; too broad and the effect will be 
equivalent to patenting all future use of the gene sequence. 
The parameters of the novelty, inventive step and disclosure requirements 
are exceedingly flexible, and the courts and the Patent Office must have guidance 
as to the appropriate extent of those parameters. I argue that there may be some 
justification for allowing a liberal interpretation. Broad protection is needed for 
upstream patents if they are to have any value, because it is too easy to invent 
around narrower claims. The deleterious effects of such broad claims, for example 
those including all the methods for producing a particular product, can be 
ameliorated if others are able to continue to work in the general area of the claims 
and can make downstream claims to patents for new products or processes within 
that general area. By this means downstream research will not be impeded, rather, 
there will be continuing incentive to do that research. In this respect, if a restrictive 
interpretation were given to the novelty and inventive step requirements, it would 
be more likely to deny patents to downstream inventors than to upstream 
inventors, because many more aspects of the invention would be already known 
or thought of. This is inappropriate, because downstream inventions are closer to 
the stage of clinical application and therefore they are likely to provide greater 
possible benefit to • the public. Nevertheless, there are some potential 
disadvantages with this suggestion: 
• Upstream patentees may claim broad patents and refuse to grant licences; 
• Licence fees may be set at unreasonably high levels, which could become 
excessive for later downstream users who may have to pay fees to a number of 
patent holders; 
• Owners of upstream patents who subsequently claim downstream patents in 
the same area may be able to extend artificially the life of their upstream 
patents. 
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Use of the compulsory licensing provision and establishment of guidelines for 
setting licence fees may do much to lessen these disadvantages, These provisions 
are discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
The settlement of the Murex v Chiron case out of court has done nothing to 
improve the certainty of the law. Indeed, it has sent a wave of disappointment 
through the patent law community. Moreover, it means that a patent which is now 
generally recognised as being invalid is being enforced.. Nothing can be done 
about this unless another party is willing to challenge the validity of the patent in 
fresh revocation proceedings. On the other hand, because there is general 
agreement that the patent would have been susceptible to revocation, this would 
indicate that similar patents may suffer the same fate. Whether this means that 
competitors will be more willing to bring revocation proceedings or that patentees 
will be more willing to grant licences to competitors to avoid the chance of 
revocation remains to be seen. With respect to the development of patent law, the 
former option is clearly more favourable, but in terms of commerce, the latter is 
more likely to eventuate. 
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CHAPTER 7: STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE: IS THERE A 
NEED FOR REFORM? 
Introduction 
Human genetic research will have an increasing effect on health care in 
Australia for many years to come as technologies for delivering diagnostic tests 
and therapeutic treatments improve and knowledge of genetic disease 
expands. 1 The biotechnology industry is a major player in human genetic 
research. It is a recognised fact that this industry protects its investment in 
research and development through patents. 2 I can see no reason why it should 
choose another source of protection for its investment in human genetic 
research. 
Inevitably, the effect of patenting of human genetic research will be felt 
within the health care system. It must be remembered, however, that the 
health care system has been exposed to the effect of patents in the 
pharmaceutical industry for some years, and this, together with an increasing 
requirement to justify its functioning in economic terms, means that economic 
considerations are not totally alien to it•3 Perhaps the effects of patenting will be 
more profoundly felt in academic institutions which, in the past, have been 
shielded from such commercial influences.4 The biotechnology industry itself 
is not immune from the patenting debate. Those companies which are focusing 
on sequencing the human genome would prefer patent protection to be as far 
upstream as possible, whereas those companies which are predominantly 
interested in developing diagnostic and therapeutic techniques prefer more 
downstream protection. 
One major assurance can be made about patenting of human genetic 
research - that DNA sequences of unknown function are not patentable. 5 In 
other respects, however, my analysis of the Australian patent legislation and 
case law has shown that the patentability of human genes and gene sequences 
1 	These issues were discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
2 	Relevant statistics are presented in the introduction to Chapter 5 
3 	See Chapter 5, at 3.1. 
4 	Chapter 5, part 2. 
5 	See the discussion in the introduction to Chapter 6. 
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has some uncertainties. 6 The way in which the patent legislation is currently 
interpreted by patent examiners indicates that, although there is provision in 
the Australian legislation to exclude from patenting some aspects of human 
genetic research and its applications in addition to gene sequences of unknown 
function, those provisions are not being used. It is far more likely that patent 
issues will be decided in this area on a case by case basis through consideration 
of the normal patenting criteria, principally novelty and inventive step, as well 
as the specification requirements. 
The main theme that I have tried to present in this thesis is that the 
debate should not be about whether human genetic material should be 
patented but about the boundaries within which the patent system should be 
allowed to function. The difficulties in this area are not with patenting genes 
and gene sequences per se but with broad upstream patents that include all the 
products and processes of a particular gene sequence or broad downstream 
patents that include all of the methods of producing a particular product. The 
novelty, inventive step and specification requirements in patent law provide 
means by which broad claims can be defeated, although the parameters within 
which they are to be applied have not yet been explored in Australia. In 
England these requirements have been decided on an ad hoc basis, with no 
clear guidelines developing from the cases. My submission is that we must look 
elsewhere to ensure that the detrimental effects of broad claims are minimised. 
There is justification for allowing broad upstream and downstream 
claims for genetic inventions. The unique features of genetic material that have 
been discussed in previous chapters require that claims extend outside the 
ambit of the invention if patents are to have any real value. I suggest that it is 
generally appropriate for the first invention in a particular area to be allowed 
broad coverage, provided that mechanisms are in place to allow others to work 
the invention in exchange for reasonable licence fees and provided that those 
other workers can acquire the benefits of more limited secondary patents. In 
some circumstances, however, it will not be in the public interest to allow 
broad patents, and in these cases it should be possible to challenge the validity 
of patents on the basis of the public interest. 
6 	See generally Chapters 2 and 6. 
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The patent system requires that the Patent Office gives the patentee the 
benefit of the doubt when the patentability of a given invention is open to 
question. 7 The rationale for this is that the validity of the patent can be 
challenged at any time during its 20 year life. The Patent Office then adapts its 
practice in accordance with judicial rulings. Although in principle sound, this 
system fails if there are insufficient challenges to the validity of patents in a 
given area. This is precisely the problem being encountered for biotechnology 
patents in Australia. There have been no cases in which judicial rulings have 
been made as to the patentability of genes and gene sequences. The Murex v 
Chiron case offered the first opportunity for such a ruling, but out of court 
settlement prevented this. Challenges to the validity of patents are generally 
made by competitors in Australia. 8 The public interest is of minor importance 
to the parties in such challenges, commercial success being the prime 
consideration. It is easy to see why parties to such litigation would be tempted 
to reach out of court settlements. Even if the public interest is put in issue by 
the parties, the judiciary has shown a reluctance to decide matters on the basis 
of ethics alone when there is no firm foundation for such considerations in 
law. 
The patent system can be changed, either by lobbying Parliament to 
modify the legislation or by bringing legal action in order to obtain a judicial 
ruling on the interpretation of the legislation. In proposing any solution to the 
patenting question it is essential to bear in mind the stance of the government 
on this issue and the influence of the international debate. Proposed solutions 
are only of value if there is a possibility that they will be implemented. The 
following statement is particularly pertinent: 
"it is in our national interest that we [inter alia] resist attempts to restrict patents in 
sensitive areas where we are proficient, particularly in the areas of computer 
programs, biotechnology, life forms and plant genetics. Restrictions on the patenting 
of inventions relating to higher non-human organisms and methods of medical 
treatment contained in the European Patent Convention can operate to the 
disadvantage of Australia which is a significant contributor to inventions . in this 
field. Australia should endeavour to exert diplomatic pressure to reduce the influence 
7 	See Chapter 2 at 3.6. 
8 	Note that this is not always the case in Europe: a range of interest groups opposed the 
Onco-mouse patent; Greenpeace opposed the Plant Genetic Systems patent and the 
European Greens challenged the H2-relaxin patent (see Chapter 6, section 1.3). 
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of these restrictions internationally and should be resistant to political pressure to 
introduce such restrictions in Australia." 9 
This statement is a good indicator of the federal government's position 
in relation to patenting of human genetic research. The government will be 
unwilling to impose restrictions which may impede Australia's contribution to 
the research effort unless there is adequate justification to do so. With this in 
mind, I will first assess the options for removing some aspects of human 
genetic research and its applications from the reach of the patent system and for 
giving them alternative sources of protection. It is my view that none of these 
options are appropriate at the present time. It is more appropriate to level the 
playing field of the existing patent system to better protect academic research 
and the public interest from its excesses. Options to do so will be discussed later 
in this chapter. The chapter ends with a series of key conclusions which follow 
from my analysis in the preceding chapters. 
Part 1: 	Specific Legislative Exclusions 
One of the immediate responses to the problems associated with 
patenting is to suggest ways in which certain aspects of human genetic research 
should be removed from the ambit of the patent system. Such suggestions 
imply that the patent system itself is inadequate and unable to meet the needs 
of new technology. There is no evidence that this is the case for other new 
technologies. Indeed, the patent system has proved itself to be quite capable of 
adapting. It may be an old system, but it does not necessarily follow that it is out 
of date. Human genetic technology is perhaps advancing at a greater rate than 
most other new technologies and the issues associated with it may be of more 
pressing concern. Whether this means that immediate action should be taken 
to rectify shortfalls in the patent system is an open question. What can be said 
with some certainty is that such action should be taken only if it will actually 
ameliorate the problems. 
1.1 All Biotechnological Inventions 
The removal of all biotechnology inventions from the ambit of the 
patent system has been advocated. But to do so without providing some other 
9 	Working Group of the Prime Minister's Science and Engineering Council, The Role of 
Intellectual Property in Innovation. Strategic Overview, Volume 2 (1993) AGPS, 64. 
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form of protection for investment is likely to be detrimental to health care in 
Australia. Companies are unlikely to be willing to invest in biotechnology 
research without some guarantee of recouping that investment. One of the 
problems with this particular type of research is that the initial phase of 
identifying and sequencing genes is especially cost and labour intensive. Once a 
gene has been identified and its function determined, competitors can adopt the 
benefits of that knowledge unless it is either kept secret or protected by a patent-
or by some other form of protection. Of the alternatives suggested below in Part 
2, it is difficult to see how any would provide a better balance than that 
currently available through the patent system. 
1.2 Gene Sequences of Unknown Function 
Accepting that it is inappropriate to deny protection to all forms of 
biotechnology inventions (unless a better system of protection is introduced), 
there may still be specific areas that should be excluded. The patent claims that 
elicited most concern throughout the world were the NIH claims to DNA 
fragments of unknown function (ESTs). The fears raised by those claims are 
illusory. It is most doubtful that ESTs or other sequences of unknown function 
would be patentable in Australia, or in any other jurisdiction. Indeed, the 
argument that gene sequences are pre-patentable until function is ascribed is 
sound. The patent system as it stands accommodates this argument by requiring 
that the invention is industrially useful (a manner of manufacture in 
Australia), novel and non-obvious. 
1.3 Gene Sequences of Known Function 
There are obvious problems to society with patent claims to particular 
genes both for moral reasons and because patents could effectively exclude all 
future use of those genes by competitors. This may be detrimental to the health 
care system because it could impede the production of diagnostic tests and 
therapeutic treatments for particular genetic diseases. Companies will be likely 
to target genes which are responsible for the most prevalent genetic diseases 
because there the economic rewards will be greatest. Yet these are the same 
diseases for which there is the greatest need for medical intervention. A 
framework should be put in place to encourage individuals to carry out 
research on these genes, but at the same time it should not exclude other 
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individuals from that research. One possible option is the exclusion of genes 
and gene sequences from the ambit of patent law. 
Some English cases indicate that patentees are willing to accept that gene 
sequences, even when they have known function, are unpatentable 
discoveries.lo But given that novelty and inventive step can still reside in the 
discovery, very little ground is actually being conceded. 11 The only things that 
are prevented are claims to inventive methods using the discovery that are cast 
in such broad terms as to become, in effect, claims to the discovery itself. 
Provisions of this type may provide a check on broad claims which attempt to 
exclude all subsequent use of a particular gene or gene sequence. They will only 
be of practical value, however, if guidelines can be prepared for Patent Office 
examiners as to the acceptable breadth of patent claims in this area. Unless this 
can be done, judicial consideration will be required of the breadth of claims 
made in the patent on a case by case basis. This is both costly and time 
consuming. Patentees will be encouraged to cast their claims as broadly as 
possible, and competitors may decide to accept broad claims in return for 
suitable licensing arrangements. 
The amendment to the Patents Act 1990 proposed by the Australian 
Democrats seeks to remove naturally occurring genes and gene sequences from 
the ambit of the patent system. 12 If this amendment were interpreted as 
denying patent protection for all genes and gene sequences, inventors in the 
area would have to rely on patents claiming protection for processes using the 
genes and gene sequences or products resulting from their use, which appears 
to be the position in England. On its face, this form of protection would be 
narrower than patents on the genes themselves and there may be a greater 
chance that such claims would be held to lack novelty and inventive step. 
Much would depend on the extent to which the Patent Office and judiciary 
would allow patent claims to extend outside the scope of the invention, and 
whether novelty and inventive step could reside in the discovery from which 
the invention arose, as in England. 
10 	See particularly Chiron Corp v Murex Diagnostics Ltd(No. 12) [1996] FSR 153. 
11 	See Chapter 6 at 1.3.1. 
12 	See Chapter 6 at 1.2.3. 
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The more likely interpretation of the Democrats' provision is that it 
would be strictly applied, only preventing the patenting of genes and gene 
sequences in their natural state. It is generally recognised that exceptions to 
patenting should be given a narrow reading. Given the current state of gene 
technology, any gene or gene sequence would have to be isolated and capable of 
production in its recombinant state to be industrially useful and therefore 
patentable. As such it would not run foul of the first two parts of the 
Democrats' amendment. The third part excludes the description of the base 
sequence of the naturally occurring gene or gene sequence. If the base sequence 
is the same for the gene in its natural and recombinant state then arguably the 
sequence could not be claimed. Since recombinant genes are generally produced 
as cDNA copies of mRNA, however, the base sequences will not be the same as 
for their naturally occurring counterparts. Hence such claims will not fail on 
the basis that they are discoveries or that they lack novelty. 
Existing patent legislation probably already prevents the patenting of 
naturally occurring genes and gene sequences because they are discoveries, 
although the line between discoveries and inventions is very blurred in this 
area. 13 The Patent Office presently accepts claims to gene sequences, but only in 
their isolated or recombinant state. The Patent Office would, of course, have to 
change this practice if the courts decide otherwise or if the legislation was 
amended. It would take an amendment of the type proposed by Senator Coulter 
in 1990, which included in its prohibition from patenting "a gene or genes, 
whether derived from cells or chemically synthesised" or a judicial ruling 
expressed in similar terms to have any real effect on current Patent Office 
practice. The desirability of such a broad prohibition would have to be carefully 
weighed. It may be appropriate to exclude some, but not all genes, the 
appropriate focus being what is in the public interest. The issue of patenting in 
the public interest is more fully explored in Part 4. 
1.4 Methods of Medical Treatment 
Following the decisions of Gummow j and the majority of the Full 
Federal Court in the Rescare case,14 methods of medical treatment are not 
13 	The discovery/invention dichotomy is discussed in Chapter 6 at 1.1.1. 
14 	Rescare Ltd v Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd (1993) 25 IPR 119; Anaesthetic Supplies Pty 
Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 28 IPR 383. See Chapter 6 at 1.1.3. 
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excluded from patenting in Australia on the basis that they are not manners of 
manufacture. This is inconsistent with Europe, where the exclusion has 
legislative force,15 and disregards the provision in the GATT TRIPS Agreement 
which specifically allows for such exclusions. Given that products used in 
medical treatment can be patented, it is difficult to see why the methods 
themselves should be singled out for exclusion, particularly when the product 
claims can be drafted in such a way as to be tantamount to claiming the method 
as well. Unless the legislature is prepared to exclude both the products and the 
processes involved in medical treatment, and this must be seen as being highly 
unlikely and not necessarily desirable, I suggest that there is little justification 
for excluding only the processes. 
Part 2: 	Other Forms of Protection 
Suggestions have been made in the literature for a number of forms of 
protection outside the patent system which might better achieve a balance 
between the conflicting interests of society, academic researchers and the health 
care system on the one hand and the biotechnology industry on the other (if 
indeed such a conflict exists and if the camps are so obviously in opposition). 
The main focus of attention has been in providing for the protection of 
sequence information. Forms of protection that have been suggested include: 
2.1 Copyright Protection 
The fact that the information in gene sequences can be recorded in a 
simple sequence of letters (for example, ATTTCCGGAA, etc.) has led some to 
suggest that copyright may be a more appropriate form of protection than 
patenting. This option was raised some years agol§ and has recently been 
revived in Britain following the new edition of The Modern Law of Copyright 
and Design. 17 It has been suggested that the sequence of letters constitutes a 
15 	Discussed in Chapter 6 at 1.3.2. 
16 	For example, Burk, D., "Copyrightability of Recombinant DNA Sequences" (1989) 29 
furimetrics Journal 469. 
17 	By Laddie, H., P. Prescott and M. Vitoria, (1994) Butterworths, London, second edition. 
The issues raised in the book have been discussed in two recent articles: Speck, A., 
"Genetic Copyright" (1995) (5) EIPR 171; Kamen, G.W.G., "Protection of Results of 
Genetic Research by Copyright or Design Rights?" (1995) (8) EIPR 355. 
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literary work and that the use of this published sequence to make a DNA 
sequence or protein constitutes infringement. Copyright lawyers would appear 
to be willing to accept that the sequence of letters may be a literary work, but are 
less willing to concede that the use outlined above does in fact constitute 
infringement. 18 Copyright protection only extends to protection of the 
originality of the work, and the only things that could be described as original 
are the elucidation of the sequence and its transcription into understandable 
language. Accordingly, it has been argued that the DNA sequence is not part of 
the original work and copyright will only protect against copying the sequence 
of letters and not copying of the DNA sequence itself. 19 As such, copyright does 
not provide an appropriate form of protection. 
The are other policy reasons why the copyright alternative is not 
acceptable. In particular the length of copyright protection, the life time of the 
author plus fifty years, is far longer than what is reasonably required. 
2.2 Sequence Rights 
Some people, including Luigi Palombi who was the solicitor for Murex 
in the Murex v Chiron case, have suggested that a new form of protection 
should be developed which would provide certain rights over particular gene 
sequences.20 Those rights would not be akin to ownership, but would provide 
acknowledgment and remuneration for valuable work. 
The state of play has changed considerably since those suggestions were 
made. It has recently been agreed within the community of scientists who 
contribute to the human genome project that all sequence data should be 
released as rapidly as possible onto a publicly accessible database.21 In coming to 
these agreements the parties have effectively given up any opportunity to claim 
rights to those sequences. Claims to genes or gene sequences must therefore 
now include information as to a new method of sequencing a particular 
sequence or as to its function, since otherwise they will not possess any of the 
18 	Ibid. 
19 	Ibid. 
20 	Personal communication with Luigi Palombi of Banki, Palombi, Haddock and Fiora, 23 
July 1996. 
21 	See Chapter 5 at 2.2.3. 
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requisite novelty or inventive step. Now that DNA sequences are publicly 
accessible, it would be most inappropriate to provide an additional form of 
protection. 
2.3 A New Biopatenting System 
One of the other, more broadly ranging reforms that has been suggested 
is the creation of an entirely new system for the protection of biotechnology 
inventions. Thomson, for example, has proposed such a system on the basis 
that the patent system has inadequacies and none of the other existing systems 
provide a suitable alternative. 22 Her system would create the same rights in the 
patentee as the patent system does, namely the exclusive right to exploit the 
invention and to licence others to exploit it. It could include staged forms of 
protection to take account of differences between improvement patents and 
patents for new inventions. 23 The biopatent system would give three different 
types of protection for products, processes and products from processes. One of 
the more radical changes that Thomson has proposed is the possibility of a one-
off payment to the patentee by the government in return for disclosure and 
tendering of the invention by the government to biotechnology companies. 
She has also included mechanisms for clarifying the novelty and inventive 
step requirements. 
Although such proposals are not without merit, I think that it is highly 
unlikely that government will have the motivation to provide such a system 
unless the patent system is seen as being totally inadequate. There may be some 
problems with the patent system in its present form, but it is certainly not 
failing completely. Moreover, I doubt that Thomson's biopatenting system 
offers sufficiently radical changes to justify its implementation. Slight 
modifications to the existing patent system may provide many of the same 
features. 
22 	Thomson, J.A., Biopatenting the Splice of Life: A Consideration of the Interface between 
Biotechnological Inventions and Patent Law (1994) Ph.D. Thesis, University of Western 
Australia, Chapter 10. 
23 	Ibid., at 408. 
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Part 3: 	Ameliorating the Effect on Academic Science 
Academic researchers will inevitably feel the effects of the patent system 
in the future, if indeed they have not done so already. From one side, funding 
agencies are likely to pressure them to patent inventions arising out of their 
work and transfer technology to industry. And from the other side, scientists 
may be exposed to infringement proceedings or demands for royalty payments 
or licence fees for the use of patented material. If we continue to value this type 
of research then it is necessary to provide some sort of shield from the potential 
detriment that patenting may create. 
3.1 Grace Period 
One of the difficulties that patenting creates for researchers is that they 
cannot publish research results as early as they would otherwise do because 
publication may destroy the novelty of an invention arising out of their 
research. In many circumstances, material will be ready for publication some 
time before it is in patentable form. Since the sharing of the results of research 
through publication in peer-reviewed journals is a requisite component of the 
culture of science, any restrictions on the freedom to publish are undesirable. If 
the patenting option is to be accepted by academic researchers a mechanism 
must be put in place to minimise any restrictions on the freedom to publish. 
In the USA, novelty is not measured at the time that the patent 
application is submitted but one year prior to claiming. This one year "grace 
period" enables researchers to publish their research results up to one year 
before submitting the patent application without risking loss to novelty. 
Further, and as a necessary corollary to this requirement, it is the first to invent 
and not the first to claim who takes priority. The one year grace period is one 
way of reconciling the conflicting goals of academia and the patent system 
because it allows scientists to publish in a timely fashion and to continue to 
refine the research results in such a way as to be able to claim inventor's rights 
up to one year later. Joseph Straus, who chairs the HUGO Intellectual Property 
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sub-committee has strongly endorsed world-wide adoption of the grace period 
provision. 24 
In Australia, two advantages akin to the one year grace period are already 
available in existing legislation. First, in determining novelty and inventive 
step, section 24 of the Patents Act 1990 provides that validity of a patent is not 
affected by publications or use in certain prescribed circumstances. 25 This 
provision is more limited than the US grace period, both in extent and 
duration. Nevertheless, it does provide the inventor with some capacity to 
discuss research results in public before submitting a patent application. 
Secondly, section 38 of the Patents Act 1990 allows for completed applications to 
be associated with provisional applications at any time during the prescribed 
period of 12 months. 26 Where this is the case, the complete application acquires 
the priority date of the provisional application. The provisional application is 
required only to describe generally the nature of the invention. 27 The priority 
date of the provisional application can be claimed provided that the complete 
application is fairly based on the provisional application. By these means the 
inventor can submit a general overview of the invention to the Patent Office 
and then is free to publish the invention prior to submitting the more detailed 
claims and specification. These two provisions may provide sufficiently similar 
advantages to the US grace period that no changes to the Australia patent 
system are required in this respect. 
24 	See, for example, Straus, J., "Intellectual Property Issues in Genomic Research" (1996) 3(3) 
Genome Digest 1. Professor Straus strongly affirmed this view at the recent Genome 
Summit of the Human Genome Organisation (1996) 16-18 October, Canberra. 
25 The circumstances that are prescribed are set out in the Patents Regulations 1991, 
regulation 2.2(2). They include (a) showing or using the invention at recognised 
exhibitions, (b) publication of the invention at recognised exhibitions, (c) publication of 
the invention in papers read before learned societies or published by or on behalf of 
learned societies and (d) working in public of the invention within 12 months of the 
priority date for reasonable trial of the nature of the invention requires this. Regulation 
2.3 provides that the prescribed period for (a), (b) and (c) is 6 months, and 12 months for 
(d). 
26 	Patents Regulations 1991, regulation 3.10. 
27 	See Chapter 2 at 4.2.3. 
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3.2 Exemption from Patent Infringement for Academic Research 
According to section 13(1)Patents Act 1990, 
"... a patent gives the patentee the exclusive rights, during the term of the patent, to 
exploit the invention and to authorise another person to exploit the invention." 
The word "exploit" is defined in Schedule 1: 
"in relation to an invention, includes: 
( a ) 	where the invention is a product - make, hire, sell or otherwise dispose of 
the product, offer to make, sell, hire or otherwise dispose of it, use or import it, or 
keep it for the purpose of doing any of those things; or 
(b) 	where the invention is a method or process - use the method or process or do 
any act mentioned in paragraph (a) in respect of a product resulting from such use;" 
The patent will be infringed whenever a person without licence does an 
act in relation to the patent which only the patentee or licensee has the 
exclusive right to do through section 13. Accordingly, pure research could be 
considered to be exploitation and as such it would be susceptible to 
infringement proceedings through section 120. There is no provision for 
exemptions from infringement for acts done for non-commercial research 
purposes under existing Australian legislation, and neither the Patent 
Regulations 1991 nor the Practice Notes 1991 provide guidance as to the extent 
to which acts of this type constitute infringement. Furthermore, there has been 
no judicial consideration in Australia of the extent to which research is exempt 
from infringement proceedings. It has for some time been accepted in the case 
law in other jurisdictions, however, that where acts are done solely for the 
purpose of bona fide experiments they will not constitute infringement. 28 
In Europe, the European Patent Convention provides express exemption 
from infringement for experimental purposes, 29 and in the USA, a case law 
defence of experimental exemption from liability is also available against patent 
infringement. Until recently, the US exemption has been read narrowly.30 
28 	See, for example, Frearson v Loe (1878) 9 ChD 48. 
29 	For example, see section 60(5)(b) Patents Act 1977 (UK). 
30 	For example in Roche Products Inc v Bolar Pharmaceutical Co 733 F 2d (1984) the court 
characterised the exemption as being truly narrow. 
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Eisenberg has suggested that there is some indication in more recent cases of a 
willingness to extend the ambit of the defence. 31 
Presently there is very little indication that patentees are generally 
• enforcing their patent rights against academic researchers. If they were to do so 
in any systematic way, much of the research conducted in the academic arena 
could at the very least become more expensive through payment of licence fees 
and more time consuming through licence applications. At the worst, some 
research may actually be prevented if licensing was refused by the patentee. For 
such reasons, there is some justification for an explicit research exemption in 
the patenting legislation to ensure that research having no commercial 
implications is not impeded. 
Many of the potential hardships to scientists created by the patent system 
could be softened if this defence was more clearly stated in Australia and 
elsewhere, and even given statutory recognition. On the one hand, it may be 
appropriate to allow all forms of basic research exemption from liability. On the 
other hand, however, where research has an ultimate commercial purpose 
there may be legitimate reasons for insisting on enforcement of patent rights. 
The issue then becomes how far downstream must the commercial purpose be 
realisable. It was held in a New Zealand case that field trials of a herbicide were 
a stepping stone to a full commercial launch and hence constituted 
in f r ingement. 32 On this basis, clinical trials for gene therapy or genetic 
screening tests could be infringing acts. It could be argued even more broadly 
that all human genetic research has an ultimate commercial purpose. 
Difficulties will inevitably arise in setting the limits on the types of research 
that have no commercial implications. It should also be pointed out that the 
commercial applicability requirement of some inventions lies in their use as 
research tools. Eisenberg has pointed out that it is not in the public interest for 
research exemptions to be claimed against these types of inventions, because to 
do otherwise would defeat the purpose of granting a patent. 33 Any provision 
31 	Eisenberg, R.S., "Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental 
Use (1989) 56 University of Chicago Law Review 1017, at 1018. 
32 	Monsanto Co v Stauffer Chemical Co (NZ) [1984] FSR 559. 
33 	Eisenberg, R.S., "Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental 
Use" (1989) 56 University of Chicago Law Review 1017, at 1078. 
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allowing for exemption from infringement will require very careful 
formulation. 
3.3 Release of Sequence Information and Broad Patent Claims 
By the year 2005 it appears likely that the entire sequence of the human 
genome will be available on the Internet. Release of sequence information into 
the public domain will ensure that patents cannot be claimed for DNA 
sequences of unknown function because they will lack the requisite novelty, as 
well as commercial applicability. The release of sequence information may also 
have an effect on more downstream claims to patents for genes and gene 
sequences of known function, although the House of Lords decision in Asahi 
Kasei Kogyo KK's Application 34 makes it clear that in that jurisdiction an 
invention will not lose its novelty merely because its formula is already known 
since the method of making it must also have been made available to the 
public. It must be remembered, however, that the methods of making 
particular gene sequences are now fairly routine. As such, the novelty and 
inventive step requirements may be denied satisfaction if both the method of 
making the sequence and the description of the sequence are known. Where 
this is the case, the novelty and inventive step requirements would have to 
reside in the use of the sequence, either in the form of a particular product or a 
particular process. This will considerably decrease the scope of patent claims 
because it will be outside the ambit of the invention to claim all subsequent use 
of a particular gene. 
This valuable contribution of scientists to the public domain should not 
be underestimated, even though it is not strictly necessary in terms of patent 
law, since DNA sequences of unknown function are unpatentable. Its primary 
benefit is that it may renew public faith in scientists as working for the public 
good rather than for their own gain. It may also curtail speculative patent 
claims to gene sequences encompassing all future uses. If the value of this 
offering is to be secured, it is vital that patent examiners vigilantly monitor the 
ambit of patent claims. In this respect Australian legislation is much more 
satisfactory than existing European legislation because it enables challenges to 
be made to broad patent claims at the opposition and revocation stages on the 
34 
	
[1991] RPC 485. 
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basis that they are not fairly based on the description of the invention in the 
specification. 35 
In interpreting the specification provisions and other patenting 
requirements, however, it is important that the Patent Office and the courts 
should not restrict patent claims to such an extent that they become valueless. 
In this regard, it may be appropriate for these bodies to allow claims to extend 
outside the true limits of the invention, particularly where the invention is a 
new product or process. The detrimental effect on future research in the general 
area of the claims can be ameliorated first by allowing new and subsequent uses 
of previously claimed inventions to be patented, provided that this does not 
enable patentees to artificially extend the life of exhausted patents; secondly, by 
allowing compulsory licensing of certain patents; and thirdly, by preventing 
anti-competitive licensing agreements through Part IV of the Trade Practices 
Act 1974 (Cth).36 
Part 4: 	Patenting in the Public Interest 
4.1 A Morality Clause 
The European Patent Convention and mirror State legislation provide 
the only statutory recognition of the need to address morality issues in the 
patenting of some inventions. 37 Provisions of this nature may be justified 
solely on the basis of public concern about patenting in some areas and the need 
to provide a forum to debate such issues. On the other hand, patent examiners 
have expressed concern that they simply do not have the expertise to 
adequately assess ethical concerns. 38 What, then, is the appropriate forum? 
Clearly the ethical appropriateness of the research leading towards the 
invention and the application of the inventive idea into practice are matters for 
government regulation, either in the form of research guidelines or legislation. 
What of patenting such inventions? Are we to assume that if the research and 
practice themselves are ethically appropriate then so too is their patenting? 
35 	See Chapter 2 at 4.2.3 and Chapter 6 at 4.2 and 4.3. 
36 	The compulsory licensing and TPA options are discussed below at 4.2 and 4.3. 
37 	Discussed in Chapter 6 at 1.3.3. 
38 	One famous comment rumoured to be made by an examiner at the European Patent Office 
was that they wished for a t-ransgenic cat to eat the transgenic mouse. 
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With respect to patenting of genes there are competing ethical 
considerations focusing on the desire to alleviate suffering versus the desire to 
keep things that are common to all mankind as part of the common heritage of 
mankind. Clearly no one person should be able to assert ownership rights over 
the entire human genome. It is quite another matter whether an individual 
can claim an exclusive right to exploit a particular gene or gene product for a 
limited time. In many circumstances it may be ethically appropriate to grant 
such exclusive rights if it ensures that research of this nature continues. In 
others, however, particularly where exploitation rights are being claimed to 
genes which play a role in common and/or severe diseases, it may be more 
appropriate to retain open access. In these circumstances value judgments must 
be made on a case by case basis. It may be appropriate for Parliament to provide 
guidance as to the factors that should be taken into account in reaching such 
decisions, but ultimately it will be for the courts or the Patent Office to address 
these issues. This could be effected in one of a number of ways: 
• through compulsory licence applications in section 133 of the Patents Act 
1990 (Cth); 
• through applications under Part IV of the TPA to have anti-competitive 
licensing conditions set aside; or 
• through revocation proceedings based on the "general inconvenience" 
provision from the Statute of Monopolies. 
Each of these options is discussed below. 
4.2 Compulsory Licensing in the Public Interest 
At present the compulsory licensing provisions in the Australian Patents 
Act are rarely used.39 In some circumstances it may be appropriate for these 
provisions to be given greater force. The hepatitis C scenario is an obvious 
example of a situation where it would be in the public interest to encourage 
further research into the production of diagnostic tests and vaccines. 40 It may 
well be in the public interest for compulsory licences to be granted to enable 
extensive research into some of the more prevalent genetic diseases and 
diseases with genetic components. Potential licensees should be encouraged to 
39 	See Chapter 2 at 2.1.1. 
40 	The hepatitis C scenario was discussed more fully in Chapter 5 at 3.3.2. 
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apply to the courts for compulsory licences in such areas of research whenever 
patentees express reluctance to provide licences voluntarily. 
The combination of broad primary patents, narrower secondary claims 
and compulsory licensing will enable those who are successful in the early 
research and development phase to be rewarded for their inventiveness, but 
not at the risk of closing off the opportunity for subsequent research to others. It 
should be noted, however, that this may be detrimental to downstream 
licensees who will be required to pay licence fees to a chain of inventors as 
initial inventions become more refined and sophisticated through subsequent 
inventions in the same area. 
4.3 Anti-Competitive Licensing and the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) 
The aim of Part IV of the TPA is to prevent abuse of market power, 
although section 51(3) gives patentees some protection from the full rigours of 
Part IV.41 It is not in the public interest for patentees to be allowed to impose 
licence conditions that are overly harsh on licensees. In particular, it is 
inappropriate for patentees to set licence fees at such high levels that they have 
the effect of excluding potential licensees who have the ability to make valuable 
contributions to the research effort. It would seem to be more appropriate in 
these circumstances that the Patent Office sets, collects and distributes licence 
fees. Further, the full force of Part IV of the TPA should be available against 
licensing agreements that are not in the public interest. This may require 
removal of s51(3). The extent to which s51(3) prevents challenges to licence 
agreements which are not in the public interest must be examined. 
4.4 Defending the Public Interest 
The fact that the whole of section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies is 
incorporated into the Patents Act 199042 means that the focus of inquiry into 
the validity of a particular patent does not rest solely on satisfaction of the 
patenting criteria. An investigation can also be made into the appropriateness 
of granting monopoly rights for that particular invention. There is no reason 
why the general inconvenience exclusion cannot be raised against the patenting 
41 	Discussed in Chapter 2 at 2.1.2. 
42 	See Chapter 6 at 1.2.2. 
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of certain genes. The benefit of inquiries of this nature is that patent examiners 
and judges need not base their assessments of the merits of the arguments 
solely on ethical considerations. Some of the issues that should be taken into 
account in determining the balance between providing the patent incentive 
against the incentive of free access may include: 
• present costs to society of the disease in question; 
• the likelihood that treatments will eventuate more rapidly if more research 
teams are working in the area; 
• the amount of time and effort already dedicated to the research effort both by 
the patentee and by competitors; and 
• charges made by the patentee for use of the invention. 
The Patents Act gives jurisdiction to make challenges to the validity of 
patents based on the general inconvenience provision at both the opposition 
and revocation stages. The issue remains as to who might bring such 
challenges. It is doubtful that it would necessarily be in competitors' interests to 
focus on this public interest provision. 43 Although public interest bodies have 
not made challenges to patents in Australia in the past, there is nothing 
preventing them from doing so. Sections 59 and 138 allow the Minister "or any 
other person" to apply for opposition or revocation of a patent. As such, there is 
no requirement that the person making the challenge has an interest greater 
than an ordinary member of the public. 44 
The problem with any public interest litigation is its cost. Even if the 
challenge is successful and costs are awarded against the patentee, full recovery 
is unlikely. Most other public interest litigation has the advantage of the 
possibility of a damages award. The only thing to be gained by challenging the 
validity of a patent is that it will be revoked, unless an account of profits is 
ordered. On the other hand, it will only take one or two successful challenges 
on the basis of general inconvenience for the Patent Office to be required to 
modify its practice and make specific provision for consideration of the public 
interest. This feature of the Australian patent system makes it worthwhile to 
43 	Note that one of the grounds for revocation raised by Murex in the Murex v Chiron case 
was that the invention was generally inconvenient. 
44 	As required when standing is limited to "interested persons": Boyce v Paddington Borough 
Council [1903] 1 Ch 109; Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v Commonwealth (1980) 
146 CLR 493. 
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bring a small number of test cases before the courts. Public interest bodies such 
as the Environmental Defenders Offices may well be the appropriate parties to 
initiate such actions. They should be encouraged to look into the possibility of 
constructing challenges to patents for inventions which have clear public 
interest components to them. Funding could be sought from a number of 
arenas, including medical, scientific and government sources. 
4.5 Compulsory Royalty Payments for Research Subjects 
The most clear connection between the issues associated with the science 
of genetic research and those associated with the patenting of that research is in 
the area of access to human tissue. The law in this area is by no means clear in 
that it has yet to be determined whether use of the tissue should be contingent 
on informed consent to that specific use by the donor. 45 It does seem unfair that 
the only person who is prevented from making a profit out of the use of 
human tissue is the donor. For this reason it may be appropriate to provide for 
royalty payments to donors in certain prescribed circumstances. In particular, 
where that tissue is in some way unique to that donor (as was the case for John 
Moore46) and the patentable invention would not have been achieved without 
that tissue, there is every reason to provide the donor with a share of the profits 
from the patent. Where tissue is donated by indigenous groups the provisions 
of the Biodiversity Convention 47 should apply. It is appropriate that 
indigenous groups are provided with some remuneration, whether it be 
through monetary reward or more indirect reward in the form of improved 
medical and other services. At the same time, it is most important that such 
remuneration is not seen as a form of bribery, used to ensure cooperation. 
Conclusions 
My aim in this chapter has been to synthesise my analyses in each of the 
preceding chapters and to suggest means by which shortfalls in the existing 
patent system with regard to patenting of human genetic material can be 
rectified. Fourteen key conclusions flow from this synthesis: 
45 	Discussed in Chapter 4 at 2.4.1. 
46 	See Moore v Regents of the University of California 51 Ca1.3d 120 (1990). 
47 	Discussed in Chapter 5 at 1.4. 
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1. Inventions arising out of human genetic research should continue to be 
patented. 
• The patent system plays an important role in encouraging investment in 
research and practice of human genetics. There is no justification for 
removing human genetic research and its applications from the ambit of the 
patent system. 
2. No specific exclusions related to genes, gene sequences or methods of medical 
treatment should be inserted into the Patents Act 1990. 
• Gene sequences of unknown function are not patentable, nor are naturally 
occurring genes or gene sequences. These exclusions are adequate. There is 
little justification for excluding methods of medical treatment without also 
excluding products used in medical treatment. 
3. It does not appear appropriate at present to provide additional protection for 
investment in human genetic research outside the existing patent system. 
• The suggested alternative forms of protection either do not apply, or 
provide rights hl excess of requirements, or provide for a system that would 
be costly to implement and may provide small benefit over the existing 
patent system. 
4. The adequacy of the provisions in the Australian legislation that allow for 
publications or use in certain prescribed circumstances and for complete 
applications to be associated with provisional applications should be compared 
with the provision in US legislation for a one year grace period. 
• A provision which enables scientists to publish their research results before 
submitting detailed patent applications will aid in maintaining the culture 
of science. 
5. Provision should be made for an express research exemption in the Patents 
Act 1990. 
• Arguably the use of a patented invention for non-commercial research 
purposes is not exploitation of the invention and therefore does not 
constitute infringement. It would seem far more satisfactory, however, that 
if research exemptions are deemed appropriate in Australia, a specific 
provision is provided in the Patents Act to facilitate their application. 
6. Patent examiners should be encouraged to be vigilant in ensuring that patent 
claims do not extend too far beyond the true extent of the invention. 
• Whilst the patentee needs to acquire protection in an area greater than the 
extent of the invention because of the degeneracy of the genetic code, it 
would be inappropriate to allow the patentee to exclude all future use of a 
particular gene. 
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7. Second and subsequent licences should be allowed in the general area of a 
primary patent. 
• Incentives should be available to both upstream and downstream inventors 
to ensure that research tools evolve into diagnostic and therapeutic 
treatments. 
8. A morality clause is not recommended. 
• Patent examiners lack expertise in assessing ethical issues. As such they are 
unlikely to be willing to make use of the provision in all but the most 
exceptional circumstances, and when they do so they likely to make 
assessments on the basis of set criteria rather than taking a flexible approach. 
On this basis, the value of such a provision is questionable. 
9. The possibility that the compulsory licensing provisions should be relaxed 
should be explored. 
• It is undesirable in areas that will lead to improvements in public health 
that a patentee should be allowed to close off whole areas of research. 
Compulsory licensing would enable widespread research into prevalent 
genetic diseases or diseases with genetic components. This may be necessary 
when the patentee is unable or unwilling to exploit the patent with all due 
haste, and is reluctant to come to voluntary licensing arrangements. 
10. Licence fees should be set and monitored by the Patent Office. 
• Every effort should be made in the area of human genetic research to ensure 
that products reach the stage of clinical application. It is inappropriate that 
patentees should be allowed to impose licence conditions that are excessive 
or onerous. 
11. The need for removal of section 51(3) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) 
should be examined. 
• With or without s51(3), patent licences will not breach Part IV of the TPA if 
the public benefit in allowing the patentee to recover the costs of his or her 
invention outweighs the anti-competitive effect of the licence. Once this is 
recognised, the need for s51(3) is questionable. 
12. Testing in the courts of the ambit of the general inconvenience exclusion 
from patenting is recommended. 
• Bodies such as the Environmental Defenders Offices should look into the 
possibility of bringing opposition or revocation proceedings on this basis. 
The ideal test case would require that the patentee was only narrowly ahead 
of competitors in creating the invention, made broad claims in the patent 
and imposed onerous licence conditions where it was clearly in the public 
interest for further downstream research to be done using the invention. 
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13. Where a person donates unique tissue that is essential to the development 
of the patentable invention they should be given a share of the patent profits. 
• Bearing in mind that the patent is granted for the invention and not for the 
tangible object that is used in creating the invention, there may be 
circumstances in which it is appropriate for the donor of the tissue to be 
given just reward. 
14. Indigenous groups should share in the profits of inventions derived from 
use of their donated tissues. 
• Where this is the case, consent requirements must be very carefully framed 
so that true consent is given, with not even the slightest hint of compulsion 
to donate tissue. 
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